Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

We talked about this and I think there was a large agreement that this would be a good choice both in terms of the ideal system for Ontario and in terms of the pragmatics of the system actually being adapted. MMP offers a more proportional system of representation while still allowing for regional representation, an important thing to have in a space as big and socio-environmentally diverse as Ontario. I am curious to see what those at the Public Issues Forum have to say about this.
Of course whether or not this gets buried in the media or in politics is another story. However, there is currently an ammendment to the Election Act in committee right now which, if I am sifting through the legal mumbo jumbo correctly, adds:
"New section 114.1 authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to implement public education and information programs and provide the public with information about the electoral process. Also included is a requirement for a program of public education in preparation for the referendum that is to take place in October, 2007 under the Electoral System Referendum Act, 2007." http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee_business.do?BusinessType=Bill&BillID=1660&locale=en&CommID=141. If that is the case and it goes through then I would say that is certainly a positive, regardless of whether or not you like the CA's reccomendation, in that education can be seen as dealing with the criticisms that surrounded BC's referendum. However, that there was no real education campaign on the CA process itself might render such an effort, if it indeed happens, too little too late.
I am curious to hear everyone's thoughts and to hear what people think at the Public Issues Forum.

The Centre for Ethics announces a Public Issues Forum on the recommendations of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Our speakers will examine normative considerations that are relevant for the evaluation of electoral reforms and discuss the recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly in their light. The event, which is open to the public, will take place on Thursday, May 24, 3pm-5pm at the Vivian and David Campbell Conference Facility of the Munk Centre for International Studies (1 Devonshire Place, Toronto) and will be followed by a reception. The participants in the roundtable are George Thomson, John Ferejohn, Joseph Heath, Andrew Stark, Melissa Williams, and it will be chaired by Amit Ron.

For more information, see: http://ethics.utoronto.ca/publicissues.html

As many previous posts on this blog have pointed out, the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) is far from a given. How does the suggestion of a group of randomly selected citizens, put in a position to deliberate on a given issue (in this case, electoral reform in Ontario), bear any weight or political significance to the political community at large? Other institutions (like legislatures) are considered legitimate largely because they are thought to be representative of the citizenry in some fashion. So the question might be asked, can the CA be considered a representative body? Or does the deliberative theory upon which the CA rests imply a different form of legitimacy? In the case of the latter, the idea of representation, at least in its most conventionally understood usage, might not be a necessary or even desirable trait for the CA to possess.

As a means of examining this issue in this post, I consider deliberative democratic theory and its corresponding notions of representation and legitimacy. First, I review the concept of representation and how social choice theory necessitates some form of it for legitimacy in contemporary politics. I will then contrast this notion of representation with that of the CA and its corresponding deliberative democratic foundations. I contend that theories of deliberative democracy depart radically from social choice theories in that they don’t necessitate representation of the citizenry in order to view themselves as legitimate. I make this claim not as a defense against the need for representation, but rather to point out the risk of deliberative democracy, and its capability to be unrepresentative, and perhaps undemocratic, when it is used in designs of mini-publics such as the CA. I end with an argument for why deliberative democracy should entail qualities representing the Ontario citizenry, assessing the extent to which the CA possesses these.

We may as well start by asking what the word “representative” means. The term has many different usages and implications, which complicates the matter of determining the meaning of “representative” as it pertains to legitimacy.[i] In the introduction to Representation Hanna Pitkin gives an extremely basic definition, which is “a making present of something absent—but not making it literally present.”[ii] Much of the controversy of defining “representation” can be seen as stemming from its core paradoxical precept of endowing something with opposing properties (namely absence and presence). Still, when we consider the idea of political representation, we generally have a more specific interpretation in mind, though we might not be able to articulate it. In order to help articulate it, asking the following clarifying questions can help: who/what is absent which is to be made present, who/what is to make them present and, in what manner are they to be made present? In answering these questions through different theoretical perspectives, we can ascertain what form of representation the theories are based upon.

Much of current political practice is informed by some variant of social choice theory, which sees the political process as functioning in the same way that the market does. In this conception, political views and beliefs are understood to be necessarily private, rendering the process of determining public policies as aggregative.[iii] In its most simple form, citizens would gather to pursue their own private political views, with the end result being the “optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests.”[iv] A legitimate political system then, according to social choice theory, would be one which allows for its citizens to pursue their private interests or, put differently, one which allows for the many “selfs” of the polity to be present in the political process as to pursue their self-interests. We could see this being done in two different ways: direct democracy or representative democracy. The former does not seem plausible, as the expanse, complexity and specialization of modern society renders citizens unable to participate in the everyday practice of politics which direct democracy demands.[v] For the same reasons, politics become the business of an elite professional few who are capably specialized in the process of governance. In order to make this elite-driven model compatible with the aforementioned necessity that individuals pursue their private political interests, politicians must appeal to a concept of representation in order to be seen as legitimate; the individuals of society must see the elites of government as having their interests at heart in some fashion.[vi] This is congruous with the definition of democracy which Schumpeter offers: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”[vii] In this way, representation is actually the necessary compromise between the pursuit of self-interest and pragmatic functionality, as the political market of private self-interest is supplemented by the market of elite-level representation.

This can be seen as the governing paradigm of Western liberal democracies, or at least Canadian democracy, in a number of ways. First, there is a stark contrast between the private nature of citizens’ opinions and the public nature of politicians’ and political candidates’ views, made clear by the contrast between the secret ballot system of voting and the public debates of political candidates which are televised and open to all. This reinforces the view of political belief as private, and the competitive and public nature of politicians. Furthermore, the immutable pursuit of self-interest can be seen as analogous to the rigidity of party discipline, in which case party platforms serve as the representative instrument of the represented citizens. Therefore, in contemporary democratic practice, as social choice theory would suggest, absent citizens are made present by selected political elites (chosen through an aggregation of votes through political parties) who pursue the interests of their constituents as they govern the political process.[viii]

In this way, social choice theory’s conception of representation is understood. The CA, on the other hand, is not based on theories of social choice. As Elster notes, the premise which informs deliberative theory and practice

is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation…[T]here would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.[ix]

In this view, the raw pursuit of self-interest is replaced with inquiry into the nature of the public-interest, with aggregation and compromise being substituted for rational discussion; in other words, the market view of private politics is replaced with a public-minded forum in which the goal is “not optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement.”[x] Politics is therefore not considered a private concern as it is in social choice theory, but rather an inherently public act. Individuals are brought into a forum for the express reason of discerning what is best for all. In such a situation, arguments invoking self-interest are impossible in that they are incompatible with the objective at hand; “in a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself.”[xi] In this fashion, the practices and results of deliberation are seen as legitimate insofar as they are defended with reasons and evidence which all members of the public can understand and conceivably agree to. This criterion for deliberation is what theorists refer to as reciprocity.[xii] As Gutmann and Thompson point out, reciprocity implies a form of deliberative equality in which “citizens recognize and respect one another as moral agents, not merely as abstract object of others’ moral reasoning.” [xiii] By limiting reasons and arguments to those which could conceivably be agreed to by all, reciprocity implies that the argument is being addressed to all and that all are capable of comprehending and refuting it.

With this theoretical understanding, we can begin to determine what concept of representation deliberative democracy appeals to, using the CA as a focal point. First, the basic questions of representation (who is absent, who is present, and how the latter makes the former present) can be posed to the case of the CA. To these questions we might respond that the citizens-at-large, who are absent, are being made present by the selected CA members, and they are being made present through the processes of consultation and deliberation[xiv]. While the first two parts of this answer seem plausible enough, the question of how the act of the CA members deliberating makes present those absent from the process is not so clear. In his discussion of deliberative citizen panels, Mark Brown gives a possible answer:

Because panelists are not beholden to interest groups or political parties, and because the process encourages participants to defend their views with reasons potentially acceptable to all, citizen panels are arguably well suited to identify ways of addressing public problems that accord with some conception of the public interest… [They do] not represent in the sense of communicating with or acting for its constituents. It is rather a “representation of the public’s judgment.”[xv]

In this case, it is not actually Ontarians at large who are being made present in the CA, but their purported judgments or reasons. This is a notable difference, as Brown points out that “an important risk associated with this …is that it easily leads to the idea that deliberation by members of citizen panels can substitute for deliberation by their presumed constituents.”[xvi] The act of deliberation in a group differentiates the representation of the public interest (which these bodies purport to do) and the representation of the public itself. With this understanding, the CA does not fit into the mode of representation discussed earlier: if legitimate, it is representative of the citizenry’s logic, reasons, judgments and ideally, their general “public interest,” but not of the citizens themselves or their individual interests. Deliberations do not promise to make present the non-participating public, but rather to make their reasons present: “Because the immediate aim of representing perspectives is deliberation rather than decision-making, the need to include all possibly relevant perspectives (impossible on small citizen panels) is less pressing than if the aim were to represent their interests.”[xvii] In this way, as long as reasons which convince the public are given to justify the decisions, the deliberators do not need to be in anyway representative of the public. Similarly the CA, according to deliberative democratic theory, is not required to be a representative body; as long as the claims, reasons and arguments made satisfy the caveat of reciprocity, the deliberations can be seen as representative of a wider public deliberation, with the conclusions reached by the CA being seen as reached by Ontario as a whole. Bluntly, in deliberative democracy, reasons, absent from most political discourse, are made present by citizens through the act of deliberation.[xviii]

It must be noted that deliberation does not preclude representation in government and in fact can be seen as enriching representative practice. As Mark Brown articulates, “democratic representation depends on continuous interaction between decision-making in state institutions and various sorts of public talk, including both informal public discourse and the more structured forms of deliberation that occur in civil society.”[xix] Representation then “depends on a critical public sphere”[xx] which is best cultivated through processes of deliberation. With this type of public sphere the aforementioned type of representative government which social choice theory suggests could still exist, and would in fact exist better, in that representatives would be chosen out of conceptions of the public good which have eclipsed and replaced notions of private good. However, for the type of public sphere to exist in which all citizens are able to participate and contribute to deliberation, it would take massive social transformation, arguably to a Marxian extent of public-ownership of many types of capital. Until such a public sphere exists, the process of deliberation itself entails aspects of representation in that those deliberating are seen as also doing so for those who are not participating; deliberations which impact policy or governance in some way are seen as bearing public value and opinions, although the entire public, and most often a vast majority of the public, did not participate. In this way, deliberations are seen as making present those who are absent from discussion by formulating an idea of “public interest” or “common good.” This is seemingly problematic in that those who are absent lack political and moral agency, having no ability to control or choose in what ways they are being made present by the deliberators. To counter this problem the idea of a “mini-public,” a group of people selected in such a way as to be representative in some form of the public-at-large, has been developed as a vehicle in which deliberations can be conducted.[xxi] In this way, just as deliberation can be a tool for enriching representative politics, representation can enrich the process of deliberation. For these reasons, the CA claims to represent Ontarians in some fashion, being referred to as a “representative body of electors” in the Election Act which created it.[xxii]

Some find contention with the convergence of representation and deliberation. One argument is that representation could conceivably restrict the representative from fully acknowledging and understanding ideas which diverge from those held by whomever s/he represents. In essence, representation “would lead to representation by an “elect” group, thus clashing with the goal of providing a voice for ordinary citizens.”[xxiii] In this view, representation is too contaminated by the interest-driven premises of social choice theory to be compatible with the public-minded promise of deliberation. While this is a valid claim that should be considered, I don’t think it completely forecloses representation in deliberative bodies. It is conceivable that representatives could be chosen for their ability to reason and comprehend arguments, as opposed to similarities in interest or belief. Furthermore, the way that a body represents the public-at-large does not have to be through an individual-constituency relationship. A deliberative body can be seen as a representative microcosm, in which the individual members of the body would not be representative, but the body itself would be representative of the general public. In this sense, a type of controlled randomness in the selection process would make the group deliberative, with the underlying premise being that any other group of citizens, given the same circumstances, would come to similar conclusions.[xxiv] It is this form of representation which I suggest the CA assumes.[xxv]

Whether or not deliberative bodies can, or are, in fact representative, the normative question of whether or not deliberative bodies should be representative still remains. In their discussion of mini-publics “with some claim to representativeness,” Goodin and Dryzek qualify their definition in a useful way for this discussion:

By “some claim,” we do not mean statistical representativeness…nor do we mean electoral representation. All “some claim to representativeness” need mean is that the diversity of social characteristics and plurality of initial points of view in the larger society are substantially present in the deliberating mini-public.[xxvi]

It is the importance placed on the diversity of “social characteristics” and “initial points of view” which is instructive. If the concept of deliberation rests on the notion that rational discussion, conducted by a group of non-self-interested individuals, can best unveil a truth in regards to (or at least the best answer for the question of) “public good,” then contingent to this is the assumption that an individual, with his/her held perspectives and experiences, holds an incomplete, but completely necessary, component of the public good. Reasons, arguments and public-minded claims are not seen as independent from individual perspective and opinion, but rather as deriving from them, in which case the perspectives individuals bring to deliberative forums are infinitely unique sources of reason and conceptions of public-good. Understood in this way, a plurality of “social characteristics” and “initial points of view” creates a richer supply for reasons and opinions, thus a more a robust deliberation and, it would follow, a better formulated conclusion and conception of public interest.

In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill writes that because “the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.”[xxvii] This was written in the defense of freedom of opinion, and it is this freedom which must be actively sought after and made present in deliberative bodies for the best results. As such, representation offers the ability for a vast array of perspectives and experiences to converge and synthesize, simultaneously enriching deliberation and fortifying legitimacy in the eyes of those not participating in the deliberation. This being the case, I suggest deliberative bodies, the CA included, be representative of the diversity of experiences, backgrounds, and lifestyles of the general public. Here, proportionality may or may not be necessary, as giving minority and majority alike the same amount of representation could make for a deliberation more inclusive to wide-ranging perspectives and viewpoints.

So in what ways does the CA attempt representation? First, as I mentioned earlier, it attempts to statistically represent Ontario as a microcosm through randomness. To this I would simply question whether or not 103 members is a statistically relevant sample size for this purpose. As for the representation of diverse backgrounds and perspectives which I just discussed, there are three main ways in which the CA has taken this into account: the requirement that a member from each electoral riding be present, presenting geographical diversity; the mandatory presence of fifty-two women in the CA; and the mandatory presence of one self-identified Aboriginal person.[xxviii] While this is certainly a good start, I would suggest that a fuller conception of diversity can have been taken into account. Some considerations along this line which, if taken into account, could have enhanced the diversity of the CA are as follows: requiring more than one mandatory seat for Aboriginals, perhaps with the intention of representing the diversity of experiences, cultures, and values within the Aboriginal community; the representation of recent immigrants, perhaps from different national backgrounds; taking social class into consideration, perhaps making certain requirements for landowners and non-owners, managers and union members, etc.; augmenting the “one member from each riding” stipulation in such a way that reflects the large Francophone community in Northern Ontario as a means of representing Ontario’s linguistic diversity.

While I know these types of suggestions presents a self-perpetuating problem in that there are an infinite number of groups which could demand representation ad infinitum, including cross-group sects (eg. perhaps there should be a mandatory seat for Aboriginal women or Francophone workers), it is nevertheless an important consideration for future deliberative bodies to take into account. In this way, the reasons which are made present by deliberation can be more closely in sync with the reasons of the absent society-at-large, making deliberation a more viable and legitimate political method within Canadian political culture as it now stands.
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[i] For a more thorough treatment of the complexity of “representation” see Dr. Ron’s first posting.
[ii] Hanna Pitkin. Representation. New York: Atherton Press, 1969: 16.
[iii] Jon Elster. “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103-104.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1950: 259-262.
[vi] The way in which the representative acts can still be open to interpretation, particularly in what Pitkin calls the “mandate-independence controversy” (Ptikin, Representation, 17). Regardless of how it is interpreted, the necessity here is that the citizens see their interests as somehow represented through their politicians.
[vii] Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 296.
[viii] Elster, “The Market and the Forum,” 104-105.
[ix] Elster, “The Market and the Forum,” 112.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ibid, 113.
[xii] For a more detailed discussion of “reciprocity” see my posting “Deliberative Democratic Theory and the Citizens’ Assembly”
[xiii] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996: 14.
[xiv] The emphasis here however is on deliberation over consultation. I say this because the vast majority of Ontarians are not participating in the consultation phase. Because of this, those who participate are more akin to those who are present as opposed to those who are absent; by participating in the consultation phase, non-CA Ontarians are participating in the more general deliberation, and in turn are participating in the act of making those not participating, or who are absent, present. While one might argue that voting on the final referendum is also part of making those absent present, I would contend that that does not make them present in the process of producing the recommendation (what the CA was assembled for) but rather in the enactment of it. In this way, it is still mainly the act of deliberation which is supposed to make them present in the CA.
[xv] Mark Brown. “Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation.” Journal of Political Philosophy (14.2, 2006): 216. Representing “in the sense of communicating with or acting for its constituents” relates to the point I raised in Note vi regarding the “mandate-independence controversy.”
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Ibid, 219.
[xviii] One objection to this might be that in practice the CA’s conclusion is definitively not seen as the same as Ontarians, a fact evidenced by the proviso of the referendum. Because of this, deliberation is perhaps not intended to reason on behalf of the public, but merely on behalf of its participants. While I might agree with this contention, the referendum (notwithstanding the sixty percent super-majority recently attached to it) can still be viewed as compatible with deliberative theories in that it assures that the conclusion reached by the CA is justified by sufficient reason. In theory, the conclusions reached by such a deliberative body could be agreed to by all and the reasons used to justify it could be understood by all, however if the reasons offered are not sufficient to convince the general public, the referendum failing to pass hold’s the decision accountable. In short, if deliberations are conducted successfully, the referendum will pass; if not, the referendum will fail. Either way the referendum does not deligitimate the CA’s deliberation but indicates how efficiently it was carried out.
[xix] Brown, “Citizen Panels,” 206.
[xx] Ibid., 205
[xxi] Archon Fung. “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences.” The Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338-339, and Robert Goodin and John Dryzek. “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics.” Politics & Society (34.2, 2006): 219-221.
[xxii] Election Act, Ontario Regulation 82/06, Citizens’ Assembly on ElectoralReform, Article 2.
[xxiii] Brown, “Citizen Panels,” 208.
[xxiv] Ibid, 209.
[xxv] See my post “Monday’s Public Issues Forum.”
[xxvi] Goodin and Dryzek, “Deliberative Impacts,” 221.
[xxvii] J.S. Mill. On Liberty. London: Penguin Publishing, 1974: 116.
[xxviii] Election Act: Article 4, Clauses 1-3.

This is a brief observation report on the meeting of the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) which took place on this past Saturday the November 25^th, focusing on the presentation of the Working group on the Representation of Women and Other Underrepresented Groups. I post this on the heels of my peer Glaucon’s engaging report regarding the same topic. His report focuses on the non-functionality of the CA’s working group process, using Amy Lang’s observations of British Columbia’s CA experience as a point of reference. What I would like to do in this post is offer ways in which the working group could have been more effective, ways in which this concerns the nature of the CA, and what type suggestion of electoral reform I think this concern should point towards. I suggest that the concept of “listening,” as Melissa Williams and Iris Young use it, can be very instructive in this process.

One of the presenters gave an interesting analogy for the problem of groups underrepresented in politics, likening the situation to a broken bone. As she aptly put, the situation is, like a broken bone, problematic and undesirable, raising the question of whether or not we should let the bone heal on its own, at the risk of it not healing properly, or put a cast on it which will heal it correctly, but at the expense of unnaturalness. While underlying this presentation was a certain assumption that some type of “cast” is necessary, I was disappointed that a) there was not any clear statement of why the broken bone was a problem, and b) there was not any recommendation as to what type of cast should be utilized. As Glaucon observed, “the working group’s presentation did not have any concrete recommendations for the Assembly. Instead, they…put forward ideas they felt the Assembly should consider.” I would have liked to have seen an articulation of a strong claim in regards to the two points raised above, as it probably would have been more effective in stimulating productive discussion and debate, more so than merely putting ideas or considerations forward to be thought about. Before delving into how the working group could have gone about this better, or what I would have liked to hear them say, I think it is important to consider why this was the case.

In making their case for the considering ways of equalizing representation of women and marginalized groups through the electoral system, the working group pointed out that a more equal degree of participation will bring a larger diversity of views and perspectives to the political table, enriching the political process and making it more legitimate. While this is an important point to be made, and I strongly agree with it, I would have liked to hear reasons given which are not purely instrumental to the general public. I was frustrated that there was no mention of the good it would do for the marginalized groups themselves. It seems to me that the most obvious reason for addressing the disproportionate representation of many groups is also the simplest: the sheer fact of discrimination and subordination. Yes, women will bring important voices and opinions to parliament, but why not also consider the structural, legal, and societal forces which continue to restrict women from attaining political office? If this is made clear, we can see the rectifying of this situation not as something which will simply “enrich” politics, but which is intrinsically necessary for equal and democratic politics.[i]

The hesitation on the part of the working group to be more straightforward and forthcoming with clear and pointed arguments might come from two places. The first could be that there was simply no consensus within the working group as to whether or not the issue should be addressed through electoral reform, and what type of reform would work best. If this was the case I think instead of presenting apolitical and unopinionated considerations, it might have been better to present the diversity of the group’s opinions, as they suggested earlier, with each of their supporting arguments and rationales. The second reason could have been from a fear of being seen as pursuing personal-interests in some way or form. It should be noted that the majority of the working group were women, with one man who appeared to be of East-Asian descent. Perhaps there was a feeling, and quite possibly a fully justified one, that if they were to make more pointed suggestions and arguments regarding marginalized-group representation it would be classified as “special-interest” and therefore illegitimate for the deliberative forum, regardless of whether or not good reasons were presented for it. This could be the same reason why there were absolutely no arguments made, either for or against, which were based on personal experience. If a woman were to point to her perspective as a woman in regards to her claim about representation of women in politics, it would most certainly be seen as privatizing the scope of discussion. However this seems counterintuitive, in that “what women think” should play some sort of roll into actions made on behalf of women’s participation.

This is where the act of “listening” comes to play. Melissa Williams, quoting Iris Young, describes this process:

While everyday discourse about justice certainly makes claims, these are not theorems to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system. They are instead calls, pleas, claims upon some people by others. Rational reflection on justice begins in…hearing, in heeding a call, rather than in….mastering a state of affairs, however ideal.[ii]

When applied to deliberative forums, listening suggests that what is good or just for all should not be conceived simply through reflection or deduction, but through reception; experience and individual perspectives should be incorporated and considered as types of self-understanding crucial to understanding a more overarching sense of “good” or “just.” Similarly, the perspectives and experiences of women, Aboriginals, visible minorities, etc, in regards to their representation in Parliament should be welcomed in the CA as empirical examples of perception as opposed to self-interested argumentation.

Furthermore, I would argue that listening should be considered when thinking about electoral reform and the representation of marginalized groups. One CA member asked the question of whether it is know if women statistically tend to vote more for women than not. The response was that there is no tendency for women to do this, as they tend to vote according to ideological preference. One member of the working group made the good point that this often has to do with the lack of choice: if a woman wants to vote for the NDP, in the current single member plurality system she can only vote for whoever the NDP places in running. While the discrimination within political parties is an important issue to consider in this topic, I lack both the space and knowledge to speak well on it. What I want to point out, however, is that the aforementioned fact that women tend to vote according to ideology as opposed to sex points to the heterogeneous perspectives of marginalized group representation within those marginalized groups: some prioritize it higher than others, for example. This problematizes more rigid solutions like quotas or consociational models. I would suggest that some system of proportional representation would be best in that it allows citizens to define what constituency they belong to, be it according to ideology, gender, or geography. In this way the electoral system is structurally capable of listening to groups and individuals self-understandings and adapt accordingly. For example, women who prioritize the representation of women can vote according to that, with more options to choose from, and women who prioritize ideological representation can vote according to that.

In these ways, by incorporating the act of listening into both the structure of deliberation, and as a focus of deliberation, the CA might be able to better include citizens belonging to marginalize groups. Not only that, the ways in which they are included will be more reflective of the self-constitutions they possess.

Engaged Citizen's (EC) critique of the CA's procedure is interesting, although I must say am unconvinced. His contention, if I have it right, is that the principle-based approach to electoral reform strucutrally excludes certain electoral systems by way of an inevitable compromise; "[a]s a result, in trying to determine a new electoral system, the CA is necessary lead to engage in the incorporation of divergent principle that could only be inevitably reconciled by the adaptation of a kind of a mixed system." His suggestion is that these different principles be debated and talked about which will lead the CA to "selecting only one or a few non-opposing principles" on which they could base their recommendation.

The first point that should be made is that EC's recommandation of debating the principles until there is one or a number of "non-opposing" principles falls into the same problems that the original approach does. If in fact choosing three principles which might be divergent from each other predisposes the assembly to agree on a mixed system, wouldn't the necessity of the CA to come to one main principle similarly rules out the option of mixed systems? If we see diversity of principles as neccesitating mixed systems, then the barring of the same diversity would seemingly foreclose the option of mixed systems, bringing the CA into the same conundrum, just over opposite systems.

This brings me to the more crucial point: ruling out certain systems is precisely what the CA is supposed to do. As the current procedure stands now, the CA is to select three principles on which they prioritize among others. First of all, I don't see how this necessarily predisposes mixed systems; if the three principles the CA isolates above others are, for instance, fairness of representation, voter choice, and effective parties, it would seem that a simple system of proportional representation would correspond quite well. However, if, as EC suggests, the CA does come up with three divergent principles, it would seem that the ruling out of pure systems would be the right approach for coming up with the system which fits the needs of Ontarians best. If fairness of representation, voter choice, and regional representation are the most important values of Ontarians, than a mixed system seems like the most adequate electoral system. I think it is a mistake to see the mixing of systems as necessarily a compromise, insofar as the word denotes a giving up of certain values for others. Rather, perhaps mixed systems are the ones which would best serve Ontario, satisfying all, or most, of what citizens want out of an electoral system. The ruling out of "pure" systems like PR or MV in this way is not actually systemic to the approach of the CA; rather, it would be ruled because of the fact of principle-diversity in Ontarians. If this is the case, which it remains to be seen, than it would seem as though choosing a mixed system would fit perfectly into the CA's aim, which EC correctly identifies as "recommending the best possible electoral system for the province of Ontario."

I think Young Ontarian makes an important point regarding the excluding of certain voices and arguments in forums of purported rationality. Pointing out that deliberative forums in which “non-rational, non-public minded arguments are illegitimate will make it much easier for the members who are most comfortable with formal argumentation (i.e the lawyers, professors and possibly, university students) to control the process” gestures towards the issue of specialization, an idea which seems to run contrary to the egalitarian and inclusive notions of deliberation. While this is certainly a problem, I think rational exchange of argument is still the most effective and democratic method of deliberation (which I think Young Ontarian agrees with), in that it appeals to reasons which everyone can comprehend and understand, either through conceptualization or empirical demonstration. With both of these in mind, the problem should be understood as making inclusivity and rationality compatible. This could be done in two different ways. One would be to train participants before deliberation in the method of rational argumentation, thereby changing the nature of the participant. The other would be the development of the “non-rational” or “non-public” opinion into one fitting for the public setting, thereby altering the form of argument.

Changing the nature of the participant into one who is “capable” of deliberation could be accomplished in two different ways: through the institution of deliberation, or through socialization. The latter, more Habermasian view is much broader in implication, essentially arguing that the organization of society has to be radically altered in order to create for citizens more capable of deliberation. Along this line of thinking would be that in order for deliberative processes to function, social inequalities would have to be completely mended, and the mechanism of the media would have to be publicly owned, in order to create for a citizenry better educated and capable of debate. Archon Fung refers to this as the “God’s-eye perspective” of the public sphere.[i] Another, more modest method would be that the institution of deliberation train arriving participants when they begin on how to argue effectively. While this might make participants all competent in argumentation, it fails to address the problem of specialization in that those with more experience in these types of arguments (lawyers, professors, etc.) would still have disproportionate influence. I am having trouble locating the quotation, but there is an instance in The Republic in which Socrates is indicted for not actually being the most truthful, but being the best with argumentation and rhetoric. Certainly this is situation we have probably all found ourselves in, finding it quite unenjoyable and, more importantly for this brief, unproductive; we are generally not convinced by someone’s superior arguments if we feel they come from higher skill as opposed to better reasoning or understanding.

The other way of making inclusivity and rationality compatible would be to view the process of deliberation not only as a mechanism of argument-exchange, but also as one of argument-formation. In this view, the act of deliberation takes private-based individuals and their arguments and transforms them into something public-minded.[ii] In this view individuals come to deliberate with their own private interests, making arguments that might not be considered “rational arguments” in that they don’t conform with rules of reciprocity. These individuals, through arguing in a setting which is public in nature, would develop their arguments and ideas into claims which could be understood by all, falling in line with reciprocity. In this way the deliberative end is a sort of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium; in that everybody brings their interests to the table, the public interest is developed and understood through the exchange of these ideas, creating an understanding of where certain claims can and cannot be thought to be understood by all. In this view, deliberation does not necessitate that all participants be capable of public-minded arguments; it sees public-mindedness as being created by deliberation.

So, for example, someone could come to the Citizens’ Assembly make certain individually-based claims regarding electoral reform (like that of Bill from Kapuskasing’s original claim which I gave in my original post). These, while perhaps not being valid arguments, are nonetheless crucial for deliberation in that by being compared with other contrasting individually-based claims, participants would be forced to spin their claims out into something which all could come to understand (like the reformulation of Bill’s argument). By being forced to pose their claims in such a manner, participants take their original claims, which might not have been in line with reciprocity, and make them into something which can be understood, and accordingly challenged, by all. In this way, the “non-rational” and “non-public” methods of communicating with Young Ontarian suggests can be seen as valid in a deliberative and rational forum.
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[i] Archon Fung. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338.
[ii] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103.

The focus of this week’s discussion was the concept of deliberative democracy, which is a pertinent concept when considering the Citizens’ Assembly (CA). What I aim to do in this post is describe the basic theory of deliberative democracy, discussing key issues like reciprocity and legitimacy. Applying these concepts to the case of the CA, I will attempt to illustrate ways in which the CA can be viewed as legitimate by the public at large, specifically through the use of reasoned arguments appropriate to the setting. I apologize in advance for the length of this posting, but the complexity of the subject matter and its relevance to the CA necessitates it.

Deliberative democracy is currently a major focus of study by political scientists and democratic theorists. Stemming from the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas, deliberative democracy emphasizes the role of communication and discussion in regards to politics and public issues. Its basic contention is that the best method of reaching the best decisions which everyone would feel were legitimate is through the ongoing defense and critique of public opinions through the reasoned arguments of active and engaged citizen-participants. As John Rawls puts eloquently,

when citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by their discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests.[i]

Accordingly, deliberation is seen as a means to produce results which, even if everybody has not been convinced of, everybody can at least understand the logic of and see as legitimate. It also is seen as effectively taking issues out of the realm of “private or nonpolitical interests” and made appropriately public in nature, an idea which I will develop later.

In their now canonical book Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson outline a theory of deliberative democracy based on its capability to properly address moral disagreement in politics. Noting that deliberative discussion, even at the level of political elites, only occurs in reference to democratic procedure or in matters of interpreting governing principles (ie Supreme Court rulings), Gutmann and Thompson contend that the practice of deliberation should extend to what they call “middle democracy,” which encompasses “any setting in which citizens come together on a regular basis to reach collective decisions about public issues—governmental as well as nongovernmental institutions.”[ii] By extending deliberation to policy-making, administration and public reaction, citizens are put in more situations in which they are forced to defend their moral views to those who disagree, and are made to listen to opposing arguments and rationales. In doing so, “they express and respect [each other’s] status as political equals even as they continue to disagree about important matters of public policy.”[iii]

Gutmann and Thompson articulate three traits which democratic deliberation must possess in order to properly address moral dispute: reciprocity, publicity and accountability. Publicity refers to openness of argument, that moral claims and refutations are intended for “dissemination in public forums.”[iv] The notion of accountability indicates the need for those making moral claims to explain their claims to those for whom the reasons are offered. So, in current political life elected officials are (in theory) accountable to those who elected them, and therefore must defend their actions to the citizens. In deliberation, not only elected officials, but “ordinary citizens when they act in a public capacity”[v] (inclusive to participating in public deliberation) must be able to defend and explain their stances to other citizens. These two concepts, publicity and accountability, when taken in tandem point towards the third criterion of reciprocity.

Reciprocity refers to the method of argumentation, and essentially entails a respect for other citizens as politically and morally equal. Thusly, “reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens.”[vi] So, if in defending one’s moral stance a citizen cites his or her religious doctrine as a reason, he or she is appealing to reasons which other citizens not of the same religious belief could not reasonably, as free and equal citizens, come to share. Reciprocity also asks that “empirical claims in political argument be consistent with reliable methods of inquiry, as these methods are available to us here and now, not for all times and all places,”[vii] so that a claim and its supporting facts can be examined by other citizens, being open to scrutiny by other empirical claims. By making claims which follow the concept of reciprocity, citizens are making themselves accountable to their interlocutors and making their stances open to the public.

By this light, the CA is a legitimate deliberative body if it follows these three principles. To demonstrate how these principles might and might not be followed, an example is helpful. Say Bill is a member of the CA from Kapuskasing which is located in northern Ontario. In the deliberative phase of the CA, Bill makes the following argument: “The current FPTP system will represent me and my interests better than any other system because I am from the north. FPTP gives me better representation, therefore we should not alter the electoral system.” This argument does not satisfy reciprocity. Bill’s reasons (“FPTP gives me better representation”) prioritize his interests over others and, in turn, his argument does not appeal to reasons which others could reasonably come to share. Furthermore, he has not given any rationale as to why FPTP would better represent his interests just because he is from the north; without giving an account for how he came to this conclusion Bill appeals to a belief which he has, and by doing so forecloses any rational discussion or criticism of his claim. A better argument, which falls more in line with reciprocity, would be: “It is important that our electoral system take into account the regional diversity of Ontario, and assures representation of regional interests in Parliament. FPTP, with its geographic riding systems, best considers the regional interests of Ontarians.” Here, Bill appeals to reasons which are more open to inspection. Someone might hear this argument and agree that regional interests are most important, and in turn support FPTP. If someone disagrees they can refute Doug’s claims through argumentation of their own. So, someone might argue that regional interests are not nearly as important as proportionality, and give reasons why. Or, someone might agree that regional interests are important, but demonstrate the ways in which FPTP does not actually account for regional interest (For an example of such an argument see my Response to Scholar84)). In this way, whether or not we agree with Bill, we can understand his argument and his reasons, and accordingly see it as a legitimate claim, refuting it by challenging the method in which he arrived at the conclusion.

In this example what deliberation can be seen to do is create public-mindedness in citizens. This is perhaps the most important and distinguishing aspect of deliberative democracy. Prior to the development of deliberative theories of democracy, the prevailing concepts of democracy fell into the category of social choice theory. Social choice theory, as Jon Elster explains, sees political views as determined by private interest, and therefore sees political participation as a private act. The political system then functions in a manner similar to the market in which individuals compete for their own interests, making the goal of politics “the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests.”[viii] Deliberative democracy differs in that it sees politics as a necessarily public realm. In this way, individual interests should not be aggregated and then a conclusive compromise be reached, but interests should be made into public interests in which all could discuss on the same grounds: “the core of the theory, then is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation.”[ix] As I stated in the beginning of this discussion, deliberation makes political issues appropriately public in nature, by making the grounds on which citizens seek to justify their claims public-minded. Even if private interests are stated, they must be stated in terms of reciprocity, and in turn they are opened to exposure. Our previous example of Bill from Kapuskasing, illustrates this: while his interests might still be entrenched in his stance, he is still forced to appeal to the public good. Public-mindedness is forced to be brought out in deliberative bodies on the simple basis that individual-interest-based arguments will not move a forum brought together to discuss the good of the whole.

In these ways, the deliberations of the CA would are seen as legitimate if arguments conform to reciprocity and if the issues are discussed in terms of public-welfare as opposed to private interest. But legitimacy in this situation must function in two ways, both within the CA and outside the CA: even if the deliberations of the CA are reasoned and open, how might the general public see these deliberations as legitimate? This is characteristic of a question which has already come up on this forum, namely why should Ontario see the deliberations of the CA as representative or legitimate? This is a more difficult question to answer, which a contextualizing of the CA in terms of deliberative democratic theory will illustrate.

The CA is emblematic of a departure from the more classical theories of deliberative democracy to the more contemporary. James Bohman writes of this transition,[x] noting that earlier democratic theorists dealt mainly with concepts of ideal speech situation, in which the actualization of something like Habermas’s ideal public sphere[xi] was the main goal. Currently, deliberative democrats deal more with making current institutions and procedures more compatible with, and open to, public deliberations. Bohman writes, referencing the more contemporary theories of Habermas, that “the only feasible form of deliberation occurs in the interaction between formally organized institutional decision-making mechanisms and informal and “anonymous” debates and discussion in the public sphere…it is this interaction via institutional channels…that makes deliberative politics possible, five the “unavoidable” constraints of complexity and the need for…law.”[xii] As such, the CA represents the opening up of electoral procedures and policy-making powers of the legislature to deliberative practice. However, the CA is hard to locate in the terms which Bohman lays out; certainly it is not part of the “institutional decision-making mechanisms” which the Ontario parliament represents, but it is also not simply an “informal and anonymous” debate as it has been vested with some authority, and has been called together by the Ontario government. Simply put, does the CA lie in the public sphere or in the governmental realm? This ambiguity makes it hard to define where the CA’s legitimacy lies: not in its purely spontaneous dedication to the pursuit of the public good, nor through its elected status, as neither of these are true. So how can the deliberation of the CA be viewed as legitimate by the public?

Ideally, the vast majority of Ontarians would be involved in the process, making deputations and attenting consultation meetings, thereby integrating their views and arguments with those of the CA members. In this way the CA’s deliberation would contain the views of most of Ontarians, and in turn be viewed as legitimate by most of Ontarians. However, this has not been the case as of yet, and there seems to be no reason to suspect it will.

I would suggest that, similar to how arguments would be legitimate within its deliberations, the CA’s decision should be seen as legitimate based on the reasons, which follow reciprocity, it gives the general public for its decision (its decision being the question posed in the referendum). The general public can then agree or disagree with the CA’s suggestion and vote accordingly. In this way, if the reasons the CA offer do not convince the general public they are held accountable through the vote. But the suggestion would still be legitimate based on the rationale offered. According to this view, whether the CA is “representative” is not really important; the prime function of deliberation is to produce reasoned conclusions and any body, representative or not, might be completely capable of doing that. One might argue, as I would, that the merit and quality of the reasons and arguments the CA, or any deliberative body, offers might be directly related to how representative it is. For example, if the CA was composed entirely of Torontonians, not only would this not be representative of all Ontario, it would be very unlikely that it would produce a reasoned conclusion which all of Ontario would see the logic to. Still, representation, as it is commonly understood, is only important in terms of its instrumentality to effective and good deliberation.[xiii] This differs from the notion of representation which individual-interest-oriented models, like those of social choice theory, would suggest. In those cases, representation is seen as crucial because the final decision rests on the aggregation of individual interest. If a citizen’s interest is not seen to have been represented in the process, the end-result is fundamentally flawed because it did not encompass the interests of all in some form. Because the basis for deliberation is the public, and not the private, good, the “fair representation” of individual-interest in the process is not obligatory for the decision reached at the end to be legitimate. As stated before, the role of “fair representation” in deliberation is to create a more complete understanding of the public good. If the majority of Ontarians disagree with this conception (and its ensuing proposal), they can vote against it. However, they will be voting against it in terms of the reasons, which must conform to reciprocity, offered. In this way, the CA’s decision is made public, and is held accountable through the referendum.[xiv]

In considering choices being made by a body of people, it goes without saying that the manner and extent to which they are informed is an extremely important factor to keep in mind. If we feel as if the body has been misinformed then we may very likely find the decision to which they came illegitimate or insufficient. It is with this in mind that I would like to comment on the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) meeting that I attended on Saturday, October 14th, specifically the session entitled “Electoral Systems: What are they?” which was conducted by Dr. Rose. Electoral systems being the very thing which the CA was created to evaluate, assessing the manner in which the systems are being taught is necessary in evaluating the CA’s ability to make a recommendation regarding electoral reform. After observing this session, and some of the small-group discussions which followed, I believe that the manner in which these sessions are being conducted will enable the CA to make not only a well-informed decision, but a decision which has been well-reasoned and critically reflected upon.

I will start by giving a basic description of what I observed at the CA meeting. Following this, I consider some of the issues surrounding the educational phase of the CA in general, specifically the issue of bias. I conclude by analyzing what I observed with the issues that I have raised, highlighting specific theoretic considerations.

The meeting was called to order by the chairman who announced a CA member’s birthday and then introduced Dr. Rose. Dr. Rose made a joke about how hard it is to follow a birthday announcement with discussion of something as dry as electoral systems to which everybody laughed. The instructors and the members of the CA seemed fairly comfortable in the situation, seeming to show that, while taking this quite seriously, they were not nervous or stuffy because of the cameras or the setting.

The object of this session was to explain what an electoral system is, to explain some of the basic vocabulary used in describing electoral systems, and to provide a basic overview of the main electoral systems. Dr. Rose was careful with his definition of electoral systems (“The way in which votes are translated into seats”) to not include any normative qualifiers that might bias the CA against any of the given systems. He then introduced the basic components of an electoral system: ballot structure, district magnitude, and electoral formula. Once these concepts were well established, he briefly discussed the ways in which they interact to form different systems. What was impressive was that by the time he got to each individual system he did not need to spend more than a couple minutes on each, only needing to make reference to the aforementioned concepts. For example, in describing systems of plurality he said “these systems have categorical ballot structures, district magnitudes of one representative (generally), and an electoral formula in which the most votes win.” While he illustrated these systems a bit more than I have recounted, he made it clear that he was giving a simple overview (not a full description) of each of these systems and that the main goal was to really familiarize the CA with the relevant vocabulary.

Overall, Dr. Rose’s lecture was easy to follow, to the point, and unbiased. He did not give any more explanation to one system than another, and importantly, explained all of them in reference to the same three components which he defined at the outset. This was refreshing to see since the question of bias has been raised in a few different forums in reference to the CA.

And perhaps this question should be on the tip of most of our tongues; it would seem that the CA members, most of whom are presumably not formally educated in political science, would be extremely vulnerable to the bias of the educators. Ian Urquhart, a writer for the Toronto Star, wrote a very critical piece on the CA last month in reference to this very issue. He argued that the panel of experts chosen to advise the CA “reads like a who's who of advocates of proportional representation” which stacks the deck against maintaining the current First Past the Post system.[i] This is a reasonable concern which I would assume the CA is aware of. However, underlying this skepticism is a fairly paternalistic assumption that the members of the CA, far removed from the safety and familiarity of their “humdrum lives”[ii], are not capable of interrogating that which they are being taught. While bias is an important concern, can we also consider that the CA might be fully aware that bias will exist, and that they will be able to sniff it out and challenge it? Perhaps it might be as naïve to assume that this criticality is prevalent within the CA as it is smug to assume that isn’t, but since this whole exercise rests on certain assumptions of competency on the part of the CA members, I think it is fair to assume a certain potential for critical reflection. In this light then, it would seem that whether or not the CA is carried out in such a way to facilitate this type of critical reflection among the members is as crucial of a consideration as the question of bias in the content.

In this way we can identify two general criterions useful to assess the quality of this education phase of the CA. The first would be that it is absent of any glaring bias which could be systemic of a lesson plan (i.e. misinformation, vast discrepancy in the amount of time and energy spent between two differing views, vast discrepancy in manner of explanation from subject to subject etc.). The second criterion would be that the CA members are being taught in such a way which recognizes the limitations of the instructor(s) and in turn enables and empowers the CA plenary to be critical and interrogate what they are being taught.

Based on my own observation I did not find any glaring bias in Dr. Rose’s lecture. While I grant that this was an introductory session and one would need to attend the more specific lectures to better know the existence of any bias, I think that this session sets up a fairly objective framework and approach on the part of the whole CA panel. As I said before, the definitions and concepts were established in such a way that would not preclude the dismissal or acceptance of any system discussed.

I found the lecture to be quite encouraging based on the second criterion that I pointed to before. As I have been describing, Dr. Rose began the discussion of electoral systems first by introducing basic definitions and vocabulary. What this does is put the CA members in a position where they are not merely learning what people have told them about specific electoral systems, although they will do that, but they are learning what these different systems are made of and different ways of evaluating and assessing these systems. In essence, the CA is being taught how to learn about these systems before being taught the specifics, which places them in a position where they can assess what they are learning and make judgments on their own.

In 1970, the Brazilian scholar Paulo Freire wrote the seminal book Pedagogy of the Oppressed in which he outlined the ways in which the educational system is used to maintain power structures. He suggested that traditional education uses a “banking concept” in which the teacher deposits lifeless information into the students and then withdraws it from them later.[iii] Freire makes this point to show the manner in which power structures are reinforced within systems of education, with the one knowledgeable teacher who bestows gifts of information upon the students who “accept their ignorance as justifying the teacher’s existence” and in turn presume themselves inferior to the teacher. [iv] I bring this up not to draw a parallel between the current Ontario government and that of Brazil in the 1960’s, but rather to point out that the basic manner in which an educational project is approached has a drastic effect on those who are being taught and the way they interpret that which is being taught to them.

This is especially important to consider in the case of the CA. If sessions are conducted strictly in such a way that information appears solely owned by the instructor, then capacity for inquiry and interrogation is in many ways foreclosed, rendering the information being taught as immutable. If this type of educational model is not used however, the CA members can understand themselves as equal parts of the educational process and understand that it is their job as students to analyze, interpret, and interrogate what they are being taught and who is teaching them. Thus, the potential for critical reflection which I mentioned earlier can be honed by creating an environment in which the CA members (a) are being taught in ways which make the information meaningful and dynamic as opposed to lifeless and dryly academic, and (b) understand that they can learn as much from other “students” through discussion and questions as through the formal information sessions.

To this end, the basic structural aspects of the CA such as questioning periods, the small-group discussion periods which follow plenary sessions are very important in enabling the CA members to properly understand the different electoral systems and to combat whatever bias might exist on the instruction end. Furthermore, things like the announcement of birthdays and small jokes which the chair makes, or the metaphors Dr. Rose uses,[v] go a long way in dismantling the “power” such a situation bestows on an instructor without robbing them of their ability competently educate CA members on the intricacies of electoral systems and electoral reform.

Overall, I think the educational phase will be very effective in enabling CA members to properly make a well-informed decision.

References
[i] Urquhart, Ian. “Beware citizens' assemblies on electoral reform” Toronto Star Sep. 9, 2006.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Freire, Paulo. The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York (Continuum Publishing, 1988), 57-58.
[iv] Ibid. 59.
[v] In describing Ontario’s current system Dr. Rose referred to the Olympics in which one country might win an individual event, but you also might refer to one country winning the entire Olympics by winning the most individual events. At another point used a metaphor of choosing a dessert from a list to describe different electoral systems.