Monday, November 27, 2006
Response to Engaged Citizen's CA report
Engaged Citizen's (EC) critique of the CA's procedure is interesting, although I must say am unconvinced. His contention, if I have it right, is that the principle-based approach to electoral reform strucutrally excludes certain electoral systems by way of an inevitable compromise; "[a]s a result, in trying to determine a new electoral system, the CA is necessary lead to engage in the incorporation of divergent principle that could only be inevitably reconciled by the adaptation of a kind of a mixed system." His suggestion is that these different principles be debated and talked about which will lead the CA to "selecting only one or a few non-opposing principles" on which they could base their recommendation.
The first point that should be made is that EC's recommandation of debating the principles until there is one or a number of "non-opposing" principles falls into the same problems that the original approach does. If in fact choosing three principles which might be divergent from each other predisposes the assembly to agree on a mixed system, wouldn't the necessity of the CA to come to one main principle similarly rules out the option of mixed systems? If we see diversity of principles as neccesitating mixed systems, then the barring of the same diversity would seemingly foreclose the option of mixed systems, bringing the CA into the same conundrum, just over opposite systems.
This brings me to the more crucial point: ruling out certain systems is precisely what the CA is supposed to do. As the current procedure stands now, the CA is to select three principles on which they prioritize among others. First of all, I don't see how this necessarily predisposes mixed systems; if the three principles the CA isolates above others are, for instance, fairness of representation, voter choice, and effective parties, it would seem that a simple system of proportional representation would correspond quite well. However, if, as EC suggests, the CA does come up with three divergent principles, it would seem that the ruling out of pure systems would be the right approach for coming up with the system which fits the needs of Ontarians best. If fairness of representation, voter choice, and regional representation are the most important values of Ontarians, than a mixed system seems like the most adequate electoral system. I think it is a mistake to see the mixing of systems as necessarily a compromise, insofar as the word denotes a giving up of certain values for others. Rather, perhaps mixed systems are the ones which would best serve Ontario, satisfying all, or most, of what citizens want out of an electoral system. The ruling out of "pure" systems like PR or MV in this way is not actually systemic to the approach of the CA; rather, it would be ruled because of the fact of principle-diversity in Ontarians. If this is the case, which it remains to be seen, than it would seem as though choosing a mixed system would fit perfectly into the CA's aim, which EC correctly identifies as "recommending the best possible electoral system for the province of Ontario."
The first point that should be made is that EC's recommandation of debating the principles until there is one or a number of "non-opposing" principles falls into the same problems that the original approach does. If in fact choosing three principles which might be divergent from each other predisposes the assembly to agree on a mixed system, wouldn't the necessity of the CA to come to one main principle similarly rules out the option of mixed systems? If we see diversity of principles as neccesitating mixed systems, then the barring of the same diversity would seemingly foreclose the option of mixed systems, bringing the CA into the same conundrum, just over opposite systems.
This brings me to the more crucial point: ruling out certain systems is precisely what the CA is supposed to do. As the current procedure stands now, the CA is to select three principles on which they prioritize among others. First of all, I don't see how this necessarily predisposes mixed systems; if the three principles the CA isolates above others are, for instance, fairness of representation, voter choice, and effective parties, it would seem that a simple system of proportional representation would correspond quite well. However, if, as EC suggests, the CA does come up with three divergent principles, it would seem that the ruling out of pure systems would be the right approach for coming up with the system which fits the needs of Ontarians best. If fairness of representation, voter choice, and regional representation are the most important values of Ontarians, than a mixed system seems like the most adequate electoral system. I think it is a mistake to see the mixing of systems as necessarily a compromise, insofar as the word denotes a giving up of certain values for others. Rather, perhaps mixed systems are the ones which would best serve Ontario, satisfying all, or most, of what citizens want out of an electoral system. The ruling out of "pure" systems like PR or MV in this way is not actually systemic to the approach of the CA; rather, it would be ruled because of the fact of principle-diversity in Ontarians. If this is the case, which it remains to be seen, than it would seem as though choosing a mixed system would fit perfectly into the CA's aim, which EC correctly identifies as "recommending the best possible electoral system for the province of Ontario."
