Monday, November 27, 2006
Validating the "Non-rational": Response to Young Ontarian
I think Young Ontarian makes an important point regarding the excluding of certain voices and arguments in forums of purported rationality. Pointing out that deliberative forums in which “non-rational, non-public minded arguments are illegitimate will make it much easier for the members who are most comfortable with formal argumentation (i.e the lawyers, professors and possibly, university students) to control the process” gestures towards the issue of specialization, an idea which seems to run contrary to the egalitarian and inclusive notions of deliberation. While this is certainly a problem, I think rational exchange of argument is still the most effective and democratic method of deliberation (which I think Young Ontarian agrees with), in that it appeals to reasons which everyone can comprehend and understand, either through conceptualization or empirical demonstration. With both of these in mind, the problem should be understood as making inclusivity and rationality compatible. This could be done in two different ways. One would be to train participants before deliberation in the method of rational argumentation, thereby changing the nature of the participant. The other would be the development of the “non-rational” or “non-public” opinion into one fitting for the public setting, thereby altering the form of argument.
Changing the nature of the participant into one who is “capable” of deliberation could be accomplished in two different ways: through the institution of deliberation, or through socialization. The latter, more Habermasian view is much broader in implication, essentially arguing that the organization of society has to be radically altered in order to create for citizens more capable of deliberation. Along this line of thinking would be that in order for deliberative processes to function, social inequalities would have to be completely mended, and the mechanism of the media would have to be publicly owned, in order to create for a citizenry better educated and capable of debate. Archon Fung refers to this as the “God’s-eye perspective” of the public sphere.[i] Another, more modest method would be that the institution of deliberation train arriving participants when they begin on how to argue effectively. While this might make participants all competent in argumentation, it fails to address the problem of specialization in that those with more experience in these types of arguments (lawyers, professors, etc.) would still have disproportionate influence. I am having trouble locating the quotation, but there is an instance in The Republic in which Socrates is indicted for not actually being the most truthful, but being the best with argumentation and rhetoric. Certainly this is situation we have probably all found ourselves in, finding it quite unenjoyable and, more importantly for this brief, unproductive; we are generally not convinced by someone’s superior arguments if we feel they come from higher skill as opposed to better reasoning or understanding.
The other way of making inclusivity and rationality compatible would be to view the process of deliberation not only as a mechanism of argument-exchange, but also as one of argument-formation. In this view, the act of deliberation takes private-based individuals and their arguments and transforms them into something public-minded.[ii] In this view individuals come to deliberate with their own private interests, making arguments that might not be considered “rational arguments” in that they don’t conform with rules of reciprocity. These individuals, through arguing in a setting which is public in nature, would develop their arguments and ideas into claims which could be understood by all, falling in line with reciprocity. In this way the deliberative end is a sort of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium; in that everybody brings their interests to the table, the public interest is developed and understood through the exchange of these ideas, creating an understanding of where certain claims can and cannot be thought to be understood by all. In this view, deliberation does not necessitate that all participants be capable of public-minded arguments; it sees public-mindedness as being created by deliberation.
So, for example, someone could come to the Citizens’ Assembly make certain individually-based claims regarding electoral reform (like that of Bill from Kapuskasing’s original claim which I gave in my original post). These, while perhaps not being valid arguments, are nonetheless crucial for deliberation in that by being compared with other contrasting individually-based claims, participants would be forced to spin their claims out into something which all could come to understand (like the reformulation of Bill’s argument). By being forced to pose their claims in such a manner, participants take their original claims, which might not have been in line with reciprocity, and make them into something which can be understood, and accordingly challenged, by all. In this way, the “non-rational” and “non-public” methods of communicating with Young Ontarian suggests can be seen as valid in a deliberative and rational forum.
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[i] Archon Fung. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338.
[ii] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103.
Changing the nature of the participant into one who is “capable” of deliberation could be accomplished in two different ways: through the institution of deliberation, or through socialization. The latter, more Habermasian view is much broader in implication, essentially arguing that the organization of society has to be radically altered in order to create for citizens more capable of deliberation. Along this line of thinking would be that in order for deliberative processes to function, social inequalities would have to be completely mended, and the mechanism of the media would have to be publicly owned, in order to create for a citizenry better educated and capable of debate. Archon Fung refers to this as the “God’s-eye perspective” of the public sphere.[i] Another, more modest method would be that the institution of deliberation train arriving participants when they begin on how to argue effectively. While this might make participants all competent in argumentation, it fails to address the problem of specialization in that those with more experience in these types of arguments (lawyers, professors, etc.) would still have disproportionate influence. I am having trouble locating the quotation, but there is an instance in The Republic in which Socrates is indicted for not actually being the most truthful, but being the best with argumentation and rhetoric. Certainly this is situation we have probably all found ourselves in, finding it quite unenjoyable and, more importantly for this brief, unproductive; we are generally not convinced by someone’s superior arguments if we feel they come from higher skill as opposed to better reasoning or understanding.
The other way of making inclusivity and rationality compatible would be to view the process of deliberation not only as a mechanism of argument-exchange, but also as one of argument-formation. In this view, the act of deliberation takes private-based individuals and their arguments and transforms them into something public-minded.[ii] In this view individuals come to deliberate with their own private interests, making arguments that might not be considered “rational arguments” in that they don’t conform with rules of reciprocity. These individuals, through arguing in a setting which is public in nature, would develop their arguments and ideas into claims which could be understood by all, falling in line with reciprocity. In this way the deliberative end is a sort of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium; in that everybody brings their interests to the table, the public interest is developed and understood through the exchange of these ideas, creating an understanding of where certain claims can and cannot be thought to be understood by all. In this view, deliberation does not necessitate that all participants be capable of public-minded arguments; it sees public-mindedness as being created by deliberation.
So, for example, someone could come to the Citizens’ Assembly make certain individually-based claims regarding electoral reform (like that of Bill from Kapuskasing’s original claim which I gave in my original post). These, while perhaps not being valid arguments, are nonetheless crucial for deliberation in that by being compared with other contrasting individually-based claims, participants would be forced to spin their claims out into something which all could come to understand (like the reformulation of Bill’s argument). By being forced to pose their claims in such a manner, participants take their original claims, which might not have been in line with reciprocity, and make them into something which can be understood, and accordingly challenged, by all. In this way, the “non-rational” and “non-public” methods of communicating with Young Ontarian suggests can be seen as valid in a deliberative and rational forum.
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[i] Archon Fung. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338.
[ii] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103.
