Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

And the winner is MMP

2007-05-17T13:37:00.000-04:00

We talked about this and I think there was a large agreement that this would be a good choice both in terms of the ideal system for Ontario and in terms of the pragmatics of the system actually being adapted. MMP offers a more proportional system of representation while still allowing for regional representation, an important thing to have in a space as big and socio-environmentally diverse as Ontario. I am curious to see what those at the Public Issues Forum have to say about this.
Of course whether or not this gets buried in the media or in politics is another story. However, there is currently an ammendment to the Election Act in committee right now which, if I am sifting through the legal mumbo jumbo correctly, adds:
"New section 114.1 authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to implement public education and information programs and provide the public with information about the electoral process. Also included is a requirement for a program of public education in preparation for the referendum that is to take place in October, 2007 under the Electoral System Referendum Act, 2007." http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee_business.do?BusinessType=Bill&BillID=1660&locale=en&CommID=141. If that is the case and it goes through then I would say that is certainly a positive, regardless of whether or not you like the CA's reccomendation, in that education can be seen as dealing with the criticisms that surrounded BC's referendum. However, that there was no real education campaign on the CA process itself might render such an effort, if it indeed happens, too little too late.
I am curious to hear everyone's thoughts and to hear what people think at the Public Issues Forum.

Public Issues Forum: The Ethics of Electoral Systems

2007-04-15T21:42:00.000-04:00

The Centre for Ethics announces a Public Issues Forum on the recommendations of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Our speakers will examine normative considerations that are relevant for the evaluation of electoral reforms and discuss the recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly in their light. The event, which is open to the public, will take place on Thursday, May 24, 3pm-5pm at the Vivian and David Campbell Conference Facility of the Munk Centre for International Studies (1 Devonshire Place, Toronto) and will be followed by a reception. The participants in the roundtable are George Thomson, John Ferejohn, Joseph Heath, Andrew Stark, Melissa Williams, and it will be chaired by Amit Ron.

For more information, see: http://ethics.utoronto.ca/publicissues.html

CA Consultation Meetings in Toronto

2007-01-13T03:28:00.000-05:00

Hi all,

The Assembly is currently hosting public consultation meetings all across Ontario (until Jan 25 2007) for anyone interested in coming out to public consultation meetings in Toronto:

1)Wed Jan 17 7-10 pm
Ryerson University
**The George Vari Engineering & Computing Centre**
The Atrium
245 Church Street

*exact location at ryerson corrected*

2)Sun Jan 21 2:30-5:30
Yonge and eglinton area
Northern District Library
40 Orchard View Blvd.

3)Thurs Jan 25 7-10 pm.
Metro Central YMCA
20 Grosvenor Street.

Aside from the meetings in T.O there are upcoming meetings in Etibocoke, Chatham, Kenora etc.
for a full consultation meeting schedule (and more information) please see:

http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/en-CA/Whats-New/EventsRG.aspx

Cheers

Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

2006-12-07T12:20:00.000-05:00

A Call for Further Participation and Deliberation in Ontario

Introduction

This paper is intended to be my final word to my peers and Citizens’ Assembly members concerning all the material, both theoretical and practical, that I have covered on this forum thus far. That being the case, I am writing this paper to be both theoretical and practical, and especially sneaky. Yes, I said sneaky. I will outline my plan right here, so there should be no confusion as to what this paper is actually saying (both on the surface and between the lines).

Theoretically, and on the surface, what I am speaking to in this submission, and the position that I am advocating myself, is the prescription made by deliberative democratic theorists, that citizens’ juries are one way to further realize democratic values. Deliberative democracy is a topic that has been explored in some depth on this forum. So, it may come as no surprise that the thesis of this paper is that systems of competitive representation alone (hint: read ‘first past the post’) do not realize as fully as may be possible the democratic values of political responsibility, political equality, and political accountability. Furthermore, I am arguing that that a more deliberative democracy, made manifest by the increased use of citizens’ juries, may be better able to realize these principles.

In support of my claims I am looking to the model set by the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform, which I take to be prime examples of what deliberative democratic theorists call, “citizens’ juries.” The claim made by these scholars, and I believe this is true of the Citizens’ Assembly and Students’ Assembly, is that citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries build on the “distinctive practical competence that citizens possess as users of public services, subjects of public policy and regulation, or residents who have contextual knowledge of their neighborhoods and ecosystems.”[i] The idea, and it certainly isn’t a new one, is to draw on these competencies by bringing ordinary citizens into deliberation over certain public issues.

As I mentioned earlier however, this paper also has a practical prescription imbedded between the lines. After all, this is a forum dedicated to an institution that may change the face of Ontario. When read between the lines, what this paper is meant to convey is an argument for a change from the conventional ‘first past the post’ electoral system – ideally a more deliberative change.

This paper makes many references to “competitive representation.” The reader should note that although all electoral systems may be classified as falling under this rubric, in the context of this paper – written to be read by a Democratic Theory class and members of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform – the current electoral system in Ontario, which we may also label as our “conventional” method of “competitive representation” is to be read as heavily featured in this regard.

As an aside to members of the Citizens’ Assembly – perhaps a system of forcing political parties (which after all are simply cliques within a larger body politic) to cooperate with each other, in say, coalition governments which are the product of, let say, a more proportionally representative electoral system, might actually make parliament more deliberative in the construction of its policies than, say, the system we have now, where deliberation between parties is meaningless in the face of a single party majority government; government made up by a single party within which deliberation is also meaningless because of a political culture of party discipline – but you’ve all heard enough about that, I’m sure.

That having been said, lets now move back to the topic of the viability of citizens’ juries and how they may serve the function of better realizing certain principles of democracy:

The Normative Foundations of the Citizens’ Assembly

At a theoretical level, it is essential to understand the deeper sentiment behind the Citizens’ Assembly. I am not referring here to campaign promises made by Ontario liberals. Rather, what I am speaking of, and I have argued a similar point in earlier submissions to this forum, is that there is a palpable sentiment in Ontario regarding the perceived legitimacy of our current legislative institution. In fact, it has been documented that in no region of the country does more than a bare majority find the workings of the present electoral system acceptable.[ii] In my understanding of the situation, the move to employ a citizens’ jury to deliberate and adjudicate on the concern of electoral reform reflects a combination of skepticism about the regulatory capacities of the Ontario provincial government and a more general concern about the capacity of conventional democracies to engage the energies of ordinary citizens.[iii]

By “conventional democracy,” I mean the modern liberal democracy, a government of competitive representation, in which citizens are endowed with political rights, including such rights as free speech, free association and universal suffrage. In liberal democracies, citizens may advance their interests by exercising their political rights; in the form of voting for representatives in regular elections. These elections are organized by competing political parties for whom electoral victory means control of government. This gives winning parties and candidates the authority to shape public policy through legislation and control over administration.[iv]

I argued in my first major submission to this forum that any contemporary democracy would need to be organized at least in part as a system of competitive representation. This, I posited, is a basic fact of contemporary political life due to the ever increasing scale, complexity and interconnectedness of modern society.[v] However, for me, as is the case for some academics, the ideal of turning to citizens’ juries and of harnessing the capacities, interests and perspectives of citizens represents a seeking of a fuller realization of democratic values than competitive representation alone can attain.[vi] This is where the literature on deliberative democracy features as a new trend of contemporary political thought.

Indeed as some scholars note, “The ambitious aim of deliberative democracy is to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation and power to the common reason of equal citizens as the dominant force in democratic life.”[vii] And ideally, in the exercise of this common reason no power is at work “except that of the better argument.”[viii] This is the normative foundation upon which the Citizens’ Assembly is founded. The Students’ Assembly mirrors this experience also.

For me, the organization and practice of the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies, and citizens’ juries in general, represents a general commitment to broader participation in public decision-making as a confrontation with the perceived shortcomings of conventional forms of competitive representation. The idea that citizens should have greater direct roles in public choices or at least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgment is not new. It started with the Greek democratic tradition. What the rationale of citizens’ juries does, is emphasize a more deliberative democracy, one in which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them, instead of simply acquiescing to a politics of power and interest.

The Shortcomings of Competitive Representation

Members of the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies will attest to the fact that their work began with an articulation of values and principles against which they would hold to scrutiny the different electoral systems to be studied. I, in a similar manner, want to focus on three principles of democracy, and the normative values they represent, and hold traditional forms of ‘competitive representation’ to scrutiny against these values. These three values are: responsibility, equality, and autonomy.[ix]

1. Political Responsibility. Is a democratic government organized solely as system of competitive representation as responsible in the practice of governance as could be possible were there some inclusion of broader citizen participation in public decision making? Notice, that I am not saying that the existing system is broken or insufficient. In fact, it is notable, especially in Canada and Ontario, that the existing electoral system of competitive representation has played its part in producing and maintaining one of the highest qualities of life on earth. What I am saying, is that the current system is not as responsible to all citizens as might be possible were it to include some form of citizen deliberation and broader citizen participation as part of the legislative process.

Jean Jacques Rousseau said, “As soon as public business ceases to be the citizens’ principal business, and they prefer to serve with their purse rather than with their person, the state is already close to ruin.”[x] Here, he is expressing the idea that the balance of reasons sometimes speaks strongly in favor of performing a task oneself rather than delegating it, especially if a task is of great importance, its performance (both initiation and execution) demands judgment, and the consequences of misjudgment are serious.

Such thought advises against relying excessively upon representatives to make consequential political choices.[xi]

As I noted earlier, competitive representation is not totally deficient. It does provide opportunity, in Ontario, once every 4 years, for citizens to judge for themselves, usually in hindsight, the merits of alternative laws and policies and hold representatives accountable in light of those judgments. However, this is a very limited tool for ensuring official accountability and almost guarantees that citizens will be tempted to leave the hard work of substantive policy judgment to professional politicians. Consequently, the capacities of citizens may in turn atrophy. In light of this, the argument can be made that citizens, lacking democratic skills and habits, may refrain from judging public business except under dire circumstances, and then too, judge poorly.[xii] Participating in deliberative institutions like citizens’ juries, may be one way in which a society can be sure to maintain in its citizens the skills of political participation and judgment.

2. Political Equality. Is a democratic government organized solely as system of competitive representation as equal in the practice of governance as it could be possibly were there some inclusion of broader citizen participation in public decision making? Again, I am not saying that the existing system is completely insufficient. What I am saying, is that the current system is not quite as equitable to all citizens as might be possible were it to include some form of citizen deliberation and broader citizen participation as part of the legislative process.

One great achievement of modern representative democracy is the idea that people should be treated as having equal importance in the processes of collective decision-making.[xiii] Ideally, the political institutions of a modern state will reflect this principle so that ‘formal political equality,’ or suffrage rights, will not depend on property qualifications, gender, race, or social status. Members of the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies will remember, however, that despite such legal equality, social and economic inequalities do still shape opportunities for political influence within systems of competitive representation. For example, it has been shown that a ‘first past the post’ system is less conducive to women’s representation in public office (the amount seats which are filled by women vs. that amount filled by men) than is an ‘open list proportional representation’ system.[xiv]

My point here is one that is made by academics also, that even with the principle of political equality in place, social and economic inequalities shape opportunities for political influence within systems of competitive representation. It should come as no surprise to anyone that economic advantage is one important source of political advantage.

Additionally, scholars note that since it is easier and more practical to mobilize small groups of individuals rather than large ones, competitive representation tends to favor concentrated interests, in which few actors gain large benefits on some policy initiatives, over diffuse ones, where many actors gain small benefits.[xv]

Expanding and deepening citizen participation and engagement in public governance may be the most promising strategy for challenging inequalities stemming from asymmetric concentrations of interests and traditional social and political hierarchies in society. This is why scholars recommend participation and deliberation to increase political equality. Deliberation blunts the power of greater resources with the force of better arguments. Likewise, citizen participation is the most promising cure to the influence conferred by wealth because it implies a shift from organized money to organized people the basis of political contestation.[xvi]

3. Political Autonomy. Is a democratic government organized solely as system of competitive representation as conducive to fostering citizen self-governance as much as possible were there some inclusion of broader citizen participation in public decision making? Again, I am not implying that the current system is completely broken. What I am saying here is that the current system does not foster citizen self-governance to the degree that might be possible were it to include some form of citizen deliberation and broader citizen participation as part of the legislative process.

Scholars assert that systems of competitive representation fail to realize the central democratic ambition to foster political autonomy by enabling people to live by rules that they make for themselves.[xvii] Even though, as was argued in other submissions to this forum, it might be futile to expect all the citizens of a pluralist democracy to achieve political consensus, still John Locke’s concept of self-government remains possible – that citizens agree either by overt or tacit consent to live by the laws of a society, and insisting on the protection of ‘rights and freedoms within that society.’[xviii] What we see in systems of competitive representation however, is that political outcomes result from “differential capacities to mobilize popular constituencies, balances of interest backed by voters or money, complex deals of legislative law-making, or narrow interests capturing the division of government that most concerns them.”[xix] In this sense, competitive representation falls far short of citizen self-governance – it legislates to interests (money), not to citizens’ calls for political autonomy – and reflects bargaining among competing interests, not Locke’s ideal of self-government (choosing to be free within a society).

Theoretically however, in citizens’ juries, laws, policies and prescriptions are the result of processes in which citizens defend solutions to shared problems on the bases of what are generally acknowledged by their fellows to be relevant reasons. I can state from my own experience with the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies, that these two examples of citizens’ juries closely resembled this ideal. As I argued upon returning from facilitating the Students’ Assembly in particular, (and I will use this example because the Citizens’ Assembly has not yet begun its deliberation in earnest) the reasons articulated at this particular citizens’ jury expressed such widely shared values as fairness, legitimacy, accountability, liberty, equal opportunity, public safety, public consultation, pragmatism, respect for tradition and the common good.[xx]

It is quite probable that different citizens might interpret the content of ‘shared values’ differently and assign them different weight. It is also quite probable that citizens will disagree on matters of fact. I saw this happen at the Students’ Assembly as well. Scholars too note that, “In the allocation of scarce resources, different citizens might, for example, assign different importance to advantaging the least advantaged, advantaging those who would benefit most from the resources, and assuring equal chances for access to those resources. Disagreements might also occur over acceptable levels of risk, and about when assurances of freedom of expression are excessively damaging to the equal standing of citizens.”[xxi]

My point here echoes the argument I made in my return submission from the Students’ Assembly. Scholars, who emphasize the importance of reason, still do not expect self- and group-interest to disappear as political forces and aim to ensure that political agreement and appeals to interests are framed by considerations such as fairness, equality and common advantage.[xxii] The literature on deliberative democracy tells us, when citizens take these political values seriously, the political judgments they make are not simply the product of power and interest. Rather, and this is something even citizens whose views do not win out will be able to see, political decisions are supported buy good reasons.[xxiii] Applied to citizens’ juries, and namely our Citizens’ Assembly, what this means is that, despite disagreement, all participating members may regard their conduct as generally guided by their own reason. According to deliberative democratic theory, establishing such political deliberation will realize an ideal of self-government under such conditions of plurality.

In fact, the ideals of responsibility, equality and autonomy may themselves be understood to represent a particular account of political legitimacy. That account, is concordant with the claim made by some political philosophers and political science scholars that, “outcomes are legitimate to the extent that they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question.”[xxiv] The ideal is that all those subject to collective rules should have helped to make those rules.

What “is” Deliberation?

It is possible to further conceptualize how deliberation may better realize political legitimacy by analyzing how scholars conceive of the process of deliberation – what it actually “is.” The conceptualization of how deliberation further realizes political responsibility is rather straightforward – citizens who are part of the process of public policy making are, consequently, politically responsible not only for the inception of new norms, precedents and prescriptions, but are also responsible to their fellow citizens as together, they will live under those same prescribed policies.

Conceptually, deliberation better realizes the ideal of political equality by demanding of any deliberative group, such as a citizens’ jury or assembly, the assurance that public reason and not private power dominates public discussion. Therefore, there must be an insistence on equality between participants. In an inclusive franchise that is meant to deliver decisive decisions, participants must agree to reciprocity in their discussions and give each other equal speaking time and enforcement power (the only limitation to this rule that I can think of, are the personality types and comfort levels of the participants).[xxv] Perhaps then, it is better to think of the process as ‘democratic deliberation’ (not simply, ‘deliberation,’ without the modifier), the focus of which is the making of collective binding decisions, covering all the stages of the decision-making process from problem definition and agenda-setting to discussions of solutions, decision-making and implementation.

Finally, deliberation may also be conceptualized as better realizing the ideal of political autonomy, because the process of deliberation demands not to be removed from questions of agendas, interests, decisions and actions. Democratic deliberation requires that participating members’ arguments for and against certain views be made public if they are to persuade other members. Their views must then be examined and challenged by those others. In this process, “preferences which may be more or less vague, unreflective, ill-informed, and private, will be transformed into more firm, reflective, informed, and other-regarding ones through the deliberative encounter.”[xxvi]

Of course, two prerequisites for such a transformation of ideas are, 1) that participating members are communicatively competent, meaning that they will understand and critically assess the arguments of others and make sound arguments themselves; and 2) that participating members “are willing to be persuaded, to have their preferences transformed in the face of a better argument, and thus to set aside strategic concerns and behaviour in the pursuit of those [transformed] preferences.”[xxvii]

As many theorists note, “voting-centric views see democracy as the arena in which fixed preferences and interests compete via fair mechanisms of aggregation.”[xxviii] I am arguing that citizens’ juries, the Citizen’s Assembly being a prime example of these, are deliberative forums that “focus on the communicative processes of opinion and will formation.”[xxix] They are a mirror of what happens, or what should happen – in an engaged and lively democratic constituency – between citizens before voting actually takes place; they precede voting. Here, “accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy.”[xxx]

This notion of accountability should be primarily understood in terms of “giving an account of something; that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly, justifying public policy.”[xxxi] In this way, deliberative democracy, and its use of citizen’s juries, is an expansion of our consent and voting-based competitively representative democracy. It is also notable that the whole idea that deliberation might better realize democratic ideals rests on the conception of ‘democratic deliberation’ that I have described above. In fact, many of my prior posts to this forum have argued much the same point.[xxxii] This exposition then (the reader will note) draws together much of my research and thought over the past four months within the context of a final draft.

Conclusion and Prescription

I have argued thus far that deliberation and the broader participation in societal governance that it calls for, may better realize for society, the democratic values which presumably, we all share. It fact, it calls us to greater participation in society and governance – since we are the ‘citizens’ to which deliberative democracy makes so many references. It is a thought that harks back to the Greek Tradition of Democracy – the topic on which I made my first lengthy submission to this forum – that citizen participation in the governance of the polis (Citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries) builds on the “distinctive practical competence that citizens possess as users of public services, subjects of public policy and regulation, or residents who have contextual knowledge of their neighborhoods and ecosystems.”[xxxiii] It is interesting that in today’s day and age, it has taken the work of so many scholars to suggest that society renew its commitment to draw on the competencies of citizens by bringing them back into deliberation over certain public issues.

That having been said, (and I intend this next section especially for Citizens’ Assembly members) perhaps a more deliberative legislative institution would also be able to better realize the ideals of democracy. Now the Citizens’ Assembly certainly isn’t going to change the whole organization of how legislation is passed in Ontario. Certainly, even an electoral system of proportional representation is still considered to be “competitive representation” broadly defined. What is important, I am arguing, is how closely the process of government formation and discussion of legislation in the Ontario Parliament resembles and approximates democratic deliberation.

For example, by forcing political parties to form coalition governments, through an electoral system of, say, List PR, policy prescriptions that may have been more or less one sided and partisan may be transformed into more inclusive legislation as different parties, representing the views of ‘different thinking’ Ontarians, deliberate over policy initiatives and government management. Or, here’s another example, ballots that are categorical in nature may be conceptualized as “stepping into the public forum, shouting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and leaving.” Contrast this idea with an ordinal ballot that represents the ordered preferences of each citizen brought into dialogue with the preferences of every other citizen. (By this estimation, choosing to mark an ordinal ballot in a categorical way would only represent a deliberate choice the part of the citizen to keep certain preferences private, or to refrain from fuller public participation. Already so many citizens make the conscious choice not to participate in public governance by not voting.)

I have now, at the end of four months, finally put down my opinion of electoral reform in Ontario. Hopefully, I have also articulated a convincing argument (hopefully someone important is reading this) to export the idea of citizens’ juries to other public policy issues as well (and to other places). Whatever outcome the Citizens’ Assembly prescribes, I believe that already, a tremendous service has been done to the political culture of Ontario. Perhaps this won’t be the last Citizens’ Assembly that we witness.

[i] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[ii] André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians, Vol. 17 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Toronto, 1991, p. 79.

[iii] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Scholar84, The Greek and Republican Traditions of Democracy, posted on Sept. 29^th 2006, www.pol484.blogspot.com

[vi] Simone Chambers, 2003, Deliberative Democratic Theory, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 6: 307-26, p 308.

[vii] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[viii] Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Thomas McCarthy (Trans.), Beacon Press (August 25, 1975).

[ix] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[x] Jean-JacquesRousseau, Social Contract, Book, III, chap. 15

[xi] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Simone Chambers, 2003, Deliberative Democratic Theory, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 6: 307-26, p 308.

[xiv] Alan Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1968, p. 55-80 and William P. Irvine, Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? Kingston, Ontario, 1979.

[xv] William P. Irvine, "A Review and Evaluation of Electoral Reform Proposals," in Peter Aucoin, editor, Institutional Reforms for Representative Government, Volume 38 of the research studies, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985, p. 71-109.

[xvi] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapters 7-2, 18

[xix] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[xx] Scholar84, The Possible Future of Citizens’ Juries, posted on Nov. 24^th 2006, www.pol484.blogspot.com

[xxi] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[xxii] Scholar84, The Possible Future of Citizens’ Juries, posted on Nov. 24^th 2006, www.pol484.blogspot.com

[xxiii] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[xxiv] John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000

[xxv] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996

[xxvi] Joshua Cohen, "The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy," Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 6, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 25-50

[xxvii] John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000

[xxviii] Simone Chambers, 2003, Deliberative Democratic Theory, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 6: 307-26, p 308.

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Scholar84, CA Observation Report, posted on Nov. 3^rd 2006, www.pol484.blogspot.com and Scholar84, Class Presentation Response, posted on Sept. 22^nd 2006, www.pol484.blogspot.com

[xxxiii] Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

Comment: In response to Scholar84 on deliberation

2006-12-06T16:40:00.000-05:00

In this comment on the CA, I’d like to address a question Scholar84 posed to me (Response to Young Ontarian Nov 11) on how, as a member of the CA, I view the deliberative process and its potential results.

First, as Scholar84 started with a personal note; I’m compelled to do the same. I’ve really enjoyed being part of this class and have learnt a lot from my classmates that has made being in the CA a lot more meaningful. I started out with no background on democratic theory and have finished having learnt a great deal so thanks to everyone especially Professor Ron!

Now, to steal Scholar84’s line- back to business! I agree with Scholar84s conception of deliberation as a process that includes the ‘synthesis of two or more opposing arguments’(Scholar84) in a forum of ‘free and public reasoning of equal citizens.”(Bohman pg 402) with the goal-through the public transformation of interests- of determining the common good. Although I have a lot of faith in the deliberative process and its ability to produce a common good, I am cautious to support the theoretical view that Scholar84 presents that “at the end of the CA’s deliberations, all the members will be wholly convinced…or I should say, wholly in support of the decision.”

In his article, “The coming of age of deliberative democracy", Bohman highlights that prominent deliberative democratic theorist Habermas focuses on a procedural ideal of deliberation. As Bohman highlights, ‘the problem is that this account does not show why the reasons for any such decision are good reasons.(pg.402) I think that this is an especially relevant concern, (Thrysamachus addressed this in his post “Validating the Non-rational”) as members of the CA haven’t been specifically trained in how to present rational arguments which conform to the substantive criteria of reciprocity, publicity and accountability outlined by Guttman and Thomas. Put simply, how are we to insure that, in the end, the reasons the CA give for choosing one electoral system over another are the right reasons? I think this is an especially valid concern considering the limitations that the CA is facing, mainly the constraints of a tight timeline and incomplete information (as highlighted in Bohman pg. 3).

During the deliberation phase, the CA will have only three to four weekends to make a decision on whether to keep the current system or recommend a new one. I express concern that this amount of time, even if the deliberation does follow a perfect procedure (and all participants do adhere to the principles of reciprocity, legitimacy, and accountability-a theoretical dream and practical impossibility), may not be enough time to properly transform interests through the deliberative process in order to ascertain the common good. Secondly, the assembly is dealing with incomplete information as, due to the complex nature of electoral systems, it is impossible to know exactly what the effects of a certain electoral system will be when you implement it within the culture of Ontario.

Considering this, I think that (while I'm wholy in support of consensus decision making) it isn’t necessary that all members end up in support of the decision solely because it is a product of deliberation. I do think however, that any assembly member who would vote ‘no’ to a proposed option in a referendum should make their concerns known through the proceedings and, if their preferences remain untransformed for whatever reason, they should vote against any proposed change within the assembly. In fact, in the BC assembly’s final vote; 11 people voted to keep FPTP and in a second vote asking whether or not STV should be recommended to the people of BC, 7 people voted no.(2)

A final thought; not wanting too sound cynical, due to the reasons mentioned, I think it would be worrying if, in the end, the CA votes unanimously for one system or another. I say this because due to the nature of the question (as Scholar84 highlights) it is highly unlikely that there will be a unanimous decision. Further, if a unanimous decision were to result; I would wonder whether or not that was a result of the true opinions of assembly members or whether or not it arose due to a faulty process that did not protect against the psychological pressures to conform to the group (groupthink) I think that, even at the end of deliberation, there is a role for dissenting opinion.

Hope that answers your question Scholar84!

(1)James Bohman. "The coming of age of deliberative democracy". The Journal of political philosophy. Vol 4 No. 4, 1998. (pg 400-425)

(2)"Making every vote count; the case for electoral reform in British Columbia". Citizens' Assembly Final report, 2004, pg 15.
http://www.abacon.com/commstudies/groups/groupthink.html

Representation and Electoral Systems

2006-12-06T15:39:00.000-05:00

In this post (my final essay), I will examine a topic that has been central to our course; the nature of representation. The question of representation is undoubtedly one of the central issues in the work of the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) in that, ultimately, the assembly is trying to decide which electoral system best represents the interests and values of Ontarians. In this post, I will argue that the current First Past the Post (FPTP) system is, compared to other electoral systems, inadequately representing the population of Ontario. On examining the ways in which FPTP is inadequate, I present a mixed system, mainly Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) as a viable alternative that the CA should strongly consider during deliberation.

Defining representation

Before considering what electoral system may best represent Ontario, it is critical to ask, how does one define representation? Hanna Pitkin, whose seminal work, Representation (1972) started our semester, defines representation as simply “to make present again.(1) By extension, this definition says that political representation entails making citizens’ voices present in the process of public policy making (Dovi Pg 1). Although this definition seems deceptively simple; Pitkin argues that the complexity of the concept lies in the paradoxical nature of representation which, by definition, entails having the voices of the electorate, simultaneously both present and absent in the legislature(2). The crux of Pitkin’s argument is that the concept of representation can be defined in numerous, sometimes contradictory ways. To take one of numerous examples, a political representative can be seen as either a delegate or a trustee. The delegate view sees the representative as directly expressing the preferences of the constituents whereas the trustee view sees the representative as someone who’s been elected to employ their own understanding of the best course of action (Dovi). This example serves to highlight Pitkin’s assertion that “there is no agreement to what representation is or means.” (Pitkin,pg 7). She argues that the best way to view the concept is to accept the multiplicity of definitions by looking to the appropriate context in order to understand what is meant by the term. (Pitkin pg. 8).

Representation theory applied to Queen’s Park

Considering representation is such a complex, multifaceted concept; which definition(s) best help us understand how we Ontarians are represented at Queen’s Park? Studlar and McAllister discuss that parliamentarians in Westminister-style democracies (Canada, U.K ,Australia and New Zealand) view their role as “locals, who focus on articulating local concerns and interests; partisans, who see their role in party political terms; and legislators, who emphasize the parliamentary role of an elected representative.” (3). This definition highlights the multiple facets of representation and how this complexity translates into a multiplicity of roles for the representative. Given the representative role of MPPs; which theory of representation best defines how we view our representatives? MPPS (and more generally parliamentarians in the Westminister democratic tradition) can best be described using the representatives as trustees model (Pease,pg 22). Although voters vote for a specific representative due, in part, to their ideology and stand on important issues; the representative as a trustee model is fitting because, due to the complexity of today’s issues, the electorate do not necessarily have the interest or the specialized knowledge to delegate their will on every specific issue that arises in parliament. For that reason, we entrust our representatives to represent us by using their best judgment.

There is also an alternative, modern interpretation of the role of the political representative that also applies to how we view our MPPs. This view, that developed due to the rise of importance of the modern political party, sees parliamentarians that are within major parties “as (neither) trustees nor delegates of their voters, but as partisans(Pease, pg 27)." This points to the complexity of the conflict that parliamentarians can often face when pressure to represent their political party (or colloquially, to ‘tow the party line’) is in direct conflict with the pressure to act as a trustee on behalf of their constituents. Given how we can best define the general representative role MPPs, the question of importance to the Citizens’ Assembly that follows is how well does the current electoral system represent Ontarians? I argue that, compared to other electoral systems, the FPTP system fails at adequately representing Ontarians in two ways; Firstly, the amount of seats a party is awarded after the election is not representative of the proportion of citizens who voted for that particular party and secondly, the current legislature does not adequately represent the demographics diversity of Ontario’s population.

FPTP and inadequate representation

a)FPTP and lack of proportionality

The first reason FPTP fails to adequately represent the voice of Ontarians in Queens Park (and the major criticism of the FPTP system), is the fact that the number of seats a party gets in parliament is not representative of the number of votes that the party got during the election. FPTP exaggerates the proportion of seats for the parties with the most support while underrepresenting parties with less support. For example, in the last provincial election, the Liberals got 46.5% of the popular vote and 66.6% of the seats at Queen’s park (72 of 103). Conversely, the NDP got 14.7% of the vote and was awarded 6.7% of the seats (7 of 103)(5) This discrepancy is a result of a high volume of ‘wasted votes’; wasted votes referring to ballots cast
that aren't used to elect a representative. The traditional argument for FPTP is that this disproportionality in the votes to seats ratio is a necessary trade off as it produces majority governments known for their stability. This argument, however is weaker than it may first appear (a discussion on stability being saved for another time) and, although admits to the inadequacies of representation, the argument doesn’t address how problematic the issue of inadequate representation really is.

Another related issue of representation arises from this discrepancy between how many votes a party gets and how many seats it gets. That is that voters, frustrated by the high number of ‘wasted votes’ characteristic of FPTP, are less likely to vote in the first place therefore making parliament representative of fewer Ontarians. Although there are numerous factors that affect voter turnout, (for example culture and education) the fact remains that countries using a proportional representation electoral system have a higher voter turn out than those under FPTP. Blais and Karty (1990) show that the higher turnout rate holds even when controlling for other variables aside from the electoral system. The representative nature of the legislature has been criticized due to the low number of voters who turn out for elections.

b) FTPF and lack of demographic diversity

The second reason why FPTP is inadequately representative is because it does not properly reflect the demographic diversity of the electorate. For example, although women make up just over 50% of the population, Queen’s Park currently has 17 MPPs who are women representing just 16.5% of the legislature. Visible minorities are also grossly underrepresented at the provincial level. It has been a common argument within the assembly that it doesn’t matter what demographic the representative belongs to as long as they are good MPPs who serve their constituents well. Although this is not incongruous with the trustee model of representation, it doesn’t take into account the institutional element of marginalization and how this has served to create a unique voice for historically marginalized groups such as women and visible minorities. In her widely acclaimed book Voice, Trust, and Memory (1998), Melissa Williams presents her theory of representation as mediation in order to provide a theoretical framework for why marginalized groups are best self-represented in the legislature(6). In her theory of representation of mediation, Williams’ expands on Pitkin’s assertion that representation is a complex, multifaceted concept by saying that, “The complexity of representation arises from the fact that its institutions and processes mediate between citizen concerns and governmental decisions in several ways.”(pg.8). (For a more detailed discussion of Williams' reprenstation as mediation please see my post: underrepresented groups and the CA) Williams argues that underrepresented groups are best represented by members of their own group in the legislature because of two factors; voice and memory. Williams’ posits that marginalized groups are best self-represented in the legislature because only members of that particular group have the ‘distinct voice’ that stems from the experience of systemic discrimination (pg 13). Secondly, she contends that the most effective legislature-constituent relationship for marginalized, underrepresented groups is to have a representative from their own group as this fosters trust in the representative that is difficult to cultivate, because of a history of discrimination, if the representative is a member of the dominant group(pg 9). Williams’ concept of representation as mediation provides a theoretical framework useful for understanding the faults of the argument that demographics aren’t a relevant factor when choosing representatives. Her theory, based on the experiences of marginalized groups in the U.S, helps us understand why a more equitable demographic representation in the legislature is critical.

A more representative alternative

Considering the inadequacies in our FPTP in terms of demographic representation and the lack of proportionality for political parties; what alternative electoral systems can the Citizens’ Assembly explore in order to better represent Ontario? I argue that the Assembly should strongly consider MMP because, as a mixed electoral system,MMP has the capacity to address the inadequacies of FPTP concerning proportional representation and the lack of adequate demographic representation. Further, unlike the most proportional national List PR system, the mixed nature of MPP incorporates the geographic representation element that is deeply ingrained in Ontarian democracy.

A Case for MMP:

Proportional representation

The key difference that would make MMP more representative of Ontarians is
the added proportional vote (designed to compensate for the discrepency in proportionality resulting from the FPTP ballot) on the MMP ballot. A PR system has the ability to address both the failings of representation presented by the FPTP system; the discrepancy between votes a party obtains in an election and seats they are awarded as well as the demographic imbalance in the legislature. Proponents of proportional representation, dating back to prominent political philosopher John Stewart Mill have argued for PR systems because they contributes to ‘citizen efficacy’ due to the lack of ‘wasted votes’ characteristic of FPTP. The more proportional a system is the more ‘citizen are able to identify a representative whom they have had some role in electing’. (Williams, pg 218). This fact bore out in New Zealand where a switch to MMP diluted the strength of the two major parties and gave seats to smaller parties, with 8 parties winning seats in the 2005 election. (7) Voter turnout was also positively affected by a switch to MMP in New Zealand; although the results are not as dramatic as one may have hoped, it’s shown that the adoption of MMP has, so far, stalled the decline in voter turnout. (Vowles,pg13). This shows that that there’s empirical evidence that a more proportional system more adequately represents the diversity of views of the electoral and also tends to represent a larger number of voters than FPTP.

Demographic representation

In terms of improving demographic representation, first, it’s important to note that studies show that the single most important variable affecting cross-national variation in the number of women and minorities in parliament is the electoral system (Arseneau) This supports Williams’ argument which focuses on the role of institutions, like the electoral system, in mediating the relationship between constituents and government decision-making (pg 16). It highlights that institutional barriers play an absolutely critical role in determining who represents us. (please see my comment on the Sept. 30 meeting of the CA for a discussion on direct vs. indirect barriers to entry into the legislature.) In her discussion on institutional design, Williams highlights that PR electoral systems are seen by advocates of marginalized group representation as ‘the most promising direction of institutional reform’ (pg. 215). Regarding MMP in particular, it’s noted that, compared to FPTP the MMP system ‘enhances the legislative presence not only of minority political parties but also of women and ethnic minorities'(pg 217). The case of New Zealand, a Westminister- style parliamentary democracy such as Ontario that made the transition from FPTP to MMP, shows that the adoption of the MMP model significantly increased the amount of women in parliament. In 1996, there were 35 women MPs representing 29% of the legislature (25 of which came from the party list as opposed to constituency MPs) .Further, in the first MMP election in 1996, 15 Maori MPs were elected which was roughly proportionate to their population (Arseneau, pg. 3.) It’s important to note that these gains in the representation of women and visible minorities in MMP were made through the party list. The party list element is what increases the representation of women and minorities in part because political parties, having to produce a comprehensive list of candidates, want to visibly appear to be inclusive because “it’s a statement of how the party sees itself and who it represents; failure to present a “balanced ticket” is more highly visible (Arseneau pg.10)Party lists can vary in being open or closed, both of which have their tradeoffs in terms of representation. Because of space constraints, and the fact that this is a design element within the electoral system, I will leave the discussion of open vs. closed lists and their tradeoffs in representation to another time. For the scope of this paper, it is suffice to say that research supports that a list-PR element is shown to increase the demographic representation of marginalized groups.

My discussion of increased proportionality and demographic representation in the MMP system leads to the conclusion that it’s a much more representative electoral system for Ontario. Knowing that national list PR is the most proportional system due in part to its high district magnitude and focus on party lists, it must be explained why MMP is a better alternative for Ontario than list-PR. The reason, which adds a further layer of complexity to representation, is that it incorporates the Westministarian tradition of geographic representation (in the form of ridings) whereas national list PR does not.

Geographical representation

Any discussion on representative institutions within the Westminister tradition involves the central role of geographic representation. Ontario has a history of
dividing voters into constituencies based on what region they live in, whether it be northern and rural or southern and urban. Constituency case work is seen as one of the central roles of MPPs meaning that the thing that they are representing in the legislature as a trustee (in theory at least) are the voices of people within their geographically based constituency (Pease, pg. 27) Recently, it has been questioned whether or not geographic representation is necessary especially in a modern context where may issues transcend the communities represented by geographic ridings. Williams’ explains that list PR systems are favourable because they allow people to form ‘self-defined constituencies’ without being bound by arbitrary geographical boundaries. (pg 215) Further, Although the The Law commission of Canada (2004) concluded the a geographical representation element was critical in determining a more representative electoral system for Canada they acknowledge that, “the limited research on geographic representation suggests that the link between constituents and their elected representatives may not be as important as we initially thought" (Pease,pg 28) (8). Although recent work suggests that geographical representation may not be a necessity, I, and numerous others, maintain that in Ontario (at this point in time) any electoral system chosen must maintain the tradition of geographic representation.

William’s concept of listening (pg.12) to marginalized groups in order to determine what their needs are (on which she based her representation as mediation theory) is useful in understanding why geographic representation still matters to Ontarians. First, from the geographic representation working group presentation, it is evident that citizens from Northern Ontario already feel marginalized at Queen’s Park (there is a perception that the legislature is too focused on issues concerning urban southern Ontario) and that any move away from strong constituency representation of the North would be seen as unacceptable. Secondly, from discussions within small groups at the assembly it is clear that people value having a regional representative, who they can go to, should they wish, in order to express concerns. People feel that the fact that the MPP is elected to represent a riding makes he or she directly accountable to the people that are being represented. This accountability is best expressed by a common saying that if you don’t like how you’re being represented you can directly, “vote the bums out”. This sentiment seems to be echoed in the consultation meetings throughout Ontario; assembly members are reporting back from their consultation meetings that many Ontarians are advocating for MMP because of their desire for ‘the best of both worlds’ (meaning both proportional and geographic representation). This shows that, in listening to Ontarians, geographic representation remains an important element in how Ontarians conceptualize how they’re represented in parliament.

MMP and unresolved issues of representation

Although MMP is better representative that FPFP; MMP, (like all systems) is imperfect, and has its own complex issues of representation. Within the assembly, there has been much debate over the fact that MMP produces two different types of representatives; constituent representatives and party list MPPs. It has been argued that list representatives aren’t directly accountable to the voters and in fact, there has been some problems in New Zealand where unpopular constituency candidates who didn’t win constituency seats were awarded seats by political parties through the list-PR component of the system (Vowles pg.11) If Ontario were to adopt MMP, this issue could be resolved by stipulating that candidates must choose either to run as a list candidate or constituency candidate but not both. Another issue raised with MMP is how to define the role of the two types of representatives. Clearly, this transition to the dual nature of MPPS would change the role of representatives as defined by parliamentarians in the Westminister system. In their transition, New Zealand experienced some conflict where it was perceived that, in some cases, list-MPs were trying to provide similar services to communities as constituent MPPs (Vowles, pg 11). When this issue was discussed in the assembly it was argued that two types of MPPs would likely better represent Ontarians if they accepted two distinct roles. Constituent MPPs would continue to focus on their local role whereas List MPPs would focus on their legislative role. They could be chosen on their expertise on certain issues of importance to Ontarians, i.e advocating for recent immigrants or the environment. In this way, Ontarians could have representatives in parliament that focused on representing local concerns as well as well representatives that were responsible for issue based advocacy.

STV

In this paper, I have argued that the MMP system should be seriously considered by the assembly because it addresses some of the inadequacies of FPTP. Although the Single Transferable Vote (STV) alternative also incorporates geographic representation and PR (and is arguably more representative because of a higher district magnitude within ridings; known to allow for more equitable representation of women and minorities) I contend that this system would not be as efficient in the geographical representation of Ontarians because, in order not to increase the size of the legislature to a size that would be unfavourable to Ontarians, the geographic ridings would have to be significantly increased across the province. In listening to members from the North, it is evident that this alternative would be unacceptable to Northern Ontarians who already have large geographical ridings. On the other hand, MMP could increase proportionality by maintaining similar riding demarcations and adding a modest realm of list seats, perhaps around 30.(9)

Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined the concept of political representation and how it applies to how we Ontarians view our MPPs at Queen’s Park. I have reviewed FPTP and
have concluded, like many others before me, that it doesn’t adequately represent Ontario. I have argued that the CA should seriously consider the MMP system during deliberation as it is better suited to effectively represent the people of Ontario. MMP is better representative because the list PR portion of the system will correct the inadequacies of representation in FPTP while maintaining geographic representation.

It is important to highlight that I have examined the current electoral system and a possible alternative using the framework of representation. There are, of course other criteria in addition to an electoral system's ability to represent the voice of people which can be used as an evaluative tool. The CA, for example considers among its values effective government, legitimacy and accountability as some of the other dimensions of importance. This means that, examining the electoral system with a focus on another value (and a willingness to compromise on proportional representation) may well yield a different result. Further, as the CA’s mandate covers only the electoral system, I have not extended my discussion to include how well MPPs are able to carry out their day to day work as representatives in parliament. For example, in New Zealand, although a higher proportion of women were elected under MMP, there are mixed results over how much power this more equitable representation actually gave women in the legislature (Arseneau). This highlights that, in order to get a complete picture of the nature of effective representation for Ontarians, it would be important to extend the discussion to how well representatives can carry out their representative roles once elected into the legislature. This indicates that the electoral system is only one piece of the puzzle and that although many gains in representation can be made by electoral reform, there are of course limitations to what electoral reform can and can’t accomplish.

References

(1)Susan Dovi. "Political Representation". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Jan, 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/

(2)Hanna Pitkin. Representation. New York: Atherton Press, 1969: 16.

(3)Therese Arsenau. "The Representation of Women and Aboriginals under Pr: Lessons learnt from New Zealand"; 1997. http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/nov97/arseneau.pdf

(4)Pease, Hilary. "Geographic representation and electoral reform". Canadian Parliamentary Review; 2005.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Infoparl/english/issue.htm?param=171&art=1155

(5)"Tories toppled by Liberal landslide" Ontario Votes 2003. CBC, 2003. http://www.cbc.ca/ontariovotes2003/

(6)Vanessa Williams. Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized groups and the failings of liberal representation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.

(7)Jack Vowles et. al. "Forecasting and evaluating the consequences of electoral change in New Zealand", 2005. http://www.nzes.org/docs/papers/ap_2005.pdf

(8)Is is worthy of mention that the Law Comission of Canada recommended MMP on a federal level. "Valuing Canadians: the options for voting system reform in Canada"Law Comission of Canada,2005.
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/research_project/03_valuing_8-en.asp

(9)Jonathan Rose, in teaching the assembly about electoral systems, highlighted that research shows that a 25% increase in the size of the legislature would be sufficient to increase proportionality.

Comment on Glaucon’s November 25 Observation Report

2006-12-05T15:18:00.000-05:00

As always, Glaucon’s reasoning is logical and informative. Here I intend to build on Glaucon’s idea that there are inherent difficulties in the design of deliberative bodies.

The working groups that Lang recommends are a proposed solution for the central problem she outlines earlier in her paper:

“Many deliberative processes continue to suffer from a tension surrounding who will control the parameters, substance, and structure of discussion” (Lang, p. 2).

Given that there is no ‘correct’ answer to the sorts of problems suited to mini-publics, any system will inevitably be criticized for failing to give enough consideration to one facet or another. For example, Glaucon criticizes the Assembly for its failure to spend adequate time considering women and minority representation in the political system.

If the Assembly did spend ‘adequate time’ on the issue (whatever length of time that might be), it would have to find the time somewhere. Perhaps it would take time away from Dr. Rose’s presentations on the various electoral systems, when members learn the characteristics of the designs they are considering. Perhaps the sessions would run later and take time away from Saturday evenings, when numerous observers report that some of the most enlightening informal discussions take place. In any case, there would be some who would criticize the Assembly for failing to give adequate time to one aspect over another.

Beyond the limitations in time, there are also limitations in structure. If, as the designer of a mini-public, you believe that minority rights have primacy, then surely you will believe in the value of a mini-public structure that encourages minority voices. If so, who should design that structure? And should the process of that structure’s design not include minority voices as well? Where does it end?

In the case that Glaucon addresses, the practical problem is building reflexivity into the agenda-setting process. If we accept the importance that Lang puts on agenda-setting, the Assembly members must be given more say in the agenda-setting process. But as Glaucon suggests, what is to be done if the agenda-setting process is not adequate? Is taking Amy Lang’s suggestions enough, or do we need to develop a process for designing the agenda-setting process?

Bohman’s survey paper points out that this kind of circuitous search for first principles is an inherent problem in the design of deliberative bodies:

“Deliberative democracy seems caught on the horns of a dilemma: if it establishes its moral credentials of legitimacy via an ideal procedure, it cannot underwrite its epistemic claims; if it establishes its epistemic claims, they can only be underwritten by standards that are not only procedure-independent, but also independent of deliberation” (p. 413).

Based on his observation, I do not disagree with Glaucon’s proposition that the Assembly’s working groups, as they are structured, are not adequately empowered to put minority issues on the table. But to address the problem we must first understand the challenges involved in trying to develop a mini-public structure that does give minority issues their rightful voice.

The task at hand lies in the Bohman article as well. While there is no perfect design for deliberative bodies, “a fuller realization of deliberative democracy awaits the many experiments that will produce a ‘proliferation of institutional designs” (p. 417).

References

Bohman, J. (1998). The coming age of deliberative democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 400-425.

Lang, A. (2006). Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizens’ Assembly. Madison, WI: Department of Sociology.

Comment on Publius’s Assembly Report for November 25, 2006

2006-12-05T07:04:00.000-05:00

Attending a breakout group on the results of the mixed system simulation, Publius describes “two exhibitions of representation becoming visible here, but they have both been muddled by the procedure which the Assembly has been mandated with”. He goes on to describe how the Assembly as a whole does not fit into any of the visions of representation outlined in Pitkin’s seminal essay “The Concept of Representation”.

Publius’s argument is sound. It is difficult to neatly match mini-publics like the Citizens’ Assembly with any of those conceptions of representation. Brown describes the general problem in this way:

“Citizen panels present a genuine conundrum for theories of political representation. Both conceptually and institutionally, they fall into a gap between the informal deliberative institutions of the public sphere and the formal decision-making bodies of the states”. (Brown, p. 1)

When we limit ourselves to the historical range of perspectives surveyed in Pitkins’ 1969 piece, however, we impede innovative experiments in representation like the Citizens’ Assembly. Democratic theory is not a dead science like alchemy. For as long as human relationships and decision-making continue to evolve we will have to develop new ways of describing them.

Mark B. Brown’s model approaches representation as a collection of elements that different political bodies exhibit in different amounts. Each institution can be described as a balance between five distinct elements: authorization, accountability, expertise, participation and resemblance. Brown encourages us not to aim for some unattainable ‘best’ vision of representation, but instead to examine how each political institution inhabits its own place in the spectrum.

Looked at through the lens of Brown’s model, the Assembly’s resemblance to Ontarians doesn’t have to preclude its expertise. The two can co-exist simultaneously in the balance of elements that characterize the Assembly.

In Brown’s model, the trained Assembly may not resemble Ontarians’ level of democratic expertise as well as a random sample of untrained people would, but it does represent them (in this sense) better than a group of political science professors. And while the Assembly does not fulfill the expertise element of representation in the same way a collection of ivory tower-dwelling political science professors would, it does much better than the random sample. The Assembly is somewhere in the middle, with a strong allotment of each element.

In fact, the Assembly is a good example of where Brown’s model can prove useful. The technical and political components of the Assembly’s mission are very much intertwined. Trustee representatives (the political science professors) would be accused of failing to share the laypeople’s interests, and descriptive representatives (the random sample) would be accused of being uninformed. A large part of the assembly’s merit lies in the fact that it attempts to combine technical training and a representative sample of Ontarians to arrive at the best flavour of representation for the job.

Perhaps the most useful part of Brown’s model is his replacement of competing systems for representation with a garden of democratic institutions, each one suited to its own purpose. Citizens’ Assemblies do not replace the participation of groups of average citizens, who are captured by polls. They do not replace issue experts, who are consulted in Royal Commissions. Instead they add to the variety on offer. Brown’s vision is that:

“The various institutions and practices of representation are best evaluated not with reference to the concept of representation as a whole, but in terms of their specific contributions to a larger system of representative democracy” (Brown, p. 207).

References

Brown, M. B. (2006). Survey article: Citizen panels and the concept of representation. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14, 203-225.

Pitkin, H. F. (1969). Introduction: the concept of representation. Representation. ed. Pitkin, H. F. Atherton Press.

Has the Assembly incorporated the recommendations of Amy Lang’s paper on agenda-setting in the BC Citizens Assembly?

2006-12-04T21:52:00.000-05:00

Evidence from the class’s discussion with Susan Pigott and elsewhere.

Amy Lang’s evaluation of expert influence and citizen autonomy in the BC Citizens’ Assembly concludes with the following recommendation:

“A more explicit focus on processes of agenda-setting may result in a more varied and responsive discussion among participants, and increase the legitimacy of deliberative forums as institutions for public decision-making.” (Lang, p. 16)

In the paper, Lang also looks ahead to the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly and its use of working groups as a possible actualization of her suggestion. Can the groups develop deep discussion on issues that “might be otherwise constrained by the cultural biases or emotional responses of participants” (Lang, p. 16)? Based on the evidence at hand, including Citizen Engagement chief Susan Pigott’s visit to our class, has the Assembly been successful?

At the heart of Lang’s recommendation is the belief that small, deliberative groups, empowered to inform the design of their own agenda, can help deliberative forums mitigate the structural biases infused by their leadership and administrators. An agenda does not in itself silence discussion, but it can certainly prevent a latent issue from becoming an item for decision. Bachrach and Baratz describe the issue in this way:

“Power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively ‘safe’ issues. . . to the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be detrimental to A’s set of preferences" (p. 948).

To counter this factor, the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly introduced two features that were not present in the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly: working groups and advisory committees composed of volunteer members. When our discussion with Susan Pigott turned to how Ontario’s deliberation phase would be organized, she started off by saying that these bodies would have an important stake in the development of the agenda.

The working groups are four groups of 3 to 10 Assembly members tasked with researching and reporting on topics (content issues) they believe to be worth further investigation. The chair proposed a list of topics, but the Assembly is free to change these if they like. The groups have to relate the topics to the Assembly’s task, decide which ones merit discussion by the full Assembly, and report their findings to the Assembly (OCAER, 2006). The chair’s list of proposed topics seems to have been informed by issues found to be contentious at the BC Assembly: it includes Women (and Other Under-represented Groups) and Geographic Representation as two of the four topics. By suggesting topics but allowing the working groups complete control over what issues they choose to examine, I believe the chair has given Assembly members the control that Lang proposes over what issues are on their agenda.

The advisory committees are four groups, similar in size to the working groups, tasked with giving members a strong voice in the Assembly process. Each one has a distinct purpose:

Evaluation of Assembly Process – Review and comment to improve Assembly process as it goes.
Public Consultation Submissions – Review consultation summaries and draw Assembly’s attention to the best ones.
Deliberation Phase Planning – Help the Chair develop a plan for structure of the deliberation phase.
Final Report – Review and comment on the draft version of the final report before it is shared with the rest of the Assembly.

(Ibid.)

Again, we can see where the Assembly leadership has tried to address specific problems identified by Lang. The Evaluation of Assembly Process committee gives Ontario members more of a say in recalibrating the Assembly process while it is happening, something that would have helped BC Assembly members to “check” their Chair’s opinion that the number of seats in the legislature was outside the Assembly’s mandate. The Deliberation Phase Planning committee gives Ontario members more of a say in setting the agenda for that important phase, a power that would likely have given the BC Assembly members more say in the procedures used to affirm their core values and agree on their MMP system.

In our class discussion, Susan Pigott also alluded to the fact that Ontario Assembly members will have a chance to add to the eight core principles and characteristics that will drive its evaluation of the various electoral systems. Unlike British Columbia, Ontario’s Assembly is not burdened with an arbitrary, fixed number of core values to consider. However, the Ontario Assembly is compelled by the legislature to consider its eight specific principles and characteristics. While the Ontario Assembly is “allowed to consider any other principles or characteristics it believes are important” (OCAER, 2006), there is clearly a lack of control by the Assembly if it cannot separate, combine, delete, or otherwise edit the base principles it uses to evaluate the electoral options. If the Ontario Assembly was designed with reflexivity in mind, then this is clearly a flaw.

Any body centered on democratic reform will inevitably be criticized for straying from some particular vision of democracy. The inherent trade-offs between various factors means that a perfect system is likely impossible. Lang explains the situation:

“In deliberative forums, the deliberative ideal – careful consideration of information, possible courses of action and the opinions of all participants – is constrained by the problems of organizing and co-ordinating these activities” (Lang, p. 2).

In the case of the Ontario Assembly, while the structures to empower its members have been included, we will have to wait until the process is done to see whether the working groups and advisory committees truly do increase the legitimacy of the Assembly as a deliberative forum. The only way to ascertain their effectiveness is to observe the interactions between the eight groups and the Assembly, its leadership, and its administrators throughout the process and evaluate the outcomes. Only with a detailed analysis like the one Lang provides can we gain a clearer picture of how these tools function in practice within a mini-public. Early in the life of mini-publics as we are, the feedback of participants like Susan Pigott, the members, and researchers like Amy Lang is of utmost importance.

References

Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M S. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 56, 947-952.

Lang, A. (2006). Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizens’ Assembly. Madison, WI: Department of Sociology.

Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. (2006). Working Groups & Advisory Committees (presentation). Retrieved on November 30 from http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/GetFile.aspx?aliaspath=%2Fen-CA%2Fdocs%2FWeekend+Two%2FWorking+Groups+_+Advisory++(1)

Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. (2006). Should Ontario keep its current electoral system or change to a new one. Retrieved on November 30 from http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/en-CA/About/Mandate.aspx

Making Reason Present: Deliberation, Representation, and the Citizens' Assembly

2006-12-04T09:52:00.000-05:00

As many previous posts on this blog have pointed out, the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) is far from a given. How does the suggestion of a group of randomly selected citizens, put in a position to deliberate on a given issue (in this case, electoral reform in Ontario), bear any weight or political significance to the political community at large? Other institutions (like legislatures) are considered legitimate largely because they are thought to be representative of the citizenry in some fashion. So the question might be asked, can the CA be considered a representative body? Or does the deliberative theory upon which the CA rests imply a different form of legitimacy? In the case of the latter, the idea of representation, at least in its most conventionally understood usage, might not be a necessary or even desirable trait for the CA to possess.

As a means of examining this issue in this post, I consider deliberative democratic theory and its corresponding notions of representation and legitimacy. First, I review the concept of representation and how social choice theory necessitates some form of it for legitimacy in contemporary politics. I will then contrast this notion of representation with that of the CA and its corresponding deliberative democratic foundations. I contend that theories of deliberative democracy depart radically from social choice theories in that they don’t necessitate representation of the citizenry in order to view themselves as legitimate. I make this claim not as a defense against the need for representation, but rather to point out the risk of deliberative democracy, and its capability to be unrepresentative, and perhaps undemocratic, when it is used in designs of mini-publics such as the CA. I end with an argument for why deliberative democracy should entail qualities representing the Ontario citizenry, assessing the extent to which the CA possesses these.

We may as well start by asking what the word “representative” means. The term has many different usages and implications, which complicates the matter of determining the meaning of “representative” as it pertains to legitimacy.[i] In the introduction to Representation Hanna Pitkin gives an extremely basic definition, which is “a making present of something absent—but not making it literally present.”[ii] Much of the controversy of defining “representation” can be seen as stemming from its core paradoxical precept of endowing something with opposing properties (namely absence and presence). Still, when we consider the idea of political representation, we generally have a more specific interpretation in mind, though we might not be able to articulate it. In order to help articulate it, asking the following clarifying questions can help: who/what is absent which is to be made present, who/what is to make them present and, in what manner are they to be made present? In answering these questions through different theoretical perspectives, we can ascertain what form of representation the theories are based upon.

Much of current political practice is informed by some variant of social choice theory, which sees the political process as functioning in the same way that the market does. In this conception, political views and beliefs are understood to be necessarily private, rendering the process of determining public policies as aggregative.[iii] In its most simple form, citizens would gather to pursue their own private political views, with the end result being the “optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests.”[iv] A legitimate political system then, according to social choice theory, would be one which allows for its citizens to pursue their private interests or, put differently, one which allows for the many “selfs” of the polity to be present in the political process as to pursue their self-interests. We could see this being done in two different ways: direct democracy or representative democracy. The former does not seem plausible, as the expanse, complexity and specialization of modern society renders citizens unable to participate in the everyday practice of politics which direct democracy demands.[v] For the same reasons, politics become the business of an elite professional few who are capably specialized in the process of governance. In order to make this elite-driven model compatible with the aforementioned necessity that individuals pursue their private political interests, politicians must appeal to a concept of representation in order to be seen as legitimate; the individuals of society must see the elites of government as having their interests at heart in some fashion.[vi] This is congruous with the definition of democracy which Schumpeter offers: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”[vii] In this way, representation is actually the necessary compromise between the pursuit of self-interest and pragmatic functionality, as the political market of private self-interest is supplemented by the market of elite-level representation.

This can be seen as the governing paradigm of Western liberal democracies, or at least Canadian democracy, in a number of ways. First, there is a stark contrast between the private nature of citizens’ opinions and the public nature of politicians’ and political candidates’ views, made clear by the contrast between the secret ballot system of voting and the public debates of political candidates which are televised and open to all. This reinforces the view of political belief as private, and the competitive and public nature of politicians. Furthermore, the immutable pursuit of self-interest can be seen as analogous to the rigidity of party discipline, in which case party platforms serve as the representative instrument of the represented citizens. Therefore, in contemporary democratic practice, as social choice theory would suggest, absent citizens are made present by selected political elites (chosen through an aggregation of votes through political parties) who pursue the interests of their constituents as they govern the political process.[viii]

In this way, social choice theory’s conception of representation is understood. The CA, on the other hand, is not based on theories of social choice. As Elster notes, the premise which informs deliberative theory and practice

is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation…[T]here would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.[ix]

In this view, the raw pursuit of self-interest is replaced with inquiry into the nature of the public-interest, with aggregation and compromise being substituted for rational discussion; in other words, the market view of private politics is replaced with a public-minded forum in which the goal is “not optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement.”[x] Politics is therefore not considered a private concern as it is in social choice theory, but rather an inherently public act. Individuals are brought into a forum for the express reason of discerning what is best for all. In such a situation, arguments invoking self-interest are impossible in that they are incompatible with the objective at hand; “in a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself.”[xi] In this fashion, the practices and results of deliberation are seen as legitimate insofar as they are defended with reasons and evidence which all members of the public can understand and conceivably agree to. This criterion for deliberation is what theorists refer to as reciprocity.[xii] As Gutmann and Thompson point out, reciprocity implies a form of deliberative equality in which “citizens recognize and respect one another as moral agents, not merely as abstract object of others’ moral reasoning.” [xiii] By limiting reasons and arguments to those which could conceivably be agreed to by all, reciprocity implies that the argument is being addressed to all and that all are capable of comprehending and refuting it.

With this theoretical understanding, we can begin to determine what concept of representation deliberative democracy appeals to, using the CA as a focal point. First, the basic questions of representation (who is absent, who is present, and how the latter makes the former present) can be posed to the case of the CA. To these questions we might respond that the citizens-at-large, who are absent, are being made present by the selected CA members, and they are being made present through the processes of consultation and deliberation[xiv]. While the first two parts of this answer seem plausible enough, the question of how the act of the CA members deliberating makes present those absent from the process is not so clear. In his discussion of deliberative citizen panels, Mark Brown gives a possible answer:

Because panelists are not beholden to interest groups or political parties, and because the process encourages participants to defend their views with reasons potentially acceptable to all, citizen panels are arguably well suited to identify ways of addressing public problems that accord with some conception of the public interest… [They do] not represent in the sense of communicating with or acting for its constituents. It is rather a “representation of the public’s judgment.”[xv]

In this case, it is not actually Ontarians at large who are being made present in the CA, but their purported judgments or reasons. This is a notable difference, as Brown points out that “an important risk associated with this …is that it easily leads to the idea that deliberation by members of citizen panels can substitute for deliberation by their presumed constituents.”[xvi] The act of deliberation in a group differentiates the representation of the public interest (which these bodies purport to do) and the representation of the public itself. With this understanding, the CA does not fit into the mode of representation discussed earlier: if legitimate, it is representative of the citizenry’s logic, reasons, judgments and ideally, their general “public interest,” but not of the citizens themselves or their individual interests. Deliberations do not promise to make present the non-participating public, but rather to make their reasons present: “Because the immediate aim of representing perspectives is deliberation rather than decision-making, the need to include all possibly relevant perspectives (impossible on small citizen panels) is less pressing than if the aim were to represent their interests.”[xvii] In this way, as long as reasons which convince the public are given to justify the decisions, the deliberators do not need to be in anyway representative of the public. Similarly the CA, according to deliberative democratic theory, is not required to be a representative body; as long as the claims, reasons and arguments made satisfy the caveat of reciprocity, the deliberations can be seen as representative of a wider public deliberation, with the conclusions reached by the CA being seen as reached by Ontario as a whole. Bluntly, in deliberative democracy, reasons, absent from most political discourse, are made present by citizens through the act of deliberation.[xviii]

It must be noted that deliberation does not preclude representation in government and in fact can be seen as enriching representative practice. As Mark Brown articulates, “democratic representation depends on continuous interaction between decision-making in state institutions and various sorts of public talk, including both informal public discourse and the more structured forms of deliberation that occur in civil society.”[xix] Representation then “depends on a critical public sphere”[xx] which is best cultivated through processes of deliberation. With this type of public sphere the aforementioned type of representative government which social choice theory suggests could still exist, and would in fact exist better, in that representatives would be chosen out of conceptions of the public good which have eclipsed and replaced notions of private good. However, for the type of public sphere to exist in which all citizens are able to participate and contribute to deliberation, it would take massive social transformation, arguably to a Marxian extent of public-ownership of many types of capital. Until such a public sphere exists, the process of deliberation itself entails aspects of representation in that those deliberating are seen as also doing so for those who are not participating; deliberations which impact policy or governance in some way are seen as bearing public value and opinions, although the entire public, and most often a vast majority of the public, did not participate. In this way, deliberations are seen as making present those who are absent from discussion by formulating an idea of “public interest” or “common good.” This is seemingly problematic in that those who are absent lack political and moral agency, having no ability to control or choose in what ways they are being made present by the deliberators. To counter this problem the idea of a “mini-public,” a group of people selected in such a way as to be representative in some form of the public-at-large, has been developed as a vehicle in which deliberations can be conducted.[xxi] In this way, just as deliberation can be a tool for enriching representative politics, representation can enrich the process of deliberation. For these reasons, the CA claims to represent Ontarians in some fashion, being referred to as a “representative body of electors” in the Election Act which created it.[xxii]

Some find contention with the convergence of representation and deliberation. One argument is that representation could conceivably restrict the representative from fully acknowledging and understanding ideas which diverge from those held by whomever s/he represents. In essence, representation “would lead to representation by an “elect” group, thus clashing with the goal of providing a voice for ordinary citizens.”[xxiii] In this view, representation is too contaminated by the interest-driven premises of social choice theory to be compatible with the public-minded promise of deliberation. While this is a valid claim that should be considered, I don’t think it completely forecloses representation in deliberative bodies. It is conceivable that representatives could be chosen for their ability to reason and comprehend arguments, as opposed to similarities in interest or belief. Furthermore, the way that a body represents the public-at-large does not have to be through an individual-constituency relationship. A deliberative body can be seen as a representative microcosm, in which the individual members of the body would not be representative, but the body itself would be representative of the general public. In this sense, a type of controlled randomness in the selection process would make the group deliberative, with the underlying premise being that any other group of citizens, given the same circumstances, would come to similar conclusions.[xxiv] It is this form of representation which I suggest the CA assumes.[xxv]

Whether or not deliberative bodies can, or are, in fact representative, the normative question of whether or not deliberative bodies should be representative still remains. In their discussion of mini-publics “with some claim to representativeness,” Goodin and Dryzek qualify their definition in a useful way for this discussion:

By “some claim,” we do not mean statistical representativeness…nor do we mean electoral representation. All “some claim to representativeness” need mean is that the diversity of social characteristics and plurality of initial points of view in the larger society are substantially present in the deliberating mini-public.[xxvi]

It is the importance placed on the diversity of “social characteristics” and “initial points of view” which is instructive. If the concept of deliberation rests on the notion that rational discussion, conducted by a group of non-self-interested individuals, can best unveil a truth in regards to (or at least the best answer for the question of) “public good,” then contingent to this is the assumption that an individual, with his/her held perspectives and experiences, holds an incomplete, but completely necessary, component of the public good. Reasons, arguments and public-minded claims are not seen as independent from individual perspective and opinion, but rather as deriving from them, in which case the perspectives individuals bring to deliberative forums are infinitely unique sources of reason and conceptions of public-good. Understood in this way, a plurality of “social characteristics” and “initial points of view” creates a richer supply for reasons and opinions, thus a more a robust deliberation and, it would follow, a better formulated conclusion and conception of public interest.

In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill writes that because “the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.”[xxvii] This was written in the defense of freedom of opinion, and it is this freedom which must be actively sought after and made present in deliberative bodies for the best results. As such, representation offers the ability for a vast array of perspectives and experiences to converge and synthesize, simultaneously enriching deliberation and fortifying legitimacy in the eyes of those not participating in the deliberation. This being the case, I suggest deliberative bodies, the CA included, be representative of the diversity of experiences, backgrounds, and lifestyles of the general public. Here, proportionality may or may not be necessary, as giving minority and majority alike the same amount of representation could make for a deliberation more inclusive to wide-ranging perspectives and viewpoints.

So in what ways does the CA attempt representation? First, as I mentioned earlier, it attempts to statistically represent Ontario as a microcosm through randomness. To this I would simply question whether or not 103 members is a statistically relevant sample size for this purpose. As for the representation of diverse backgrounds and perspectives which I just discussed, there are three main ways in which the CA has taken this into account: the requirement that a member from each electoral riding be present, presenting geographical diversity; the mandatory presence of fifty-two women in the CA; and the mandatory presence of one self-identified Aboriginal person.[xxviii] While this is certainly a good start, I would suggest that a fuller conception of diversity can have been taken into account. Some considerations along this line which, if taken into account, could have enhanced the diversity of the CA are as follows: requiring more than one mandatory seat for Aboriginals, perhaps with the intention of representing the diversity of experiences, cultures, and values within the Aboriginal community; the representation of recent immigrants, perhaps from different national backgrounds; taking social class into consideration, perhaps making certain requirements for landowners and non-owners, managers and union members, etc.; augmenting the “one member from each riding” stipulation in such a way that reflects the large Francophone community in Northern Ontario as a means of representing Ontario’s linguistic diversity.

While I know these types of suggestions presents a self-perpetuating problem in that there are an infinite number of groups which could demand representation ad infinitum, including cross-group sects (eg. perhaps there should be a mandatory seat for Aboriginal women or Francophone workers), it is nevertheless an important consideration for future deliberative bodies to take into account. In this way, the reasons which are made present by deliberation can be more closely in sync with the reasons of the absent society-at-large, making deliberation a more viable and legitimate political method within Canadian political culture as it now stands.
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[i] For a more thorough treatment of the complexity of “representation” see Dr. Ron’s first posting.
[ii] Hanna Pitkin. Representation. New York: Atherton Press, 1969: 16.
[iii] Jon Elster. “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103-104.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1950: 259-262.
[vi] The way in which the representative acts can still be open to interpretation, particularly in what Pitkin calls the “mandate-independence controversy” (Ptikin, Representation, 17). Regardless of how it is interpreted, the necessity here is that the citizens see their interests as somehow represented through their politicians.
[vii] Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 296.
[viii] Elster, “The Market and the Forum,” 104-105.
[ix] Elster, “The Market and the Forum,” 112.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ibid, 113.
[xii] For a more detailed discussion of “reciprocity” see my posting “Deliberative Democratic Theory and the Citizens’ Assembly”
[xiii] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996: 14.
[xiv] The emphasis here however is on deliberation over consultation. I say this because the vast majority of Ontarians are not participating in the consultation phase. Because of this, those who participate are more akin to those who are present as opposed to those who are absent; by participating in the consultation phase, non-CA Ontarians are participating in the more general deliberation, and in turn are participating in the act of making those not participating, or who are absent, present. While one might argue that voting on the final referendum is also part of making those absent present, I would contend that that does not make them present in the process of producing the recommendation (what the CA was assembled for) but rather in the enactment of it. In this way, it is still mainly the act of deliberation which is supposed to make them present in the CA.
[xv] Mark Brown. “Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation.” Journal of Political Philosophy (14.2, 2006): 216. Representing “in the sense of communicating with or acting for its constituents” relates to the point I raised in Note vi regarding the “mandate-independence controversy.”
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Ibid, 219.
[xviii] One objection to this might be that in practice the CA’s conclusion is definitively not seen as the same as Ontarians, a fact evidenced by the proviso of the referendum. Because of this, deliberation is perhaps not intended to reason on behalf of the public, but merely on behalf of its participants. While I might agree with this contention, the referendum (notwithstanding the sixty percent super-majority recently attached to it) can still be viewed as compatible with deliberative theories in that it assures that the conclusion reached by the CA is justified by sufficient reason. In theory, the conclusions reached by such a deliberative body could be agreed to by all and the reasons used to justify it could be understood by all, however if the reasons offered are not sufficient to convince the general public, the referendum failing to pass hold’s the decision accountable. In short, if deliberations are conducted successfully, the referendum will pass; if not, the referendum will fail. Either way the referendum does not deligitimate the CA’s deliberation but indicates how efficiently it was carried out.
[xix] Brown, “Citizen Panels,” 206.
[xx] Ibid., 205
[xxi] Archon Fung. “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences.” The Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338-339, and Robert Goodin and John Dryzek. “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics.” Politics & Society (34.2, 2006): 219-221.
[xxii] Election Act, Ontario Regulation 82/06, Citizens’ Assembly on ElectoralReform, Article 2.
[xxiii] Brown, “Citizen Panels,” 208.
[xxiv] Ibid, 209.
[xxv] See my post “Monday’s Public Issues Forum.”
[xxvi] Goodin and Dryzek, “Deliberative Impacts,” 221.
[xxvii] J.S. Mill. On Liberty. London: Penguin Publishing, 1974: 116.
[xxviii] Election Act: Article 4, Clauses 1-3.

The Limits of Deliberation: Reciprocal Argumentation and Memories of Marginalization

2006-12-03T22:24:00.000-05:00

While official deliberative institutions hold great promise for reviving citizenship and confronting the intuited crisis of legitimacy facing traditional liberal democratic institutions, there are limits to the scope of the deliberative forum. These limits are to be found in the demands of reciprocity which are central to both the function and legitimacy of deliberative democratic institutions. Reciprocity asks (and in reality requires) that argumentation in the forum be based on some common basis, citing generally accepted foundational criteria. Arguments that will have success in the deliberative forum are those which successfully cite experience and information located within dominant political discourses surrounding the issues of the deliberation. Reciprocity prevents marginalized groups from putting forth arguments that have their basis in rectifying historical oppression as such arguments have a tenuous position in dominant political discourse. This ultimately limits the extent to which deliberative institutions can be sites for social change. In the presentation given to the Ontario Citizen’s Assembly by the women and other underrepresented groups working group (WUG), working group members did not invoke the most obvious and forceful arguments for their cause, the memory of social exclusion and the need to rectify the situation. The fact that this most elemental argument was not advanced could be a case of the limitations imposed by reciprocity. This self-evident argument, citing the history of subordination of women, perhaps went unstated because it would involve the mention of the imperative to rectify injustice done to historically marginalized groups, an argument with a precarious stance in dominant political discourses, and thus unlikely to meet the demands of reciprocity.

Likely the most powerful feature of the deliberative forum is the structural necessity for reciprocal argumentation. In the absence of the deliberative context, beliefs, opinions, and political demands are typically phrased in a non-reciprocal and hence, irrefutable manner. One may say, “Abortion is wrong because of god’s law,” or, “I’m voting for X because she’ll lower my taxes.” While these statements are of a strikingly different nature, one appealing to universal truth and the other to unabashed self-interest, they share one structural quality: both have their basis in personal or particular criteria. It is impossible to accept statement one without believing in god and it is impossible to accept statement two without being the one who will have her taxes lowered. Neither statement is phrased with the aim of convincing another person of its value. In the deliberative setting, arguments are made precisely in order to convince others of their merit. Such arguments, in order to be even considered, must be universalized. The universalization of an argument is the phrasing of the argument in a reciprocal manner, citing general or generalizable concepts. According to Amy Guttman, “reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens (Guttman 1996 pp. 14).” By not citing any kind of “shared reasons,” one’s personal belief in god or personal desire to save money will not be a successful basis for argumentation in deliberation. The imperative of reciprocal argumentation is simply a function of the process of deliberation in which individuals, for the sake of the success of their arguments, intuitively cite as wide a basis of experience or understanding as possible.

In forcing arguments to be phrased (or rephrased) with the interests of the public-in-general as their basis, “Deliberation helps sort out self-interested claims from public-spirited ones (Guttman 1996 pp. 43).” The argument for lowering one’s own taxes becomes an argument for why low taxes benefit society generally, “One should vote for X because low taxes are good for us all.” A universalized argument, by virtue of claiming to cite a shared or potentially shared basis, is inherently refutable; one may retort, “I do not think low taxes are good for us all.” Refutability of arguments as a result of their reciprocal nature is the contingency upon which deliberation’s ability to make progress on contentious issues rests. Amy Guttman explains:

If citizens publicly appeal to reasons that are shared, or could be shared, by their fellow citizens, and if they take into account these same kinds of reasons presented by similarly motivated citizens, then they are already engaged in a process that by its nature aims at a justifiable resolution of disagreement. (Guttman 1996 pp. 25)

When citizens face each other and phrase their political stances as arguments intended to convince others, rather than simply as statements of individual desire or belief, these arguments are open to the scrutiny of others, their merit is judged, and the possibility for their refutation emerges. Deliberation opens the possibility that an individual’s initial perspective may change as a result of the open scrutiny that one’s positions face. Amy Guttman’s central claim is found in this feature of deliberation:

Actual deliberation has an important advantage over hypothetical agreement: it encourages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens would agree with them on all matters of justice if they were all living in an ideal society. (Guttman 1996 pp. 16)

Deliberation, through reciprocal argumentation, has the ability to break dead-locks on issues that emerge from the interpretation of democracy as systems of private interest aggregation, “It enables us, for example, mutually to respect one another as moral agents who share the goal of reaching deliberative agreement even when we disagree with one another’s conclusions (Guttman 1998 pp. 14).” The value of deliberative institutions is found in the way citizen participants are forced to open their positions to criticism and face the possibility of accepting new positions as they make important decisions that affect all of society.

However, there are limits to what types of perspectives can be universalized and made reciprocal. As “reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens,” reasons that are particular to specific segments of the population, that do not fit within dominant political discourses, cannot necessarily be successfully universalized before a forum of citizens (Ibid). This is perhaps the situation that Guttman had in mind when she wrote:

We do not assume that deliberative democracy can guarantee social justice either in theory or in practice. Our argument is rather that in the absence of robust deliberation in democracy, citizens cannot even provisionally justify many controversial procedures and constitutional rights to one another. (Guttman 1996 pp. 18)

While deliberative institutions may be the most effective way for citizens to come to consensus based conclusions founded on universal or universalizable criteria within the framework of dominant political discourses, the deliberative forum may not be conducive to challenging such norms. As the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (OCA) addresses the possibility of recommending a new electoral system for Ontario, the dominant discourse which their deliberations follow could be said to be those of the traditional liberal conception of representation. Melissa Williams identifies two strands of conditions that compose liberal representation. First is, “the principle of one person, one vote,” which, “holds that electoral outcomes are fair, whatever they happened to be, so long as every individual has an equally weighted vote in the electoral process (Williams 1998 pp. 10).” Second is, “the normative theory of interest-group pluralism,” which:

holds that electoral outcomes are fair as long as every citizen had an equal opportunity to organized with other citizens—whether in parties or in interest groups—to support candidates’ campaigns. At the legislative stage, interest group pluralism holds that the interests which receive substantive recognition and protection in legislative policies are and should be those around which individuals have formed large or energetic interest groups. (Williams 1998 pp. 10)

While the Assembly examines different systems through which this concept of representation can materialize, through various forms of election, the premise of liberal representation itself is not really up for discussion. The Assembly’s function is to examine the various systems used around the world for representing individuals. The presentation of the WUG, which attempted to present a “difference-conscious” group-perspective on representation, was a very slight attempt at augmenting the liberal basis for discussing representation and was really an anomaly in the process. Before discussing the form that the WUG presentation took and its connection to the concept of reciprocity, it is important to introduce the reasons why the working group system was introduced in the OCA. The reasons behind the introduction of the working group system begin to shed light on the limits of deliberation.

In her paper, Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizen’s Assembly, Amy Lang investigates the setting of the formal and informal agenda in the BC Assemby (BCCA). In her analysis, “formal agenda” refers to the structure, content, and schedule established for BCCA meetings while “informal agenda” simply refers to what was discusses and considered important by BCCA members in their selection of a new electoral system. For the purpose of this discussion, I am interested in her analysis of the setting of the informal agenda. Lang writes that the lack of formal structures through which members could influence the informal agenda was problematic for the BCCA. In the absence of such structures, the plenary sessions were the only forum in which members could advocate for particular issues. In the plenary, an attentive audience was dependent on the strength and charisma of individual advocates, along with their ability to continuously leverage their concerns onto the table. Lang observed in the BCCA that the “the needs of the North” of the province became viewed as legitimate and of key importance within the Assembly, while the issue of women’s and marginalized minority representation failed to cohere as a salient issue (Lang 2006 pp. 11). Lang explains that the issue of “the North” was able to cohere as a salient issue because “the North” had a strong individual advocate, “Wilf Chelle, a rancher from Buick, up in the remote Northeast corner of the province… an eloquent, charming and folksy man (Lang 2006 pp. 10).” Wilf was able to push the issue onto the plenary agenda and keep it constantly in Assembly members’ minds. “The needs of the North” also benefited from the interpretation of “the North,” “Perhaps for some, the North represented a universal identity – it could be anyone who lived up there. In contrast, thinking about representation for women and other minority groups was not as legitimate because they were groups whose identities were not universally shared (Lang 2006 pp. 14).” I would add that because of this interpretation, group representation of the North did not entail representing ascriptice human characteristics, an idea which is generally in opposition to the liberal conception of representation. Everyone who lives in the north including men, woman, people of all ethnic origins, are all appealingly presented as facing the same problems.

In contrast to “the north,” the issue of women and marginalized group representation was discussed, but failed to emerge as an important issue upon which the BCCA based its decision. Lang suggests that a social bias against such advocacy for women’s representation may have suppressed the strong individual(s) necessary to force an issue onto the informal agenda.

First, there was no clear advocate for women’s representation from the beginning of the Assembly as there was for ‘the north.’ While some members were interested in the issue and raised their concerns publicly and privately, they could not or would not claim to represent all women, as Wilf did for ‘the north.” Indeed one woman who characterized herself as a strong feminist was fearful of being labeled as such and dismissed. (Lang 2006 pp.13)

The theory behind the creation of the working group system for the OCA, informed by the experience in the BCCA, is that working groups can serve as a balancing function to the phenomenon of informal agenda setting observed in BC; they could give more legitimacy to issues that lack a strong individual advocate and/or face an overt social bias (Lang 2006 pp. 16). Iris Marion Young also refers to a system of caucuses or working groups as a powerful tool for undermining social bias in deliberative settings:

The content of deliberations, moreover, more often than not reflects the interests and perspectives of the more socially powerful people in the room unless explicit measures are taken to counter this tendency. Such counter measures can include agenda-setting bodies that represent diverse constituencies, caucuses, facilitators whose job is to introduce unmentioned topics, and various other self-conscious mechanisms for widening discussion and challenging consensus. (Fung, 2004 pp. 49)

Theoretically then, a working group system should help to avoid the situation that arose in BC, in which “there was no cultural consensus among Assembly members on whether or not the issue of women’s representation even should be on the Assembly’s agenda (Lang 2006 pp. 13).” While it seems that a working group system could help to empower individuals to speak, it is unclear how such a system could ever challenge the fear of being dismissed that Lang discuses. Such fear has its basis in the fact that the arguments one desires to make do not find their basis in dominant political discourses. To counteract this fear would be to undermine the political discourses upon which deliberation is based, a goal which is both impossible and undesirable for the sake of the legitimacy of the deliberative forum.

In the presentation of the WUG to the OCA on November 25, 2006, no explicit recommendations were made. Instead, the working group put forward ideas they felt the Assembly should consider—ideas which seemed to be generally supported by the working group members and curiously did not take the form of formal recommendations. The working group’s main thinking point was that electoral systems that employ more proportionality, through the use of lists, perform far better than majoritarian systems in equalizing the representation of women in parliaments. Their point is corroborated by Pippa Norris and Melissa Williams who have demonstrated how the use of lists makes party practices regarding the running women readily identifiable and thus subject to public criticism which often results in the institution of norms of equitable list making (Norris 1997 pp. 310; Williams 1998 pp. 219). The clearest statement of purpose that came out of the working group was a response to the following query made during the question period, [paraphrased] “If women are statistically shown to not vote for other women any more than men, and if women truly vote only based on ideology just as men do, then why is it that we are talking about under-representation of women?”
A member of the WUG responded:

[Paraphrased] Representation of women is not important because women have a specific interest that needs to be heard. Representation of women is important because women come with a different perspective on governing and discussing, and a variety of perspectives are needed to improve government generally. The fact that women don’t always vote for women does not undermine this point.

This statement from a member of the working group is the first half of an argument that Melissa Williams has traced to the Suffragists. According to Melissa Williams, the Suffragists argued that their voice was unique and “substantively different from those of men” because of a “history of subordination (Williams 1998 pp. 13).” The argument advanced by the member of the working group claims that women have a unique voice, but does not go on to explain why. One is left to wonder, is this voice biologically determined? Is it the result of a social phenomenon? While the working group may have justifiably tried to avoid making an argument that, “rest[s] on assertions of the essential identity of women,” what was truly striking about the working group’s presentation, was that although memory of exclusion and subordination was constantly in the subtext, they never cited these foundational reasons for their group’s existence (Williams 1998 pp. 6). There was no description of a theory of the historical foundations of under-representation, no citation of the need to rectify marginalization. The “unstated argument” of the WUG is likely a result of the fact that their argument does not fit into the demands of reciprocity in this particular deliberative setting. A universalized version of the unstated argument for women's representation, that society has an obligation to formally rectify the stance of historically marginalized groups in the political system, is not an accepted part of dominant political discourses of liberal representation and would likely fail in front of any randomly selected group of 103 people in Ontario. That the working group's true basis for arguing for women's representation would fail as a reciprocal argument, by not citing liberal conceptions of representation, is ironic, given that their main point, that PR is better for women because of the norms it helps to establish, reflects Melissa William's “complex proceduralism” and the desire to find a solution to group representation balanced with the liberal-procedural framework (Williams 1998 pp. 220).

Iris Marion Young introduces two ways social power functions in the deliberative setting: (1) through the effects of socially powerful individuals and (2) through the effects of dominant social discourses (Fung 2005 pp. 51). Formal mechanisms such as the working group system could help empower issues that would otherwise not be strongly spoken for, counteracting the strength of socially powerful individual speakers. However, it seems that a system of working groups could never have the power to advance issues onto the informal agenda which challenge the dominant political discourses framing the entire deliberative process. Nor would such a system be desirable for deliberative institutions. A system that successfully legitimized originally unshared basis for argumentation would allow arguments to penetrate the informal agenda which are divorced from dominant discourse in society at large. This creation of a basis for reciprocity in the forum distinct from that operational in society at large would ultimately threaten the legitimacy of a deliberative process. Due to their dependence on reciprocal argumentation for legitimacy, official deliberative forums cannot be sites for challenging dominant political discourses. This is not to say that social change cannot come out of deliberation. It is to say that no social change will emerge from an official deliberative forum that didn’t already have some basis in dominant political discourses.

Official deliberative institutions are not the most likely sites for challenges to dominant social consciousness, and if they became such, they would loose legitimacy. As Young describes, the role of changing dominant political discourse rests with social movements, “Radical social movements are about changing the institutional terms with which deliberations take place and about challenging the assumptions usually brought to policy discourse about priorities and purposes of collective action (Fung 2004 pp. 51).” The case of the WUG is illustrative. The WUG made half of the argument for women’s representation that Melissa Williams identifies as originating with the Suffragists, omitting what was the basis of the Suffragists’ argument 90 years ago: “their history of subordination (Williams 1998 pp. 13).” That this basis was cited 90 years ago in the context of a social movement, but was not made in a deliberative setting today, demonstrates the limits of the official deliberative forum for marginalized groups. Official deliberative institutions function only within dominant discourses of social thought, in the case of the OCA, liberal discourses of representation. As liberal notions of representation are dominant, reciprocity holds that an argument that does not cite the liberal-procedural way of thinking about representation will not be successful. As reciprocity is by its nature an intuitive concept, those who have arguments in mind that do not cite dominant political discourses, perhaps simply do not make their arguments at all. The same function of deliberation that prevents the citation of particular religious beliefs also precludes, as a basis for argumentation, the need to rectify histories of marginalization. Neither are, “reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens,” at least in the immediate context of a deliberative institution such as the OCA (Guttman 1996 pp. 14).

Works Cited

Fung, Archon. (2004). “Deliberation’s Darker Side: Six Questions for Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge.” National Civic Review, 93, 47-54.

Guttman, Amy & Dennis Thomas. (1996). The Persistence of Moral Disagreement. pp. 1-51. Belknap Press.

Lang, Amy. (2006). Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizen’s Assembly. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Department of Sociology.

Norris, Pippa. (1997). “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems.” International Political Science Review, 18, 297-312.

Williams, Melissa. (1998). Voice, Trust and Memory. pp. 3-22, 203-243. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A vision for institutionalizing mini-publics in Ontario

2006-12-03T20:18:00.000-05:00

John Stuart Mill was describing an era when universal suffrage had not yet arrived, but his words epitomize the feelings of many citizens today: “the majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions” (Mill, p. 12). While warnings of a crisis in democracy seem to reappear every few years (Dewey wrote of them in 1927), we have seen evidence in our observations of the Citizens’ Assembly that there exists a small but significant community clamoring for change in Ontario. With that in mind, this essay will outline a proposal for permanently enshrining a new tool in the province’s arsenal of deliberative bodies: the mini-public.

Before providing a vision for institutionalizing mini-publics in Ontario, it is important to alleviate the fear that they are not “representative” of the population at large. While the layperson of today may opine that representation is embodied only in a conventional legislature, with minor differences in the model from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there exist many other manifestations of the concept. The origins of the notion of representation lie in the Middle Ages, when the idea developed that the spokesman for a community could be its embodiment, the “bearer of its representative person-hood” (Pitkin, p. 2). The idea became one of the driving forces behind the American and French revolutions, and representation acquired its status as one of the universal rights of humankind.

Political representation is a complex concept with many elements – Brown identifies five:

authorization,
accountability,
expertise,
participation,
and resemblance.

Decide which elements of representation you value and designing your political institutions becomes a much clearer task. We must also consider that in a sense, the concepts of representation and liberty are at odds with one another. If liberty is the freedom to fully realize one’s personal capabilities or self-actualization, as John Stuart Mill saw it, then as social and political animals we cannot achieve true liberty via representation because representation deprives us of our liberty to participate. To put it plainly: there is not room for every one of us to fit into the legislature simultaneously. Representation is a difficult concept because of its inherent contradiction: “the central core of meaning of ‘representation’ is a making present in some sense of what is nevertheless not literally present” (Pitkin, p. 19).

If we allow ourselves a broader perspective of representation, we can begin to envision a different conception of what a representative body might look like. Pitkin elaborates on the resemblance element of representation:

One can, for example, think of representation not as an acting for other people, but as a standing for something absent. . . To be representative, a legislature must be an accurate map of the whole nation, a portrait of the people, a faithful echo of their voice, a mirror which reflects accurately the various parts of the public. What qualifies a man to represent is his representativeness – not what he does, but what he is, or is like. (Pitkin, p. 10)

The Legislative Assembly of Ontario is defined by what its members do - they are an elite groups of specialists, what Schumpeter calls “professional politicians” (Schumpeter, p. 263). What if we were to institutionalize another body in the political process, a body that reflects what its members are like? Certainly, this would make for a deliberative body with a more representative range of social perspectives, in the sense that it resembles the whole community. And if, as Dewey posited, “the important governmental affairs at present. . . are also technically complicated matters to be conducted properly by experts” (Dewey, p. 123) , then in giving regular citizens specialized training and an opportunity to formulate policy, perhaps they can, as Brown put it, “increase the store of technical expertise and moral arguments available for public deliberation and decision-making” (Brown, p. 217).

When we ask who represents us in the sense of who is like us, a look around the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform affirms that it does a better job of resembling Ontario than the Legislative Assembly. Unlike the provincial parliament, the Citizens’ Assembly’s membership is a mix of the young and the old, the refined and the coarse, the awkward and the well spoken. While there is a lack of statistical evidence on the subject, I would venture that it also does a better job of representing the multicultural breadth of Ontario. With this broader definition, we can see how a mini-public might better represent the province than a more conventional body, in some ways.

What I propose here is not a replacement for the legislative assembly, but a supplement to it. If we embrace a variety of modes of representation, each will contribute something unique to the larger system of representative democracy. While traditional legislatures are best at the authorization and accountability elements of representation, mini-publics are strongest in expertise and resemblance. Each privileges some elements over others, because no single body can incorporate each one to an equal degree. A range of different structures provides the best circumstances for citizens to access all the elements of representation (Brown).

While some democratic enthusiasts would have us press ahead with a complex, multi-level incorporation of mini-publics like the participatory budgeting scheme in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for its first attempts I believe Ontario should be wary of Habermas’s concerns about overburdening the democratic process with too much deliberation (Bohman, p. 417). It seems wise to begin by implementing mini-publics in a situation where they can demonstrate their strengths and thrive – more ambitious structure should wait until mini-publics are more established and viewed more legitimately.

The beauty of our proposal to institutionalize mini-publics is that if any particular mini-public is a failure, the worst-case scenario is that we have produced a group of better-educated citizens, more informed and more skilled at political participation. These are the sort of people who form the bedrock of civil society, and beyond those benefits there is surely no downside to enabling more fully realized human beings? After all: “among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself” (Mill, p. 55).

They may one day renew democracy and herald a new era of societal deliberation, but in the process there are numerous details to be worked out in mini-public design. Each facet means a choice that has an expected effect. Rather than design an entire system here, we will examine the options and recommend decisions for a few specific facets.

This project will outline a proposal for an educative forum type of mini-public, as described by Fung (2003) and exemplified by the Citizens’ Assembly. That is:

“. . . an educative forum that aims to create nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues through conversations with on another.” (Fung, 2003, p. 340)

Educative forums are the most common of Fung’s categories of mini-publics. Certainly there are merits to more comprehensive mini-publics like the participatory advisory panel, participatory problem-solving collaboration and participatory democratic governance, but given the novelty of mini-publics and the potential for resistance in the public sphere (as we have seen in the case of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly), for now we will propose to formally institutionalize only this kind of mini-public. And given that there is not space here to specify every detail of the mini-public, we will give a rough sketch of the model, then detail a few specific facets. The proposed mini-public will look something like the existing Citizens’ Assembly:

Members will be randomly selected, and if selected they must voluntarily choose to join.
The mini-public will be educated by experts who strive to omit bias from the learning process.
The groups will be medium-sized, neither small like a focus group nor composed of thousands of interlocutors like the colossal AmericaSpeaks events.

Why start with this rough model? Something like it has already been attempted in British Columbia and Ontario, with some success. By starting with a familiar template, we can focus on a few specific facets of mini-public design without the distraction of a completely novel structure.

Of the eight or so major design choices in designing mini-publics, we will examine three: who should be able to call mini-publics, about which topics should they be called, and how empowered should they be?

Who should be able to call mini-publics is the first question. While there is a natural impulse to begin by looking at what problems might best be solved by our mini-public, that approach put the proverbial cart before the horse. The primal question is really who or what body should have the power to call a mini-public, and our answer will help us select which issues to address.

The Legislative Assembly should be able to call mini-publics. In the accountability and authorization senses that the legislature is most representative, it serves a useful purpose in restricting what de Tocqueville called “the tyranny of the majority”. As such, it should be able to call mini-publics to draw attention to ideas that it deems important but that lack majority support. The process of a mini-public’s deliberations can introduce new ideas into the public sphere and spark broader debate, shining light on an issue that might other be opposed by the public due to ignorance or fear. Advancing noble but unpopular ideas is one of the abilities we delegate to our political leaders, and the ability to call mini-publics gives them another option for advancement beside directly passing legislation to public outcry. A majority vote in the legislature seems suitable for calling a mini-public, given that I can think of no argument for a specific threshold under 50%.

A petition with an appropriate number of citizen signatures should also be institutionalized as cause to call a mini-public. This alternate method of calling a mini-public allows the population at large to raise issues that might otherwise be ignored by the legislature. In this way, mini-publics can act as a balance against what Jefferson called “the tyranny of the legislature”, and spotlight issues that might otherwise be ignored by the legislative agenda. In fact, given that the legislature seems to have lost interest in the subject, electoral reform is a perfect example of the sort of valid issue that the citizenry might raise. A petition signed by 5% of the population of Ontario (which translates into about 635,000 people) seems suitable – given the trouble and expense of conducting a mini-public, there needs to be strong evidence that the issue at hand matters to Ontarians.

Now we can approach perhaps the most energizing element of mini-public design - which topics to deliberate on. What kind of challenges are we going to tackle?

There are many examples to draw upon. Mini-publics have been convened on topics as diverse as the provision of resources at a local health authority (Goodin & Dryzek, p. 252), a complex municipal budgeting process (Ibid., p. 222), and the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan after the attacks of September 11 (Ibid., p. 229).

Fung tells us that the evidence shows that mini-publics are best suited to topics in which public views are “divided, opaque, or especially likely to change in the course of public deliberation” (p. 349). They are good tools for aggregating values and turning them into policy (p. 348), not least because the occasion to give special education to the mini-public is an opportunity to show members how their values connect to specific decisions and recommendations. Finally, mini-publics are best suited to salient issues where those following their deliberations can kick-start wider debate on the issue in the public sphere (p. 352), a sort of magnifying effect that inspires valuable scrutiny far beyond the boundaries of the mini-public itself.

I propose that the issues best suited to our mini-publics are significant problems that are not suited to incremental changes or improvements. Issues that lend themselves to a measurable trial and error process, like the path and frequency of a bus route or the tactics of an anti-drug campaign, are best adjusted, measured and improved by the sorts of technocratic specialists that Dewey describes, and a mini-public would be an inefficient way to address them.

At the same time, significant problems on too grand a scale are not suited to mini-public debate because they are difficult to translate from values into clear options and decisions. For example, a mini-public on monetary policy would not be appropriate because a clear causal model linking design decisions and results does not exist. While the potential recommendations are simple (choosing between an expansionary or contractionary policy), the globalized monetary system is too complicated and unpredictable to present to mini-public members. In a sense, this sort of macro-problem is also best solved by technocrats, because they are better equipped to evaluate the substance of conflicting information and cloudy decision consequences around the problem.

Thus the sorts of issues best suited to mini-public evaluation are significant ones that involve distinct choices and for which there is a clear link between options and outcomes. To deliberate intelligently on them requires a certain amount of specialist knowledge (if it did not, there would be little advantage to going to the trouble of calling the mini-public), but only enough that it could be taught in a reasonable amount of time. With this knowledge in hand, mini-public members can apply their own values and experience to the options at hand and produce a constructive result.

The power of citizens to “collaboratively filter” their values into design decisions is what Fung describes as “a comparative advantage over other actors such as politicians, administrators, and organized interests” (p. 343). He later describes the advantage even more clearly: “citizens have privileged access to their own preferences and values” (Fung, p. 348).

Electoral system reform is a perfect example of an issue that would meet our criteria. While an electoral system could theoretically be optimized by adjusting it after every election, the process would be impractical and vulnerable to manipulation, so it is not suited to incremental changes. The empirical data on electoral systems is quite refined, as we have seen during the course – a connection can be made between each decision on system design and its expected outcomes. And of course, the options are being framed in relation to values.

Other suitable topics for mini-public deliberation might include: whether to direct certain transportation funds to build highways or to improve public transit; whether to invest a special federal health transfer in improved treatment facilities or in prevention initiatives; and whether to focus the provincial education system on improving standardized test scores or on other, more individualistic options.

While I acknowledge that this prescription for which topics would be addressed by mini-publics would be difficult to translate into legislative language, our purpose here is envision a design – the legal details are for the lawyers to work out!

The final design facet of our proposed system for institutionalizing mini-publics is empowerment of the mini-public. What should the power of its recommendations be? Should they have binding force, or should they merely be reported, with no requirement to present them for the approval or disapproval to any other body? Or should they possess a degree of potency somewhere in between? Fung has the beginning of the answer:

“. . . An empowered, or strong, mini-public can create powerful incentives by offering influence over a slice of state power in exchange for participation. Individuals may take deliberations in empowered minipublics more seriously than in forums where discussions are severed from tangible consequences.” (p. 346)

This agrees with the Schumpeterian notion that governments produce better results when they must face the consequences of their actions.

An empowered mini-public increases the stakes that each citizen has in its deliberations, so it tends to increase participation (Fung, , p. 347). Make the stakes too high, though, and the incentive to manipulate the mini-public for personal gain (rather than public good) can be elevated as well. Empowerment tends to increase the motivation of participants to put effort into translating their interests and values into ideas and views (Ibid., p. 348). It also increases their incentive to work harder at becoming informed and consider public interests more prominently (Ibid., p. 350).

Accountability is another result of empowerment of the mini-public – officials must sit up and take notice when mini-public can do more than just make impotent recommendations. Mini-publics are more likely to attract and mobilize public support when they are empowered because they can make a genuine difference.

I propose that if our mini-publics are initiated by a petition then their recommendations should be voted on by the legislature, and if they are initiated by the legislature they should be put forward to the public in a binding referendum. Our mini-publics’ decisions are not binding – instead they set actualize the proposal for what is being debated and submit it to the scrutiny of another body. They are empowered to recommend an approach, but the approach must go elsewhere for approval. This method encourages the separation of powers – the legislature cannot advance its recommendation without consent of the citizenry, and the population cannot act without the approval of the legislature. Recommendations are more difficult to pass, but they undergo greater scrutiny.

This maintains a system of checks and balances, promotes division of power and ensures all parties have been consulted – the legislature provides a check against the “tyranny of the majority”, while the ability of a minimum number of motivated citizens to call a mini-public ensures that even without support from the legislature, a mini-public can evolve from grassroots activism with public opinion behind it. Even if the legislature objects to the convening of a mini-public and promises to vote against whatever recommendations it makes, there is still an opportunity initiate formal deliberation on the issue. In fact, outright dismissal by the legislature could serve to galvanize public interest. In this way, citizen-initiated mini-publics could serve to release, as a certain visitor to our class put it, the “cat out of the bag”.

The best reason for institutionalizing mini-publics is the primacy of attempting new democratic experiments. How else will our democracy remain vibrant if we do not innovate with new configurations of citizens to describe our problems and propose solutions to them? Hanna Pitkin described this necessity best:

“What is needed, and what is possible, is a continuing effort to create institutions and to train men, to revise institutions and to criticize men, in terms of our idea of representation.” (Pitkin, 1969, pp. 22-23)

References

Bohman, J. (1998). Survey article: the coming age of deliberative democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 400-425.

Brown, M. (2006). Survey article: citizen panels and the concept of representation. Journal of Political Philosophy, 14, 203-225.

Dewey, J. (1954 [1927]). The Public and its Problems. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Fung, A. (2003). Survey article: Recipes for public spheres: Eight institutional design choices and their consequences. Journal of Political Philosophy, 11, 338-367.

Goodin, R. and Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative impacts: the macro-political uptake of mini-publics. Politics & Society, 34, 219-244.

Mill, J. S. (1859). On Liberty. Retrieved October 10 from http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf

Pitkin, H. F. (1969). Introduction: the concept of representation. in Representation, ed. Hannah Pitkin. Atherton Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

How Deliberative is the Citizens' Assembly?

2006-12-03T17:57:00.000-05:00

The subject of this paper is deliberative democracy and the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (CA), or rather how well is the former reflected in the latter. In particular, the scope of this analysis is limited to evaluating the way that the CA incorporates the principles that are essential to deliberative citizen bodies established for the purpose of finding a particular solution to a given problem. In this way I begin by adopting a premise that citizen assemblies are beneficial to democracy as they are able to fill in the gap where ordinary representative institutions are not up to the task or, to say more accurately, leave much to desire. Having said that, however, my approach consists in a critical reflection on the Assembly’s function as a deliberative body. In undertaking this evaluation of the CA as a deliberative democratic institution, I will examine firstly, to what extent its set-up reflects a deliberative citizen body, secondly, whether it is representative enough for the purpose of achieving its end, and thirdly, to what extent its structure of the decision-making process conforms to the principles of deliberative democracy. As a result of this investigation, I will develop an argument which admits that, although the CA is involved in an admirable undertaking as it does constitute a citizen body, its inadequate representation of Ontarians and the overall structural scheme denies the possibility of effective deliberation on the subject of electoral reform.

Deliberative Citizen Bodies

It needs clarification what is meant by a deliberative body compromised of citizens. Most recently these bodies have been referred to as “mini-publics”, however, just over a decade earlier, a prominent political theorist of the 20th century, Robert Dahl, in Democracy and Its Critics envisioned a concept of “a ‘minipopulus’ consisting of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos… [whose] task would be to deliberate, for a year perhaps, on the issue and then to announce its choice” (Dahl 1989, p.342). Such citizen bodies were envisioned by Dahl and later by more contemporary writers as supplementary to the instilled legislature arrangement within a democracy, although its function as an institution could vary, in general “ordinary institutions of representative democracy generally remain sovereign, such that micro-deliberative mechanisms merely provide inputs into them” (Goodin 2006, p.200). Following Dahl, Archon Fung takes a more encompassing view of mini-publics that include the likes of town meetings that are self-selective and are generally characterized by “reformist thinking”. On this view, deliberative citizen bodies are able to improve the public sphere by allowing for “actual constructive efforts for civic participation and public deliberation” on the micro level, as well as effectively institutionalize public deliberation on the macro level (Fung 2003, p.339). This latter effect of the mini-publics, however, is outside of the scope of my analysis since it remains to be established, as the various ways of achieving this end is discussed by Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek in “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics”.

Another aspect of citizen bodies incorporated in the idea of the mini-publics is the concept of deliberative democracy, which is at the locus of their function that makes up the theoretical principles of such assemblies’ decision-making process. In particular, deliberative democracy necessarily involves finding a solution to moral disagreements by engaging in a process of reasoning that in the end produces “mutually acceptable decisions” (Gutmann 1996, p.1). Originating from the proponents of ‘critical theory’ coming from the Frankfurt school of thought, Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ greatly shaped deliberative democracy at its early stages of analytical development, which contended that instead of the process of aggregating interests, politics should consist in rational discussion that through reason and argumentation would result in unanimous preferences (Elster 1986, p.112). More recently, in their examination of the “substance of deliberation” in Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson identify the three fundamental principles of deliberative democracy as being reciprocity, publicity, and accountability (Gutmann 1996, p.12). Accordingly, with regards to the first of these principles, “when citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). The second principle of publicity is essential to dealing with moral disagreement in politics, as it allows for conflict resolution by making the debate accessible to the public at large that is in turn able to engage in the process of deliberation. Thirdly, accountability involves the agents of deliberation (i.e. citizens) to be held responsible to one another for their political actions (Gutmann 1996, p.15). As a result, deliberative democracy involves different premises than ordinary representative democracy, as the former reflects a more reasons-based approach to politics that is underpinned by the requirements of reason, reciprocity, and a more encompassing conception of public involvement in political issues.

Consequently, as part of my evaluation of the CA’s function as a citizen body that makes use of deliberative democracy, I will use the criteria of mini-publics that attempt to incorporate the essential principles of deliberation. In regards to whether the CA’s actually properly constitute a citizen body I will consider how well it fits into the conception of a mini-public. Secondly, I will examine how representative is the CA with respect to its task of electoral reform in the existing context of its supplementary role in ordinary (representative) democracy. Finally, with respect to how well the structure of its decision-making process reflects deliberative democracy, I will consider whether the CA’s overall scheme facilitates the use of reasons instead of the aggregation of interests.

Citizens’ Assembly as a Mini-Public

I answer the question of whether the CA properly reflects a mini-public with an overwhelming affirmative. In accordance with Fung’s analysis of the types of institutional designs for citizen bodies, a mini-public can be set up in four different ways: as an educative forum, participatory advisory panel, participatory problem-solving collaboration, and as participatory democratic governance (Fung 2003, p.340-342). Using these categories as an analytical framework for determining the function of a given mini-public, I will proceed to show that the CA embraces Fung’s second (advisory) institutional design, which in turn situates it as a deliberative citizen body.

To begin with, some explanation is needed in order to show how the other three views of deliberative citizen bodies do not apply to the institutional design of the CA. With regards to mini-public being an educative forum, a vision is “to create nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues through conversations with one another” (Fung 2003, p.340). To this end, the CA only partially reflects such conditions as its underlining purpose is not to facilitate a better understanding of various electoral systems by the citizens, but rather the education phase is only instrumental to the overall end of recommending a new system for Ontario. Alternatively, a mini-public that is set up as a participatory problem-solving collaboration would constitute “a continuous and symbolic relationship between the state and the public sphere aimed at solving particular collective problems…[as] citizens and officials through participatory deliberation, may invent novel solutions” (Fung 2003, p.341). As such, the CA does not embrace this end as its task does not involve any collaboration with government or politicians in general, as its work does not reflect a joint effort with members of the political community, while the simple act of parliamentary legislation that set up this Assembly cannot be understood to mean a shared undertaking since the sole responsibility of devising a new electoral system is placed entirely on the citizen body. Lastly, on the forth vision of mini-publics, participatory democratic governance refers to “…[a] more ambitious [view] than the other three [which]…seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices into the determination of policy agendas [and thereby]…injecting direct, mobilized, deliberative citizen participation into democratic governance” (Fung 2003, p.342). The CA, however, is only limited to a single policy of devising electoral reform rather than engaging in a whole range of public policies, and even within that narrow field its decision solely involves a recommendation that in the end has to be voted on in the referendum thereby making this citizen body non-authoritative in nature.

Having illustrated how the CA does not fit into any of the three above-mentioned categories of institutional design, I will now establish how it does reflect a mini-public by constituting a participatory advisory panel. Under this conception of a mini-public, the aim is “...not only to improve the quality of opinion [through the processes of education and deliberation], but also to align public policies with considered preferences [in order]...to transmit preferences after they have been appropriately articulated and combined into a social choice” (Fung 2003, p.341). Under this institutional design, a mini-public therefore takes on a supplementary role to the established dominant democratic arrangement, as it is used for the purpose of inputting citizens’ preferences on a given issue. With respect to electoral reform, the CA was set up in this fashion by the provincial government which in turn enacted Assembly’s authority on providing a concrete recommendation, if one is thought to be needed, on the question of changing the province’s current electoral system. The reason that the CA can only be considered an advisory deliberative body is that its decision would not carry any force without passing a referendum, the criteria of which is yet to be determined by another piece of government legislation. The key point here is that the CA’s role is only limited to giving a recommendation, which is itself conditional provided that is approved by the general public in a referendum that is to be formulated by parliament. The overall purpose of setting up such mini-publics, aside from the desired effect of soliciting citizen input, is also for government to solidify its own legitimacy (Fung 2003, p.341). Having said that, the CA therefore properly reflects a deliberative citizen body as it in fact conforms to a conception of a mini-public as a participatory advisory panel.

Citizens’ Assembly as a Representative Body

Next in the investigation, I turn to the question of whether the CA is a representative body in a sense that is required in order to give an expressed recommendation on the issue of electoral reform that is representative of Ontarians. In order to do this, however, a working definition of representation is needed. As a result, I turn to Hannah Pitkin who articulated a general definition of the term that she has to taken to mean ‘re-presentation’, which stands for the act of:

...making present something absent – but not making it literally present. It must be made present indirectly, through an intermediary; it must be made present in some
sense, while nevertheless remaining literally absent. But this basic idea can take very different forms, depending on what kind of thing is being made present, by what sort
of intermediary, in what sense, under what circumstances (Pitkin 1969, p.16).

Thus, in using Pitkin’s conception of representation for the purpose of this analysis, it remains to be established how the context of the CA shapes the form of representation that is needed. In developing the understanding of what exactly is made present within the scope of the Assembly’s undertaking, it is necessary to consider the task at hand that such mini-public is set up to accomplish. Thus, since its underlining task is to devise a recommendation after considering various electoral options that presupposes some degree of deliberation, the object of representation therefore has to depend on the actual process undertaken by members of the Assembly, which consists in citizens’ engagement with information. As a result, what needs to be made present is the way that Ontario’s public would react to certain electoral systems based both on their individual and collective conceptions of the good of the province. Members of the Assembly therefore have to be representative in order to account for the way that Ontarians in general would consider the issue of electoral reform.

Next, having established that the object of representation within the context of the CA is the point of view of Ontario’s citizens in regards to changes to their electoral system, I will go on to consider how representation of this kind is necessary in order to allow deliberation, and whether in this respect the Assembly is in fact representative enough. Beginning with figuring out a connection between representation on the one hand and deliberation on the other within the mini-publics, I contend that the outcome of the latter is legitimized by the fairness of the former. This therefore raises the question how fairly does the CA represent the citizens of Ontario, which regrettably enough cannot be completely settled without appealing to some doctrine of fairness, which is in itself prone to generate much disagreement. Perhaps the only possible way to assure fairness of representation is to pursue the policy implemented by the facilitators of the CA, who chose to correct the problems of total randomness by especially including members of minorities in order to reflect province’s diversity. In accordance with this approach, a “solution is to choose specific participants who demographically mirror the general population [or engage in]...affirmative action through recruitment” (Fung 2003, p.342).

Even though the question of establishing a particular factor to determine Assembly’s fairness of representation is in itself highly controversial, perhaps then the only criterion that could signify some degree of representation is the fact that all 103 electoral districts are represented within the CA. This, however, raises two major problems. Firstly, is the issue of voluntariness, as all of the members of the Assembly agreed to participate in their undertaking out of their own free will after having been randomly chosen from the voting list. Secondly, there is further an issue regarding the use of previously instituted geographical districts associated with the current electoral system that is subject to reform, which would in turn render a non-proportional representation of riding populations. As a result, members of the Assembly can be conceived not only to be largely made-up of ‘interested’ and ‘free’ individuals, but also be over-represented by members of the less populated electoral districts at the expense of more crowded urban ridings. Consequently, together these two problems have the effect of undermining the fairness of representation with the CA.

Having said that, it remains to be seen whether this lack of fairness within the make-up of the Assembly would adversely impact its ability to be representative of the views of Ontarians on the question of electoral reform. To answer this question, I return to my assertion that, in the context of a mini-public, fair citizen representation legitimizes the result of its deliberation. Building on this view, a point can be made that since the Assembly involves the representation of citizen views, which underpin the process of deliberation, an unfair representation of these views would undermine the legitimacy of the deliberation process. As a result, a conclusion can be drawn that, since the Assembly is in some respects unrepresentative of the views of Ontarians, the outcome of deliberation undertaken by the CA will therefore be illegitimate in these respects.

I expect this part of my argument to come as a shock to the proponents of mini-publics like Mark B. Brown who considers citizen assemblies to embody representation, as in his view:

Seen as representative institutions in themselves, the potential contribution of citizen panels to representative democracy resides primarily in the expertise and
resemblance elements of democratic representation and to a lesser extent in the participation and accountability elements (Brown 2006, p.221).

As my analysis of the CA has indicated, however, specifically in the context of electoral reform, the mini-public in question lacks sufficient representation to legitimize its deliberation outcome due to the existing issues of members’ voluntariness and the use of non-proportional geographic districts, which together neglects ‘to make present’ the overall views of Ontarians within the Assembly. As a result, the CA does not construe a representative body, which thereby undercuts the possibility of effective and legitimate deliberation.

The Structure of Deliberation within the Citizens’ Assembly

Turning to the question of how the structure of the CA reflects deliberative democracy, I will examine whether the Assembly’s scheme is able to facilitate the use of reason or is it rather used to aggregate interests. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this part of the investigation is quite hypothetical since the actual deliberation by the Assembly is yet to begin. Having said that, I base my analysis on the general set-up of the CA’s future deliberation process, which is aimed specifically at producing a new electoral system for Ontario.

I begin with a few words on the deliberative process that will be undertaken by the CA. As the education phase came to a close, 2007 will witness the Assembly’s deliberation phase. Thus, having obtained all of the necessary background information on various electoral systems, the CA will begin deliberations for the purpose of devising a new electoral system. Its approach, as it is now intended on, will consist of small group discussions on the subject of which of the nine decided-upon principles should be considered in the development of a new system. As a result, legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability, along with simplicity and practicality all have to be considered as viable options. Following this initial period of deliberation, the members of the Assembly will go on to vote for their top three principles that would consequently shape electoral reform. Finally, at the end of this so-called deliberation phase, the Assembly will once again engage in discussion this time to specifically work out the details of a new system, which in the end will once again be approved by a vote.

Getting into the analysis of this future deliberation process, it remains to be established whether its structure in fact properly reflects deliberation. In accordance with the general deliberative democracy model, “the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens’ reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonable agree with them” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). In this regard, I contend that the CA’s procedural reliance on some voting formula in order to reach its decision would undercut its overall character of deliberation, as making use of some degree of majority vote inherently undermines what Habermas conceived as “the force of the better argument” (Fung 2003, p.344) and replaces it with the force of numbers. By misplacing the use of reason with voting in order to reach its final outcome, the CA therefore abandons deliberative democracy and in its place adopts what I would call an ‘educated democratic approach’ to decision-making which is characterized by preceding education and discussion. In the process of voting, members of the Assembly thereby give up the deliberative technique of persuasion through reason and instead adopt a model of preference aggregation. In light of the fact that ultimately it is the vote that will decide the outcome of their decision, the Assembly is necessarily led to engage in a process of reconciling the differences of values that emerge out of this principles-based approach to the issue of electoral reform that ultimately requires building a compromise in order to accommodate diverging points of view, and which results in the aggregation of citizens’ preferences. As a result, to take the view that the CA constitutes a truly deliberative body would be construed as wishful thinking provided that voting is taken as the ultimate mode of reaching a decision.

The procedure adopted by the CA therefore incorporates deliberation only at the pre-voting stage of its deliberation phase, which would facilitate dialogue between the citizens based on reason. This narrow appropriation of deliberative democracy, however, comes short of truly allowing the CA to have a deliberative structure. Although, as pointed out by Fung “discussion may help individual participants to clarify their own views”, as “they may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and information to be pooled together” (Fung 2003, p.344), I nonetheless maintain that the structure of the CA’s process of decision-making does not qualify as a fully deliberative scheme. James Bohman expresses the strictly deliberative structure as involving ‘ideal procedure’, which he finds

…useful in making the normative feature of consensus explicit: reasoning in a procedure that embodies norms of freedom, equality, and publicity would produce (under
further ideal conditions of full information, absence of time constraints and so on) an outcome that everyone in principle could accept. By virtue of these ideal procedural
conditions, the decision reached is fair and one that all could accept (Bohman 1998, p.402).

Using this comprehensive conception of deliberative procedure as a reference point, my contention that the CA lacks proper deliberation is further strengthened. Accordingly, it is evidently clear that the Assembly does not even come close to embodying this enlightened understanding of deliberative procedure. The use of a vote as the mode of decision-making single-handedly constitutes a breach of the deliberative structure by putting an end to giving reasons as the ultimate determinant of outcomes. As a result, a conclusion here is that the CA does not reflect a deliberative structure of reaching a decision.

Final Remarks

Having first established that the CA was in fact set-up as a deliberative body as it reflects a foundation of a mini-public by being an advisory participatory panel, I then analyzed Assembly’s level of representation and deliberativeness of its overall structure. As a result of this investigation, it was uncovered that despite appearances the Assembly is not a representative institution, while its structure does not construe deliberation in the proper sense of the term, which together suggest that in actuality this citizen body does not constitute a deliberative institution. What is important to realize in light of this conclusion, however, is that in stating that the CA is not deliberative enough, a further deduction begs to be made on the possibility of implementing deliberative democracy in the context of a pluralist geographically-dispersed society like Ontario and not to mention Canada. The result of this lengthy analysis therefore reflects a kind of a lesson that is to be learned from the CA, which signals in the direction that the application of deliberative democracy (through the forum of mini-publics or in general) is highly unlikely given its idealistic conditions. By taking this approach to politics seriously, however, a body politik has to be prepared to abandon its ordinary conceptions of fairness of representation and the methodology of voting as a settlement of disputes, since adopting deliberation as the mode of decision-making would require considerably more from the citizens than it is conceivable possible within the scope of contemporary society. On that note, perhaps it could be admitted that deliberative citizen bodies like the CA nonetheless reflect a better approach to democracy. I, however, would caution anyone from considering this progressive formulation of engaging decision-making scheme as a true formulation of deliberative democracy, as the proper use of deliberation would require us to fully abandon aggregation preferences in the context of reconciling divergent interests.

Bibliography

James Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1998): 400-425.

Mark B. Brown, “Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2006): 203-225.

Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).

Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in J. Elster & A. Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 104-132.

Archon Fung, “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2003): 338-367.

Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics,” Politics & Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006): 219-244.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press, 1996).

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “Introduction: the Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Hannah Pitkin (Atherton Press, 1969), 1-23.

Theoretical Perspectives on the Education and Legitimacy of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly

2006-12-03T16:46:00.000-05:00

The Ontario Citizens’ Assembly is an exercise in community, and representation of community. These citizens from all walks of life are brought together under the values defined by their elected Ontario Legislative Assembly, and consequently, on behalf of Ontarians. Their purpose is to discuss, deliberate and propose electoral reform. Are they brought together as individuals, as members of their home communities, or members of the Citizens’ Community? Education gives them a common experience that transforms the role members of the Citizens’ Assembly play as representatives. Pericles notably glorified the importance of service over self, of the honor of dedicating one’s life and liberty to the community. (Thucydides 3) Although the men that died while fighting Sparta were Athenians as one, civically they were individuals. Internally, Athens was a divided democracy but externally she was a united front. Disagreement and debate was nurtured on the inside, for the furtherance of democracy and citizenship, but common training and leadership made the Athenian army a noble opponent externally. The Citizens’ Assembly in Ontario is comparable to ancient Athens, except it is a reversal. On the outside, the Assembly gives the impression that its objectives are dialogue and exchange between individuals drawn from all over Ontario, but internally, an element of education brings them together into a community of uniformity of perspective. The entire Learning Phase of the Citizens’ Assembly, taking up almost as much time as the Deliberation Phase, in a way preconditions the members from playing the reflective role they are sought out to perform. This prerequisite education, or re-education as it might be, threatens the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly in serving as a body representative of the general populace. Without this accurate representation, the Assembly’s thoughts and proposals become out of sync, especially when their final proposal goes to the electorate for ratification. Some might argue that anything otherwise would lead the Assembly to be too uneducated to make the important decisions regarding electoral reform proposal; however, the argument of this essay is that Assembly members need to remain untainted in their responsibility as a representative body. Here, a number of theoretical approaches will be applied to the argument to test its validity.

Pitkin defines a number of forms of representation that help to illustrate the transformation that is taking place in the Citizens’ Assembly. To her, representation is simply the “re-presentation” of another group, or making present something that is absent. (Pitkin 16) But within that concept, there is much division. The definition of representation per se is a more complex issue, but she is able to narrow down several different incarnations, all of which vary based on what the representatives’ roles are. From a superficial perspective, two can be applied to the general idea of the Citizens’ Assembly. It is either an accurate representation of delegates that reflects the interests of the public at large; or, it can serve as a symbolic body of trustees that are entrusted with working amongst themselves on behalf of society. In the Assembly, the delegate/reflective model is more akin to a random sample, whereby the members, as they are selected by random from each district in Ontario, work towards hammering out proposals – almost like a focus group – that would be agreeable with the rest of their fellow citizens. The trustee model bears close resemblance to the Ontario Legislative Assembly as both are congregations of representative members that immerse themselves in policy and emerge with solutions. But how does the referendum factor in? Since, when all the deliberations are over and the proposals have been made, the proposals go to a referendum for ratification. Trusteeships rarely involve members facing their electorate on any one particular issue, and trustees are only held accountable by virtue of their office itself. In the Citizens’ Assembly, the members have nothing personal to lose whether the public ratifies their proposals or not. Further, trustees only face a vote on their individual performance, not on specific policy issues that they were entrusted to deal with. It makes little sense to view the Citizens’ Assembly as a body of trustees from the start. Instead, when taking into account the referendum, the Assembly should be viewed as a body that has been transformed from a body of delegates into a body of trustees, by virtue of their added sophistication.

Ultimately, “The more a theorist sees representatives as superior in wisdom and expertise to their constituents, the more he will stress the need for independent judgment […] there is no point in counting noses accurately among the constituents if the question is a technical one calling for expertise.” (Pitkin 20) This expertise, gained through study and contemplation on the subject, places greater importance on the need for representatives to be independent in their thought and actions. Thus, a dichotomy emerges for the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly: the Assembly remains uneducated (or rather, untainted) and their proposal goes to referendum, or, the members continue with their regimen of lectures but are granted more independence in their decision-making power, e.g. their recommendation goes to the Legislature instead of the general public. These are obviously both hypothetical scenarios. The reality at hand maintains that the transformed Assembly is dealing with material that the general public will not be able to handle on a policy-level yes/no vote. Montesquieu, on representatives, states, “The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.” (Montesquieu 176) In this case, it makes little sense to take these detailed public affairs to the public for approval when it is difficult enough for them to participate in the deliberation with Assembly members who underwent months of specialized training.

The Assembly process in itself, however, minus the Learning Phase, can be viewed as an educational experience. In Tocqueville’s assessment of American democracy in New England, he came to the conclusion that, “Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” (Tocqueville 2) His notion of localized deliberating, or “municipal institutions,” helps also to define where the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly is lacking. To contrast the two, municipal institutions of colonial and post-colonial America were a method of direct democracy, where decisions were made by the local community regarding local issues. As if it was their duty, the community as a whole came together to discuss and deliberate voluntarily. The Citizens’ Assembly, however, meets as a group selected randomly by the government.

It should be noted that the Citizens’ Assembly is not entirely without grassroots involvement. The Ontario process has, in between the Learning and Deliberation Phases, a Consultation Phase that allows members of the general public to come forward and make presentations to members of the Citizens’ Assembly before they begin their deliberations. Two points render this consultative phase inferior to that which Tocqueville praises: first, private citizens making presentations are not at the same level as Assembly members since they are separated by months of standardized learning, and second, public deliberation is not ingrained in post-modern democratic citizenship as it was in 18th century America, so the quality of these consultations is not as comprehensive. The purpose of contrasting the Citizens’ Assembly with Tocqueville’s writing is to display that even when regarding the output of educational potential, i.e. the potential these public deliberations have for enlightening and broadening the democratic capacity of the society, the Assembly process is lacking.

For Schumpeter, however, public discourse has the opposite effect. This theory takes a more pessimistic view of human nature, as “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. [The citizen] argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests.” (Schumpeter 262) Along these anti-educational lines, man is more thoughtful and rational when he is introspective rather than when he looks for answers in others. He has more to learn from himself than from others, who tend to reduce his rational ability. At the same time, public reason does not really exist, and consequently there is no accurate way at arriving at a “common good.” In speaking of society, “The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in turn explain the ordinary citizen’s ignorance and lack of judgment in matters of domestic and foreign policy which are if anything more shocking in the case of educated people and of people who are successfully active in non-political walks of life than it is with uneducated people in humble stations.” (Schumpeter 261) The position this theory arrives at is one, when examining the Citizens’ Assembly, which would characterize citizen deliberation as a waste of time. Accordingly, man has little free will and is easily manipulated; citizens are ignorant and superficial, and are easily manipulated by politicians. Thus, the entire Assembly process can be seen as moot: there is no common will to be determined. What is more, the fact that the referendum to ratify the proposal to come out of this Assembly is to take place concurrently with the Ontario General Election characterizes its openness to being politicized by parties and candidates seeking to gain election. In his advocacy for a minimalist government, with periodic votes and such, the only effective form of government is one that is made up of a small number of trustees, and thus education and study can be considered valuable to those few in his minimalist model. Schumpeter would be very critical of the Assembly, its sheer size and scope, and would most likely claim that the members, as well as the citizens voting in the referendum, are vulnerable to manipulation. Within this model, the education the Assembly receives threatens the legitimacy of the Assembly process, but within the context of an already illegitimate form of democracy.

Another theory, by Dewey, asserts that governments are representative simply if they lay claim to standing for the interests of the public. People involved in representative capacities do not lose their human nature and their personal interests and allegiances, viz., “interests of special groups, those of the family, clique or class to which they belong.” (Dewey 76) Here, there is no question whether the Citizens’ Assembly is legitimate or not. The composition of the Assembly itself is one that purports to be representative of regional (one member form each district), gender (divided equally between the sexes), and Aboriginal interests (at least one seat for a citizen of Aboriginal status). This representational cross-section aims to take into account sufficient viewpoint diversity, enlisting a wide range of Ontarians what will provide adequate perspective in drawing conclusions on the subject of electoral reform. Education enters the equation as an external factor that disrupts the Assembly by helping the members shed their personal interests and allegiances. Dewey’s notion of representation is all-encompassing, and the dual capacity he presents for representatives, one as voter and one as a stated official, expands on what has above been deemed a struggle, (ibid.) the delegate vis-à-vis the trustee. But again, education provides a standardizing force that moves members away from their personal allegiances and towards uniformity. Take for instance the fact that the legislation enacted by the Ontario Legislative Assembly requires to apply government-mandated principles and characteristics when assessing electoral systems: legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability. (Ontario Regulation 82/06) Such impositions upon members of the Assembly imply that personal preconditions of thought regarding electoral systems are not welcome. Under the Dewey model, although the system remains legitimate, it strikes an imbalance in the dual mandate of the members which causes them to ward off their viewpoint diversity in favor of commonality.

Deliberative democracy has been studied in philosophical depth relatively recently. This new concentration of study can be seen as a reflection of the evolving nature of democracy, or at the very least, democratic thought. According to Macpherson, democracy has shifted models several times, and is slowly approaching a manifestation in participatory democracy. (Macpherson 22). Although participation does not necessarily require deliberation, deliberation surely requires participation. The foundations of deliberation theory are traced in a desire to provide a rational response to the market-style, competitive, liberal democratic elements of society that usually result in “bargaining equilibrium.” (Bohman 400) Instead, consensus and agreement is sought. Williams discusses an abandonment of these same market-style ideals, what she terms “liberal representation,” as problems are found with the greater divisions and marginalization that result. (Williams 7) Consequently, “Because the processes that constitute political representation are complex, any theory of fair representation must be similarly complex.” (Williams 8) Education has a considerable position to fulfill in deliberative democratic theory as it has the greatest ability to influence many political actors, and, as a result, political outcomes. The rest of this discussion will focus on the implications of education within deliberative democratic theories of representation.

Embodying the “will of the people” is the aim of deliberative democracy, in which public reason is the highest ideal. (Bohman 401) Continuing Williams’ maxim, Bohman claims that deliberation is a complex idea, a concept that is rooted in public reason. He also recognizes the problem of liberal representation: “The problem is that the state is structured around the pressure to make a timely decision and to perform particular functions in complex societies.” (Bohman 414) Modern states have grown into organisms with such large bureaucracies that the slowly but surely attitude of public deliberation would not be sufficient for the fast-paced approach modern governments have come to adopt. As such, “the only feasible form of deliberation occurs in the interaction between formally organized institutional decision-making mechanisms and informal and ‘anonymous’ debates and discussion in the public sphere.” (Bohman 414-15) Thus, under Bohman’s theory, the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly may gain legitimacy after all. The Assembly can be seen as an embodiment of this personal interaction between the government and its public. The “will of the people” is collected (Consultation Phase) and organized (Deliberation Phase) until the members of the Assembly reach a consensus on the public’s behalf (Final Report). But the public is not actually engaged in any of the deliberation. The extent to which public consensus is sought comes in the form of a double majority that is required when the Assembly’s proposal is made available at the polls for ratification. This is not exactly the version of public deliberation that Bohman, or any other deliberative democracy theorists, have in mind. Deliberative democracy is the New England town meeting transformed to a larger scale. Perhaps public discourse can be embodied in public education campaigns. If the Assembly, by means of public education, can convince the public to be on side with their proposed reforms, then this might be considered public deliberation. Theoretically the Assembly should not have much of a problem convincing the public of anything, since it in itself is a cross-section of the public. But again the problem of an educated Assembly arises: is the government trying to create dialogue with the public, or is it appointing a random few to be groomed to be able to deliberate at the government’s level? Or, perhaps the members’ education puts them in a better position to engage their fellow citizens. Whether or not this is the case, their fellow citizens are not being persuaded one way or another within this process. The nature of the Assembly process is to foster enough discussion between Assembly members, with merely input from self-selecting members of the public, in order to produce recommendations that the general public will find palatable. Unfortunately, the degree to which public engagement occurs is quite limited.

Gutmann and Thompson seek out to diminish the deliberative deficit that exists in liberal democracy. (Gutmann and Thompson 12) Deliberation is a way citizens can go on living with their moral disagreements. To them, the absence of deliberation means that, “citizens cannot even provisionally justify many controversial procedures and constitutional rights to one another.” (Gutmann and Thompson 18) In essence, deliberation is a necessity in a healthy democracy, one that is naturally stricken with divisions and differences along moral lines. Several principles are identified here that aim to foster deliberation: reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity. These principles serve as conditions for healthy deliberation to take place, and by no means can be forced upon a public. A society, however, can take steps to foster these ideals, e.g. penalizing those who violate the notion of basic liberty, but the only way of encouraging such considerations is through public education. These principles seem to parallel the ideals set forth by the Ontario Legislature as principles to guide the Assembly in their assessment of electoral systems. But the fact that these principles can only be encouraged in the general public and not instituted (anything otherwise would be a treat to liberty) means that true public deliberation among all citizens is a mere dream. At most, a compromise between democratic proceduralism and deliberation democracy can be envisioned. In this way, education can be incorporated into procedure, but insofar as it is not used as a mechanism for social conditioning.

“Actual deliberation […] encourages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens […] if they were all living in an ideal society.” (Gutmann and Thompson 16) The theorists offer an account that makes citizen deliberation an alternative to hypothetical deliberation. When applied to the Citizens’ Assembly, citizen deliberation is all hypothetical: electoral systems are a very intangible concept that can be only be brought closer to home by means of education. It is through education that the citizen gains a greater understanding but also develops a closer connection to his representation and the representation of society. Citizens’ moral understandings belong to the realm of self-interest, but it is very difficult to attach (or extract) self-interest from a sphere that is not within the grasp of most, except when it comes time to mark an “X” every now and then. Education, therefore, makes deliberating electoral politics within reach of the public, allowing them to make it their self-interest. But the Citizens’ Assembly falls short in this regard, also. Aside, from a consultation guide that is available online, aptly titled “Citizens Talking to Citizens,” very little has been invested in communicating or making available educational materials for the general public.

Education is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can empower citizens to the level of participating in deliberative democracy. On the other, it makes citizen representatives illegitimate in their responsibility to accurately reflect their fellow citizens. Pericles made the claim, “instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.” (op. cit.) For most of these theorists, discussion adds to the democratic side of the equation. The Citizens’ Assembly, overall, is an exercise remarkable for its openness and good intentions. Unfortunately, when political scientists get involved, the world is turned on its side. From this end of observation, its legitimacy is threatened by the use of education as an antecedent, and the lack of education in the public realm makes its deliberative legitimacy powerless.

Bohman, James. “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 4, 400-425.

Dewey, John. (1954, 1927). The Public and its Problems. Athens: Ohio University Press. 75-142.

Election Act, Ontario Regulation 82/06, Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press. 1-51.

Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. 9-22.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. (1748). The Spirit of Laws. Tr. Thomas Nugent. (1752). Kitchener: Batoche Books. 171-184. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. (1969). “Introduction: The Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Pitkin. New York: Atherton Press. 1-23.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 250-283.

Thucydides. Pericles’ Funeral Oration. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. (1835) Book I, Chapter V: “Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States Before That of the Union at Large,” in Democracy in America. Tr. Henry Reeve. (1899). Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.

Williams, Melissa S. (1998). Voice, Trust, and Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-22, 203-243.

Report: Political Parties Working Group

2006-12-03T02:00:00.000-05:00

I attended and was lucky to be able to participate in the CA meetings on the weekend of Nov. 25-26. As Glaucon mentions in his/her post, four working groups on substantive issues (women and underrepresented groups, political parties, government stability and geographic representation) presented their findings and discussion questions to the assembly on this final weekend of the learning phase.In this post, I will focus on my experience as a member of the political parties working group and expand on the research our group presented to the assembly by highlighting what contribution democratic theory has made to our understanding of political parties. I will then discuss how different electoral systems affect the degree to which elections are candidate or party focused.

Over the last 3 weekends of the learning phase, two fellow members and I spent an hour and half on Friday evenings discussing various aspects of political parties with a focus on how parties behave during campaigns. We discussed our values and opinions of political parties as well as the relevant research on how different electoral systems affect party behaviour. I found my experience in this working group to be an invaluable one as it gave me a chance to research a specific issue in greater detail and it gave us members control over the issues we wanted to explore and findings we wanted to present to our fellow assembly members. The working group was run in a really informal, relaxed way where the three of us shared views and research while Professor Ailsa Henderson was on hand to answer questions and recommend readings on topics we wanted more information on.

The main research question of the working group was how do electoral systems affect political parties? Before turning to some of our findings on how electoral systems affect political parties, I’m going to highlight some of the contributions democratic theory has made to our understanding of political parties.

The political party is a relatively modern institution within the democratic tradition. Political parties are actually incompatible with both the traditional philosophies of Locke and Rousseau as they are structured above individual interests and deny the existence of a volonte generale (general will of the people)(1) . Political parties began to play a key role as mass democracy made a direct link between between the individual and the state an impossibility (Biezen pg.2). This means that political parties are pivotal to modern representative democracy but did not exist, for example, in ancient Athenian democracy where the polis was so small that direct democracy was possible. Now, the central role of political parties in modern democracy is accepted by both scholars and policy-makers (Biezen pg.1). There is, however, disagreement on the role of parties within a democracy . One key theorist that we studied in class, Joseph Schumpeter (1942), argued that, “A party is not, as classical doctrine (or Edmund Burke) would have us believe, a group of men who intend to promote public welfare.” Instead Schumpeter says a “party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power. If that were not so it would be impossible for different parties to adopt exactly or almost exactly the same program.(2)" Schumpeter’s view is in contrast to that of Katz (1996) who conceptualizes political parties ‘as an essential public good for democracy’ (Biezen,pg.2). This shows that, as Van Biezen argues, although there is an acceptance of the importance of the political party within modern democracy, democratic theory remains unclear on what the precise role of the party is in the democracy.(Biezen pg.4).

How Ontarians view the role of political parties in our democracy is a critical question in determining what electoral system may be best for Ontario. It is important to ask whether Ontarians want a stronger or weaker role for political parties in the electoral system. The research we looked at shows that one of the main dimensions (although not the only one) of political parties that’s affected by the electoral system is the degree to which an election focuses on parties or individual candidates. Rupinder Brar, who ran in the last federal election for the NDP said that “Ontarians need to decide whether they’re voting for individuals or parties,” he adds that, "If we are voting for parties, then we do need to change (the electoral system)”(3). Taking into consideration the importance of political parties and the uncertainty of their exact role in the democratic process; I will highlight what our working group research determined about the affect of different electoral systems on how focused an election is on political parties.

Our current First Past the Post (FPTP) system is considered a candidate focused system because, on the ballot, we are voting not directly for a political party but for a candidate.(4) This means that it is the individual MP who is held to account by their constituents come election time. Of course, the candidate usually does represent a party but can also be an independent (although it’s relatively difficult for independents to win seats under FPTP).

Other systems are even more candidate focused than FPTP. The BC Assembly, for example, gravitated towards the proportional Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system as an alternative to FPTP because of a wide dissatisfaction with the party system in B.C and a desire to tear down the party system as it stood by employing STV’s strong focus on candidates rather than parties. The STV system has several candidates from the same party running against each other in the same district in the election. On the ballot, voters can rank order candidates by preference and can indicate preference for candidates from different parties. Because there is more than one candidate per party running within the riding, the individual candidate, and how they present party policy, becomes much more important. STV is a system that is also more likely to have independent candidates run and win. For example, in the Irish Dail (one of two countries using STV, the other being Malta) there are 15 independents representing 15% of the parliament.(5) This compares to no independent MPPs in Queen’s Park and 2 of 308 independent MPs in the House of Commons under our current First Past the Post system (FPTP).

There are also electoral systems that put far more focus on, and give more power to, political parties than FPTP. For example, the closed list proportional representation (PR) system inarguably puts the highest emphasis on political parties. A closed list system (used by Israel) has voters vote for a party rather than a particular candidate with the decision of which candidates get seats going to each particular party and how they choose to structure their internal democracy. This gives political parties the most control over who gets into parliament. For this reason, elections under list PR systems also tend to be more ideologically based campaigns (focusing on the party platform) rather than emphasizing individual candidates such as the FPTP system and even more so, the STV system.

The closed list versus open list distinction also applies when considering mixed systems such as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). MMP is seen as a viable alternative in Ontario to FPTP as (like STV) it mixes regional representation with a proportional element where voters get two votes; one for the candidate they prefer and one for the party they prefer. The MMP system is more party focused than STV and part of the reason why the BC Assembly (due to the political culture in BC) didn’t vote in favour of MMP. In stands to reason that within the MMP system (as in list PR) if the PR element is closed-list it will be more party focused as the party gets more control over the candidates than in an open list where voters, instead of the party, choose the particular candidates.

The above are just examples of how electoral systems can affect whether or not elections, and consequently parliament, are more candidate or party focused. It highlights how important it is to consider how Ontarians view the current party system and what role Ontarians envision for political parties. In light of some of our findings on political parties, I would conclude that during the deliberation phase, the Assembly should be sure to pose questions to Ontarians such as; would you value a system that gave more or less power to political parties? Do you value elections that are more candidate or party focused and do you value independent candidates?

In this post, I’ve highlighted some contributions democratic theory has made to our understanding of political parties. I've also discussed what some of our research as a working group on political parties said about how electoral systems affect the degree to which an election is focused on political parties versus candidates. Lastly, I discussed the importance of asking Ontarians their views on the role of political parties and incorporating those views into any decision made by the CA.

References

(1) Van Biezen, Ingrid. How Political Parties Shape Democracy. University of Birmingham; 2004. Accessed Through pg 2.

(2)Schumpeter, Joseph. Socialism and Democracy; 1942. Accessed through Pol484 Reader; University of Toronto, Prof. Ron. pg. 283

(3)Reka, Szekely. (Durham College Campus paper) The Chronical; Nov. 2006. Accessed through Ontario Citizens’ Assmebly Member’s Blog posting by member. (http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca)

(4)"The kinds of electoral systems". Youth Vote, 2004. Accesed through (http: sf="2901&art_id=iol1076410710378Y300&click_id=2" set_id="1")

(5)"Voting System" Wikipedia. <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system>

Citizens' Assembly Observation Report: The Need for "Listening"

2006-12-01T18:32:00.000-05:00

This is a brief observation report on the meeting of the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) which took place on this past Saturday the November 25^th, focusing on the presentation of the Working group on the Representation of Women and Other Underrepresented Groups. I post this on the heels of my peer Glaucon’s engaging report regarding the same topic. His report focuses on the non-functionality of the CA’s working group process, using Amy Lang’s observations of British Columbia’s CA experience as a point of reference. What I would like to do in this post is offer ways in which the working group could have been more effective, ways in which this concerns the nature of the CA, and what type suggestion of electoral reform I think this concern should point towards. I suggest that the concept of “listening,” as Melissa Williams and Iris Young use it, can be very instructive in this process.

One of the presenters gave an interesting analogy for the problem of groups underrepresented in politics, likening the situation to a broken bone. As she aptly put, the situation is, like a broken bone, problematic and undesirable, raising the question of whether or not we should let the bone heal on its own, at the risk of it not healing properly, or put a cast on it which will heal it correctly, but at the expense of unnaturalness. While underlying this presentation was a certain assumption that some type of “cast” is necessary, I was disappointed that a) there was not any clear statement of why the broken bone was a problem, and b) there was not any recommendation as to what type of cast should be utilized. As Glaucon observed, “the working group’s presentation did not have any concrete recommendations for the Assembly. Instead, they…put forward ideas they felt the Assembly should consider.” I would have liked to have seen an articulation of a strong claim in regards to the two points raised above, as it probably would have been more effective in stimulating productive discussion and debate, more so than merely putting ideas or considerations forward to be thought about. Before delving into how the working group could have gone about this better, or what I would have liked to hear them say, I think it is important to consider why this was the case.

In making their case for the considering ways of equalizing representation of women and marginalized groups through the electoral system, the working group pointed out that a more equal degree of participation will bring a larger diversity of views and perspectives to the political table, enriching the political process and making it more legitimate. While this is an important point to be made, and I strongly agree with it, I would have liked to hear reasons given which are not purely instrumental to the general public. I was frustrated that there was no mention of the good it would do for the marginalized groups themselves. It seems to me that the most obvious reason for addressing the disproportionate representation of many groups is also the simplest: the sheer fact of discrimination and subordination. Yes, women will bring important voices and opinions to parliament, but why not also consider the structural, legal, and societal forces which continue to restrict women from attaining political office? If this is made clear, we can see the rectifying of this situation not as something which will simply “enrich” politics, but which is intrinsically necessary for equal and democratic politics.[i]

The hesitation on the part of the working group to be more straightforward and forthcoming with clear and pointed arguments might come from two places. The first could be that there was simply no consensus within the working group as to whether or not the issue should be addressed through electoral reform, and what type of reform would work best. If this was the case I think instead of presenting apolitical and unopinionated considerations, it might have been better to present the diversity of the group’s opinions, as they suggested earlier, with each of their supporting arguments and rationales. The second reason could have been from a fear of being seen as pursuing personal-interests in some way or form. It should be noted that the majority of the working group were women, with one man who appeared to be of East-Asian descent. Perhaps there was a feeling, and quite possibly a fully justified one, that if they were to make more pointed suggestions and arguments regarding marginalized-group representation it would be classified as “special-interest” and therefore illegitimate for the deliberative forum, regardless of whether or not good reasons were presented for it. This could be the same reason why there were absolutely no arguments made, either for or against, which were based on personal experience. If a woman were to point to her perspective as a woman in regards to her claim about representation of women in politics, it would most certainly be seen as privatizing the scope of discussion. However this seems counterintuitive, in that “what women think” should play some sort of roll into actions made on behalf of women’s participation.

This is where the act of “listening” comes to play. Melissa Williams, quoting Iris Young, describes this process:

While everyday discourse about justice certainly makes claims, these are not theorems to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system. They are instead calls, pleas, claims upon some people by others. Rational reflection on justice begins in…hearing, in heeding a call, rather than in….mastering a state of affairs, however ideal.[ii]

When applied to deliberative forums, listening suggests that what is good or just for all should not be conceived simply through reflection or deduction, but through reception; experience and individual perspectives should be incorporated and considered as types of self-understanding crucial to understanding a more overarching sense of “good” or “just.” Similarly, the perspectives and experiences of women, Aboriginals, visible minorities, etc, in regards to their representation in Parliament should be welcomed in the CA as empirical examples of perception as opposed to self-interested argumentation.

Furthermore, I would argue that listening should be considered when thinking about electoral reform and the representation of marginalized groups. One CA member asked the question of whether it is know if women statistically tend to vote more for women than not. The response was that there is no tendency for women to do this, as they tend to vote according to ideological preference. One member of the working group made the good point that this often has to do with the lack of choice: if a woman wants to vote for the NDP, in the current single member plurality system she can only vote for whoever the NDP places in running. While the discrimination within political parties is an important issue to consider in this topic, I lack both the space and knowledge to speak well on it. What I want to point out, however, is that the aforementioned fact that women tend to vote according to ideology as opposed to sex points to the heterogeneous perspectives of marginalized group representation within those marginalized groups: some prioritize it higher than others, for example. This problematizes more rigid solutions like quotas or consociational models. I would suggest that some system of proportional representation would be best in that it allows citizens to define what constituency they belong to, be it according to ideology, gender, or geography. In this way the electoral system is structurally capable of listening to groups and individuals self-understandings and adapt accordingly. For example, women who prioritize the representation of women can vote according to that, with more options to choose from, and women who prioritize ideological representation can vote according to that.

In these ways, by incorporating the act of listening into both the structure of deliberation, and as a focus of deliberation, the CA might be able to better include citizens belonging to marginalize groups. Not only that, the ways in which they are included will be more reflective of the self-constitutions they possess.

[i] Another thing I was surprised nobody mentioned was that the CA itself was made sure to be proportionately representative of women, and assigned one seat specifically for someone of Aboriginal descent. It would seem that referring to that as an example for how proportionate representation of groups would enrich political perspectives would be a case-in-point. Perhaps, this is not a view shared by most CA members?

[ii] Melissa Williams. Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998: 12.

Comment on Scholar84's Observation Report

2006-12-01T13:21:00.000-05:00

In “Comment on the recent Students’ Assembly and Citizens’ Assembly: The possible future of Citizens’ Juries”, Scholar84 drawing on Archon Fung’s analysis explains that “citizens’ assemblies favor a more ‘deliberative democracy’ in which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them…yet, while we emphasize the importance of ‘reason’, we should not expect self- and group-interest to disappear as political forces.” In this comment I would like to expand on the issue of the promotion of interests in the context of citizen panels like the current Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform.

Although Scholar84 raises a valid point that citizen deliberation can potentially result in solving public problems in a more democratic fashion than is allowed through conventional (representative or delegative) democracy, a further distinction between the two functions of citizen assemblies needs to be made. On one view, such citizen bodies can be understood to properly engage in the process of deliberation with the ultimate aim of finding a solution to the problem at hand by using constructive critical evaluation of the issues. Under this first conception of assemblies’ function, the overall approach therefore reflects an honest search for the best solution that most excellently reflects the good of society in large. On another view, however, citizen bodies, functioning within the accepted context of pluralism, conceptualize the common good through an aggregation of citizen interests, which thereby involves a different kind of deliberation that aims to reconcile diverging interests by eliminating those that involve poorly framed arguments and constructing a compromise between acceptable reasons.

As a result of making this distinction, it can in turn be analyzed which one of these two different functions of citizen assemblies can best pursue a more democratic solution to dealing with public issues. Although under the first conception of deliberative citizen bodies public problems are discussed for the sole purpose of arriving at the best answer, this ultimate outcome is to a degree compromised by applying the second conception of citizen assemblies, as an aggregation on interests is necessarily less capable of achieving an objectively good outcome since it can only reflect a summation of subjective interests that together form a pluralist common good. The truth in the matter, however, is that Canadian society embraces the notion of pluralism via its celebrated policy of multiculturalism, which therefore leads us to accept as de facto the second function of citizen assemblies that reflects a grant reconciliation project.

In accordance with the view of citizen bodies where the process deliberation ends being an instrument of aggregating various interests, I am therefore lead to agree with Scholar84 that the emphasize on ‘reason’ does not in turn eliminate the concern for ‘interests’ from deliberative discussion. I realize that by accepting as de facto the view of citizen assemblies as mediums of reconciliation, I thereby deny the usual distinction that is raised by the proponents of deliberative democracy who differentiate their approach from a more adversarial form of democracy that involves bargaining and interest-aggregation by politicians. Within the context of subjective pluralism, however, I contend that realizing a normative conception of deliberative citizen bodies, which aim to objectively solve public dilemmas, is an unattainable possibility. As a result, the arguments from self- and group-interest are necessarily prone to develop in citizen assemblies, as the application of reason within the current deliberative structure can only provide for an aggregation of seemingly equally valuable arguments that in the end diminishes assemblies’ objectivity in their approach to public dilemmas. The question then necessarily remains whether a modern pluralist society is at all capable of objectivity within the realm of politics, which I think was answered by Canadian multiculturalism that embraces citizens’ subjectivity while at the same time keeping it in check by granting all individuals legal rights recognized in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides the objective check on the aggregation of subjectively-held interests.

Comment on Glaucon’s The Working Group on the Representation of Women and Other Underrepresented Groups

2006-11-29T10:00:00.000-05:00

By nature, agenda setting poses a significant dilemma for the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly when considering the openness of deliberation versus constraints imposed by the government. Is the quality of the Assembly’s deliberation hampered when government bureaucrats direct it? Glaucon argues that the Citizens’ Assembly, in its utilization of working groups to foster discussion of issues that would otherwise not make it to the plenary level for one reason or another, is actually ineffective in developing a cultural consensus that is prerequisite to bringing women’s and minority issues to the foreground.

In my opinion, the only way citizen deliberation can yield meaningful, representative dialogue is if it is driven by the people that are doing the deliberating. Most legislatures usually elect one of their own to chair their proceedings, and the assembly as a whole usually has the power to set and alter its agenda. The same goes for most civic groups: Robert’s Rules of Order, the standard for meeting procedures, is adamant in its member-driven rules and in empowering minority voices. The Ontario Citizens’ Assembly stands out as it is driven by a government agency, and I believe that government cannot always elicit the outcomes it hopes for in such deliberations. Women’s suffrage did not happen because government decided it wanted to look into making the electoral system more equitable, but rather it was the result of popular opinion and grassroots organization within the context of what appeared to be an inhospitable climate. Ronald Reagan identified the most terrifying words in the English language as, “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” Maybe the Secretariat should take a step back to reevaluate its role in driving public discourse.

There seems to be a constant agonizing over under-representation of women. Lang criticizes the lack of a “cultural consensus” in identifying these issues of inequity, yet perhaps there already exists a cultural consensus that is centered on complacency because the status quo is adequate enough to meet the needs of the general public (or, in this case, the Citizens’ Assembly, which happens to be 50% female). To feminists and members of academia, the issue of representation of women is an inequality that the rest of the public does not seem to understand. According to Lang,

[T]here was no cultural consensus among [BC Citizens’ Assembly] Assembly members on whether or not the women’s representation even should be on the Assembly’s agenda. It wasn’t enough just to have an advocate for an issue - the other Assembly members had to respond to the pleas of the advocate in order to keep the conversation going. (Lang 13)

Is it really an issue that needs to be addressed if the people who were assembled to address it have no burning desire to do so? Is this ivory tower idealism at odds with a sociology that perhaps places women above the ignoble depths of public life? The danger in agenda setting is that ulterior motives for social change are brought to the deliberation table not by the members themselves, but in an almost stealthy way that pits government bureaucrats in the Secretariat in a position of marshaling the direction of dialogue towards issues of women’s representation, for one – whether or not it is on the members’ personal or representative agendas.

Lang, Amy. (2006). Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizen's Assembly. Madison: Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Assembly Report: November 25, 2006

2006-11-28T13:13:00.000-05:00

Since my last visit to the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly, there is clear indication that the members had made significant progress through the Learning Phase. Not only is the members’ knowledge of electoral systems adequate for proceeding onto the consultation and deliberation phases, but also their facility with the content and the extent to which they delve into the complexities of electoral systems is telling of their dedication to becoming academically oriented with the subject matter. Several months ago, one definitely would not have heard a question, in relation to mixed systems, such as, “Is it possible to have a double-ballot ordinal instead of categorical…?” The members are obviously investing very much time in learning the ins and outs of each particular category of electoral system. I get the impression that in their minds, they are not capable of making a proper recommendation without being fully informed.

The sessions I attended on Day One of Weekend Six of the Learning Phase (November 25, 2006), I observed about half of the simulation process for the mixed system simulation. Prior to my arrival, the members were given an overview of the mixed-member proportional system after which they proceeded into a mock election (they elected their favorite snack foods) and were given the results. Upon arriving, I observed a small group discussion of the results from the simulation, and the introduction of the simulation on the single-transferable vote system.

It is interesting to note that questions to consider when assessing the outcome of this mock election were provided to the members. This mere sheet of paper that was passed to all the members for their discussion groups is telling of the overall dynamic that exists: the members were not brought together from all over the province to lead the way as a subset of the population in producing recommendations for electoral reform. Rather, they were assembled so that they could provide their opinions within the government-mandated rubric of electoral reform. At least, it appears this way.

I see two exhibitions of representation becoming visible here, but they have both been muddled by the procedure in which the Assembly is mandated with. Either the members are serving as (a) a random sample of the population by which the Secretariat can gauge public opinion in formulating and proposing reforms that will need to be approved by the general public in the future, or (b) as a body of trustees, much like members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly, who leave behind their “common” backgrounds and are educated to be able to make the sophisticated discussions and proposals that they would otherwise not be able to make as common Ontarians.

If the Assembly is a random sample, what Pitkin would refer to as a “map or mirror,” (Pitkin 11) then the problem is that the Secretariat is interfering with their capability to act as a subset of the Ontarian population by providing specialized education that would otherwise not be available to the average Ontarian in their consideration of electoral reform. Through the intensive education process, the Learning Phase, the Assembly is transformed into more of a symbol of the general public instead of the original reflection, as “it represents by standing for something [but] does not resemble what it stands for.” (Pitkin 12) The random sample model would be beneficial as it would ensure that the reforms proposed would be stomached by the public and that the ballot question in the referendum would not be so far removed from the electorate that they would not be making uninformed decisions, but as the Assembly is transformed into a symbolic representation of the public, it loses its ability to test the palatability of electoral reforms. “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander,” – unless you clip its wing.

If the Assembly is indeed intended to be a congregation of trustees of the public, akin to Hobbes’ or Rousseau’s models for representation whereby representatives are given limited liberty to deliberate and institute policy on behalf of the public (Pitkin 8-10), then the process is poorly designed. This is so because what the members conclude in their final report on electoral reform will not necessarily be in agreement with the general population. Of course, trustees do not necessarily need to be in agreement with the people they represent, since part of their duty is to immerse themselves in policy and information that the public might not otherwise experience. However, the Citizens’ Assembly is set up in such a way that it can be viewed as a group of trustees, but one that needs to go back to the general public for ratification of the conclusions they come to in their final recommendation. The members’ education has made them so far removed from general Ontarian sentiment, for better or for worse.

Therefore, judging by the education process that members of the Citizens’ Assembly partake in, it is difficult to observe any kind of continuity in the role the Assembly actually plays. The roles seem to contradict each other, and this follows from the Learning Phase. From my perspective, they start out as a mirror of society, but this mirror is fogged as the Assembly, through education, begins to see the electoral system in a different light, as it becomes more of a symbolic representation of the public. Another way of examining the Assembly is as a group of trustees who were brought together for the purpose of deciding amongst themselves the difficult issues of electoral reform, an effect of from the education system that orients them towards their specialized study of the subject. Despite this, their decisions are forced to face the scrutiny of the public and their verdict has no real burden on policy until it does so.

There is no lucid indication of what the Ontario Government intended in regards to forms of representation. There is a lack of consistency in the forms of representation that the Citizens’ Assembly plays. According to the Assembly’s Public Consultation Guide, “[The members’] differences are important because they allow us to bring diverse perspectives to the work of the Assembly.” (Citizens Talking to Citizens 3) But nothing in the guide explains why members need to be brought together at all, let alone why the selection is on a representation by population basis (one member from each electoral district).

The Learning Phase of the Citizens’ Assembly, whether through lectures or election system simulations, places the members several steps ahead of the general public when it comes to knowledge, facility, and familiarity with electoral systems and reform. However, their consideration of electoral reform is very much removed from the general Ontarian sentiment. At the small group sessions for each of the electoral system simulations, for instance, the members are given a list of questions to consider when discussing their merits. Not only is their immersion in the subject material much more in-depth, but they are forced to consider matters that general Ontarians might not ever consider.

The motives in designing the format of the Citizens’ Assembly are unclear, except that the government is hoping to elicit ideas for electoral reform from citizens, whatever way they are represented. This is especially troubling, among other factors that indicate the government’s overall complacency on the subject (a lack of support for communicating the Assembly’s objectives, for one) since this serves as a barrier to what some might consider the best chance at revitalizing Ontario electoral politics in this province’s history. I hope to dig further into this subject in my final essay for this course to be posted next week.

Ontario Citizens’ Assembly for Electoral Reform. (2006). Citizens Talking to Citizens: Public Consultation Guide. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel (Ed.). (1969). Representation. New York: Atherton Press. 1-23.

Response to Engaged Citizen's CA report

2006-11-27T16:50:00.000-05:00

Engaged Citizen's (EC) critique of the CA's procedure is interesting, although I must say am unconvinced. His contention, if I have it right, is that the principle-based approach to electoral reform strucutrally excludes certain electoral systems by way of an inevitable compromise; "[a]s a result, in trying to determine a new electoral system, the CA is necessary lead to engage in the incorporation of divergent principle that could only be inevitably reconciled by the adaptation of a kind of a mixed system." His suggestion is that these different principles be debated and talked about which will lead the CA to "selecting only one or a few non-opposing principles" on which they could base their recommendation.

The first point that should be made is that EC's recommandation of debating the principles until there is one or a number of "non-opposing" principles falls into the same problems that the original approach does. If in fact choosing three principles which might be divergent from each other predisposes the assembly to agree on a mixed system, wouldn't the necessity of the CA to come to one main principle similarly rules out the option of mixed systems? If we see diversity of principles as neccesitating mixed systems, then the barring of the same diversity would seemingly foreclose the option of mixed systems, bringing the CA into the same conundrum, just over opposite systems.

This brings me to the more crucial point: ruling out certain systems is precisely what the CA is supposed to do. As the current procedure stands now, the CA is to select three principles on which they prioritize among others. First of all, I don't see how this necessarily predisposes mixed systems; if the three principles the CA isolates above others are, for instance, fairness of representation, voter choice, and effective parties, it would seem that a simple system of proportional representation would correspond quite well. However, if, as EC suggests, the CA does come up with three divergent principles, it would seem that the ruling out of pure systems would be the right approach for coming up with the system which fits the needs of Ontarians best. If fairness of representation, voter choice, and regional representation are the most important values of Ontarians, than a mixed system seems like the most adequate electoral system. I think it is a mistake to see the mixing of systems as necessarily a compromise, insofar as the word denotes a giving up of certain values for others. Rather, perhaps mixed systems are the ones which would best serve Ontario, satisfying all, or most, of what citizens want out of an electoral system. The ruling out of "pure" systems like PR or MV in this way is not actually systemic to the approach of the CA; rather, it would be ruled because of the fact of principle-diversity in Ontarians. If this is the case, which it remains to be seen, than it would seem as though choosing a mixed system would fit perfectly into the CA's aim, which EC correctly identifies as "recommending the best possible electoral system for the province of Ontario."

Validating the "Non-rational": Response to Young Ontarian

2006-11-27T00:02:00.000-05:00

I think Young Ontarian makes an important point regarding the excluding of certain voices and arguments in forums of purported rationality. Pointing out that deliberative forums in which “non-rational, non-public minded arguments are illegitimate will make it much easier for the members who are most comfortable with formal argumentation (i.e the lawyers, professors and possibly, university students) to control the process” gestures towards the issue of specialization, an idea which seems to run contrary to the egalitarian and inclusive notions of deliberation. While this is certainly a problem, I think rational exchange of argument is still the most effective and democratic method of deliberation (which I think Young Ontarian agrees with), in that it appeals to reasons which everyone can comprehend and understand, either through conceptualization or empirical demonstration. With both of these in mind, the problem should be understood as making inclusivity and rationality compatible. This could be done in two different ways. One would be to train participants before deliberation in the method of rational argumentation, thereby changing the nature of the participant. The other would be the development of the “non-rational” or “non-public” opinion into one fitting for the public setting, thereby altering the form of argument.

Changing the nature of the participant into one who is “capable” of deliberation could be accomplished in two different ways: through the institution of deliberation, or through socialization. The latter, more Habermasian view is much broader in implication, essentially arguing that the organization of society has to be radically altered in order to create for citizens more capable of deliberation. Along this line of thinking would be that in order for deliberative processes to function, social inequalities would have to be completely mended, and the mechanism of the media would have to be publicly owned, in order to create for a citizenry better educated and capable of debate. Archon Fung refers to this as the “God’s-eye perspective” of the public sphere.[i] Another, more modest method would be that the institution of deliberation train arriving participants when they begin on how to argue effectively. While this might make participants all competent in argumentation, it fails to address the problem of specialization in that those with more experience in these types of arguments (lawyers, professors, etc.) would still have disproportionate influence. I am having trouble locating the quotation, but there is an instance in The Republic in which Socrates is indicted for not actually being the most truthful, but being the best with argumentation and rhetoric. Certainly this is situation we have probably all found ourselves in, finding it quite unenjoyable and, more importantly for this brief, unproductive; we are generally not convinced by someone’s superior arguments if we feel they come from higher skill as opposed to better reasoning or understanding.

The other way of making inclusivity and rationality compatible would be to view the process of deliberation not only as a mechanism of argument-exchange, but also as one of argument-formation. In this view, the act of deliberation takes private-based individuals and their arguments and transforms them into something public-minded.[ii] In this view individuals come to deliberate with their own private interests, making arguments that might not be considered “rational arguments” in that they don’t conform with rules of reciprocity. These individuals, through arguing in a setting which is public in nature, would develop their arguments and ideas into claims which could be understood by all, falling in line with reciprocity. In this way the deliberative end is a sort of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium; in that everybody brings their interests to the table, the public interest is developed and understood through the exchange of these ideas, creating an understanding of where certain claims can and cannot be thought to be understood by all. In this view, deliberation does not necessitate that all participants be capable of public-minded arguments; it sees public-mindedness as being created by deliberation.

So, for example, someone could come to the Citizens’ Assembly make certain individually-based claims regarding electoral reform (like that of Bill from Kapuskasing’s original claim which I gave in my original post). These, while perhaps not being valid arguments, are nonetheless crucial for deliberation in that by being compared with other contrasting individually-based claims, participants would be forced to spin their claims out into something which all could come to understand (like the reformulation of Bill’s argument). By being forced to pose their claims in such a manner, participants take their original claims, which might not have been in line with reciprocity, and make them into something which can be understood, and accordingly challenged, by all. In this way, the “non-rational” and “non-public” methods of communicating with Young Ontarian suggests can be seen as valid in a deliberative and rational forum.
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[i] Archon Fung. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy (11.3, 2003): 338.
[ii] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103.

CA Observation Report: The Working Group on the Representation of Women and Other Underrepresented Groups

2006-11-26T17:57:00.000-05:00

On Saturday, November 25, I observed two presentations of working groups of the Citizen’s Assembly. The women and other underrepresented groups working group and the political parties working group[1] made presentations based on there activities over the past few months. In this post I will address the presentation of the women and other underrepresented groups working group as well as the working group system in general in light of Amy Lang’s analysis of the process of informal agenda setting in the BC Citizen’s Assembly. Lang observed that the BC Assembly was skewed by a lack of mechanisms to bring specific issues to the floor. The informal agenda of the assembly was determined by the strength of individual speakers. Causes that inspired broad based interest but had no strong individual advocate were unable to cohere as important basis for selection of the new electoral system. Lang, as well as the organizers of the Ontario Assembly, felt that a formal “work group” system could possibly be able to bring more serious consideration to specific concerns such as the representation of women and minorities. After observing the presentation of the women and other underrepresented groups work group on Saturday, I am not sure whether the system intended to give a serious voice to these issues has succeeded.

In her article, Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizen’s Assembly, Amy Lang investigates the balance between members and the staff-orchestrated structures within which they has to operate. Her primary analysis is that the Assembly’s agenda, though often manipulated informally by members of the Assembly, was largely controlled by the Assembly’s operational staff. The Agenda lacked an element of reflexivity, an ability for formal member adjustment and influence to what was to be discussed, when it was to be discussed, and within what framework. However, also of primary concern to Lang was the lack of formal structure through which members could bring items for consideration onto the informal agenda. This resulted in particular issues for which members advocated to emerge only in plenary sessions, where an audience for such issues was dependent on the strength of advocates. Lang reports that the organizers of the Ontario Citizen’s assembly observed this problem (as she wrote the article) and were planning to address the issue through the instillation of a system of working groups which would make formal reports to the assembly. Lang elaborates on the concept of the caucus or “working group.”

Formal mechanisms might include procedures for identifying items for discussion and for questioning staff decisions about the parameters and structure of the process. They might also involve providing a space and time for participants to organize themselves into caucuses around particular issues of interest. Formal caucuses legitimize an issue and assure its place on the agenda of the group as a whole. Caucuses also provide the means to develop a deep discussion on an issue that might otherwise be constrained by the cultural biases or emotional response of participants. To that end, the organizers of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (under way between September 2006 and May 2007) have proposed the formation of participant “working groups” on issues related to electoral reform and the Citizens’ Assembly process. (Lang, 2006 pp.16)

Lang observes that a key feature of a caucus is that a caucus or working group lends a form of legitimacy to concerns that are not necessarily considered as such without such institutionalization. Lang observed in the BC Assembly, in the absence of a caucus system, that the issues of “the north” of the province became viewed as legitimate and of key importance within the Assembly while the issue of women’s and marginalized minority representation failed to cohere as a salient issue for the Assembly (Lang, 2006 pp. 11). Lang explains that the issue of “the north” was able to cohere whereas women’s representation was not due to lack of a strong advocate, but also due to a structural social bias against such advocacy.

The theory behind the organization of the Ontario assembly is that a caucus-type group for women and marginalized groups (along with groups for other issues) would give more legitimacy to the effort to put theses issues on the informal agenda, avoiding the situation that arose in BC in which “there was no cultural consensus among Assembly members on whether or not the issue of women’s representation even should be on the Assembly’s agenda (Lang 2006 pp. 13).”

The presentation of the women and other underrepresented groups working group on Saturday brought out a small taste of the lack of consensus on the issue that Lang discusses. While I can’t say that a longer discussion would have made a true different, the brevity of the question period contributed to the work group’s inability to cement the issue firmly on the Assembly’s informal agenda. The working group’s presentation did not have any concrete recommendations for the Assembly. Instead, they did put forward ideas they felt the Assembly should consider which seemed to be generally supported by the work group members. The fact that the working group framed its ideas as “thinking points” rather than recommendations had major ramifications for the question period that followed and effected the group’s ability to cement under-representation as an item on the informal agenda (though we have yet to see the full implications). The working group’s main idea was that electoral systems that employ more proportionality perform are far better at equalizing the representation of women. In addition, they presented the idea that it is important for the Assembly to consider whether there should be any reserved seats for aboriginals. The work group sited evidence that in more proportional systems, where lists are employed in some form, the visibility of how parties are running women and minorities becomes much higher and parties are thus far more open to criticism on the issue. This is seen as resulting in political pressure equalize the position of women, ethnic minorities, and regions on the lists. This equalization then becomes a political precedent which all parties follow if they are to succeed in gaining any kind of broad based support. The examples of Scandinavian countries as well as New Zealand were cited.

As the work group presented no clearly stated recommendations, only thinking points, they opened themselves up to challenges not only to their ideas, but to the legitimacy of their concerns in general. The discussion of the working groups mandate was bound to emerge, but it was intensified by the fact that there wasn’t really anything else to challenge. The most eloquently stated and clear criticism of the working group’s mandate went along these lines, ‘If women are statistically shown to not vote for other women any more than men and if women truly vote only based on ideology just as men do, then why is it that we are talking about under-representation of women? Is there really any women’s interest to be represented?’ This query received the clearest position anyone in the workgroup had to offer on the importance of having women in government. This argument could be paraphrased as such.

Representation of women is not important because women have a specific interest that needs to be heard. Representation of women is important because women come with a different perspective on governing and discussing and a variety of perspectives are needed to improve government generally. The fact that women don’t always vote for women does not undermine this point.

However, it is important to note that this argument is not based in any concept of a history of marginalization of women, an idea which it seems would be central to the members of the workgroup. Perhaps there was a fear to make an argument based on such a history for the same reasons why the woman Amy Lang interviewed in BC feared openly calling herself a feminist. Perhaps the invocation of this memory of marginalization a la Melissa Williams would not be functional in the deliberative forum because it would not be considered a legitimate basis for argument by all Assembly members, just as the invocation of religious beliefs would inevitably fail. The forum thus questioned the legitimacy of the group itself rather than the strength of its ideas (though as I stated above this situation was exasperated by the fact that clear positions were not made). Though I am unable to address the theme properly here, I think this observation has deep implications in deliberative democratic for the functioning of marginalized groups within forums.

Toward the end of the overly brief question period, one woman asked how these issues could be addressed again in the future if the group is not slated to present again. Jonathan Rose assured her that this must be viewed as “a beginning not an end,” citing the fact that assembly members are free to meeting informally and bring issues up again in the plenary sessions. This response leaves us back at the problem Lang analyzed, without a strong single advocate an issues is dead. The working group did not have the force or time to cement its issue and I would doubt that it will emerge strongly on the table again in the absence of a strong single advocate. However, there is more to the story. The question for deliberative democracy which I referred to above is whether a strong advocate is even theoretically possible for women and marginalized minority representation in a forum given that the basis for argumentation may not be considered legitimate by many Assembly members. The question is how much can really be achieved for women and minorities in a deliberative forum, even if there were willing advocates, in the absence of what Lang calls a “cultural consensus” on the issue. If this is the case, then the system of working groups to get issues on the table may not be adequate, especially if only an absurdly short time slot is available for discussion of the issue. Even if it is possible for “culture consensus” to emerge, it will surly take more than a half hour.

[1] Great job presenting Catherine!

Works Cited

Lang, Amy. (2006). Agenda Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the BC Citizen's Assembly. Department of Sociology: University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Commnet on Thrasymachus' "Deliberative Democratic Theory and the Citizens' Assembly"

2006-11-24T19:54:00.000-05:00

In his discussion of deliberative democracy, Thrasymachus does a superb job on relating the theory in question to the Citizens’ Assembly. In contrasting public-minded deliberative democracy with private-minded rational choice theory, Thrasymachus points out that “public-mindedness is forced to be brought out in deliberative bodies on the simple basis that individual-interest-based arguments will not move a forum brought together to discuss the good of the whole”. In response not this interesting assertion, I preliminarily would like to express my outmost sympathy of this line of though, while for the sake of discussion would also like to bring up an argument against this raised by Jon Elster.

In Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Elster offers a relevant objection to deliberative democracy that “amounts to a denial of the view that the need to couch one’s argument in terms of the common good will purge the desire of all selfish arguments”[i]. As a result, this objection poses a response to the encompassing view that engaging in deliberations through public-mindedness one losses his/her self-interested line of thought. Thus, on Elster’s view, while it may be true that deliberation process may render it pragmatically impossible to express arguments from the point of individual interest [ii], it nonetheless leaves the door open to concealing one’s self-interested intentions behind the argument from the common good. In accordance with this view, the process of public deliberation like the one engaged in by the Citizens’ Assembly is prone to allow private interests to be expressed within the scope of arguments based on a conception of the common good. Moreover, it is also just as likely that the Assembly members’ personal or broadly regional interests happen to coincide with a certain line of argumentation made in the name of Ontario’s common good.

In conclusion, proponents of social choice theory are left to be answered, as upon accepting Elster’s argument, a deliberative approach to democracy at best offers a view of public-mindedness as a disguise for the participants’ true objectives that may in the end turn out to be egoistic. The question of determining what really motivates members of deliberative bodies, however, is left open-ended, as perhaps finding a response to that could once and for all settle the dispute of public versus private political conception of the good.

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[i] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.” Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Ed. J. Elster and A. Hylland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 118.

[ii] Ibid, p. 112-113.

CA Observation Report: on the use of principles in electoral reform

2006-11-24T15:37:00.000-05:00

Having had the opportunity to view two sessions of November 11, 2006 Citizens’ Assembly (CA), my observation report constitutes a reflection on the subject matter presented by professor Andre Blais on “The Importance of Principles in Electoral Reform” that took place 9:45-10:45 in the morning, and professor Ken Carty on “The Cases of B.C. and the Netherlands”, which took place 1:15-2:15 in the afternoon. The issue in question that I would like to bring to attention is the Assembly’s focus on ‘principles’ in undertaking their work of deriving a new electoral system for Ontario. In particular, it has become my conviction that presenting the CA with a list of so-called values, for the purpose of reaching its decision, necessarily leads the assembly members to engage in the reconciliation of various opposing electoral interests that would inevitably result in a compromise in trying to achieve an acceptable balance between opposing differences. In the course of this report, I will firstly outline how the Assembly is led into a deadlock by its very structural design, which in the end result entails the members (after some education and reflection) engage in a process of negotiations that is based on giving their preference to some principle over another. Secondly, I will explain how the process of negotiations that results from this stalemate eliminates the possibility of selecting particular electoral systems, and necessarily produces a compromise. Next, I will suggest how debating the principles themselves rather than attempting to reconcile several values at once for the purpose of fixing the pitfalls of First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) would be a more viable solution that avoids the challenge posed by the process of resolving the conflict between divergent civic values. Finally, in the end of this investigation, I will conclude by reiterating how my suggested approach to Assembly’s task in reality reflects its true aim, which is distorted by the process of negotiation that results from the attempt to bring together several principles.

The Unavoidable Stalemate

The principles-approach to electoral reform is at the heart of the issue at hand, as by providing the CA with a set of eight general principles and further giving it the ability to use any other additional principles, the architects of the assembly have set up the outcome of the deliberation process that would only result in a compromise. Legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability, along with simplicity and practicality, make up a broad spectrum of appealing values, some of which could be propagated by respective electoral systems. Although a principle like legitimacy is not peculiar to any particular electoral system, others and especially fairness of representation along with voter choice can readily form the backbone of changing the way that elections take place in the province.

It is the problem of reconciling some of these principles in the process of developing an improved electoral system that the unavoidable stalemate occurs as the members of the Assembly who are more predisposed to one particular value over another are forced into a compromising position of having to incorporate the plurality of competing interests that overwhelm their collective body. As a result, the decision-making process necessarily turns into a negotiations forum that is overtaken by the struggle of subjectively held principles, rather than being a place that embraces the best argument. Thus, as it was suggested by professor Andre Blais, a principles-based approach of determining a new electoral system would involve tough trade-offs. For example, fairness of representation that presupposes proportionality can be found to be in opposition to local representation, and while the latter is not included as part of the nine determined principles, it is can nonetheless reflect an additional value that is prone to be adopted by some of the Assembly members by considering it as part of the same principle of fairness. Following this line of thought, choosing a particular electoral system would inevitably involve adopting a somewhat diminished view of particular principles in the process of developing a compromised solution, which according to CA’s Secretariat, Susan Piggot, includes the selection of three principles by the Assembly in the deliberation phase.

The Elimination of Options

As a direct effect of the stalemate, upon entering the deliberation phase, the Assembly will therefore be left to devise an outcome that has to include the three to-be-later-decided-upon principles. Although some combination of principles would not necessarily suggest a clash of values like the reconciliation of legitimacy with fairness of representation and voter choice, even this particular combination of three would nonetheless entail a conflict of interests within the scope of each particular principle. For example, as I already mentioned above, the principle of fairness of representation could be conceived by some members of the assembly to mean proportionality of votes to seats, while it could also be taken by other members to suggest a fair incorporation of regional voices in parliament. As a result, in trying to determine a new electoral system, the CA is necessary lead to engage in the incorporation of divergent principle that could only be inevitably reconciled by the adaptation of a kind of a mixed system. Thus, a whole range of election structures are highly prone to result from the Assembly’s deliberation process, including Mixed Directive System , Mixed Parallel System, or some newly devised mixed system that could incorporate various values, as discussed by professor Ken Carty, like the variation of Single Transferable Vote selected by the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly.

The overall trend towards choosing some variant of the possible mixed systems, as a result works against the pure electoral structures like Proportional Representation (PR) or Majority Vote (MV), as these systems are more directed towards meeting particular principles over others. The prospect of selecting these systems is therefore eliminated by the Assembly’s appeal to incorporating several competing principles or its tendency to include a plurality of interests within the scope of a single principle like fairness of representation. Thus, the possibility of choosing PR is in effect made entirely impossible by the Assembly’s pursuit of a principles-based approach in devising a new electoral system. In particular, a number of arguments against PR is prone to come from concerns raised by the prospect of coalition governments that can to a degree undermine stable and effective government, as well as the principles effective parliament and accountability. Similarly, MV may also be crossed off the list as a viable potential candidate, as this system can potentially further diminish voter participation as a side effect of holding multiple elections to determine who receives majority of the vote.

Consequently, as a result of selecting multiple principles for determining a new electoral system, the CA will be forced to abandon pure electoral structures in favour of mixed ones, and thereby reducing its option of choosing a real alternative to FPTP. Although adopting a mixed system would nonetheless constitute an alternative to rigid Single Member Plurality currently in use in Ontario, the total elimination of pure electoral systems like PR and MV from the process of deliberation is in effect detrimental to the Assembly’s purpose of devising a better system. I would therefore argue that keeping Assembly’s options open is necessarily a good thing, while structurally restricting their choices to only mixed systems actually constitutes a gruesome limitation on the range of possible alternative available to the Assembly members.

Debating the Principles

In discussing the importance of principles in electoral reform, professor Blais pointed out that the process of devising an electoral system involves trade-offs in values. I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that this observation is only correct within the context of a (multiple) principles-based approach to electoral reform. Blais’s generalization can therefore be only understood with reference to the current structure of deliberation that is to be undertaken by the CA, which would necessarily result in a compromise that eliminates the possibility of adopting pure (or uncompromised) electoral systems. Thus, I would suggest that the process of deciding on trade-offs between values in devising a new electoral system in fact reflects the CA as a negotiations forum rather than a truly deliberative body that is directed by the power of the best argument. Furthermore, I would like to contend that the reconciliation of principles by the CA in reality undermines its purpose as a deliberative body with an ultimate aim to come up with a better electoral system for Ontario.

Debating the usefulness of each principle, and thereby selecting only one or a few non-opposing principles for the purpose undertaking electoral reform, on the other hand, would construe a better approach for the CA. Accordingly, it would seem more reasonable to discuss which principle in particular should drive the need to reform FPTP in favour of an improved alternative system. In this respect, attempting to include several divergent principles as the underlining basis of changing the current system would only result in a conflict of plural electoral interest that are expressed by allegiance to one principle over another. As a result, it would seem more conducive to Assembly’s purpose to debate the principles themselves in trying to determine which do and which do not constitute the basis for engaging in electoral reform.

The Aim of the Citizens’ Assembly

Although this refined approach to the work of the CA will consequently result in leaving out most of the principles from its agenda, this should not however be a cause for alarm. After all, if the Assembly is set up for the sole purpose of working out the best possible solution, then the reconciliation of fractional interests should not be made a priority, since is in reality the CA is only limited to a single objective: recommending the best possible electoral system for the province of Ontario. In undertaking this task, the Assembly members should therefore not be concerned with how this system reflects a given set of principles, but rather make their decision with the aim of fixing the errors of FPTP, and then let the people of Ontario decide on their recommendations in the referendum.

Hence, in the end, trying to devise an improved electoral system by using a combination conflicting principles can only result in a negotiated solution that is reflective of a typical approach of politicians that is line with an adversarial structure of parliament. The nature of the Assembly as deliberative body, on the hand, should not be reduced to mere conflict of interests dictated by proponents of rational choice theory, as in principle the Assembly members are brought together to be guided by the force of the better argument through which the truth can prevail.

Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

2006-11-24T15:07:00.000-05:00

Comment on the recent Students' Assembly and Citizens' Assembly: The possible future of Citizens' Juries

Hi all. I’m writing this commentary after returning from Deerhurst Resort where I served as a facilitator at the Students’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. My tenure there lasted from the 12^th to the 19^th of November. What was most gratifying about this experience was the fact that I (who am not as fortunate as to be on the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform nor act as a facilitator there) was able to catch a glimpse of democratic participation and citizen engagement (albeit in the form of youth involvement) in action on an important issue. There are many stories I could share concerning the atmosphere of the conference and the many people who made it a memorable experience for me. However, this is an academic forum, and I want to narrow this commentary to the implications of participatory deliberation as they pertain to democratic governance.

The emergence of citizens’ assemblies in Ontario and elsewhere may reflect a combination of skepticism about the regulatory capacities of national and state governments and concerns about the capacity of conventional democracies to engage the energies of ordinary citizens.[i] By “conventional democracies,” I mean “systems of competitive representation, in which citizens are endowed with political rights, including rights of speech, association, and suffrage; and where citizens advance their interests by exercising their political rights, in particular by voting for representatives in regular elections.”[ii] Of course, these elections are organized by competing political parties and an electoral victory means control of government, giving winning candidates the authority to shape public policy through legislation and control over administration.

It may be argued, as in my post on the Greek and Republican Traditions of Democracy, that any mass body politic must be organized at least in part as a system of competitive representation. However, I would argue in this commentary that to achieve a fuller realization of democratic values it may perhaps be necessary to also endow citizens with greater direct roles in public choices or at least engage them more deeply with substantive political issues. Citizens’ assemblies may be one way in which citizens are committed to broader participation in public decision-making.

In other post on this forum, we have explored how, instead of a politics of power and interest, citizens’ assemblies favor a more ‘deliberative democracy’ in which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them; a shift from “bargaining, interest aggregation, and power, to the common reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic life.”[iii] Yet, while we emphasize the importance of ‘reason,’ we should not expect self- and group-interest to disappear as political forces. Still, what I personally noticed, both at the Citizens’ and Students’ Assemblies, is that within such contexts political argument and appeals to interest were framed (almost as a matter of course) by considerations such as fairness, equality, and common advantage. Members of either body took these values seriously and political decisions were not simply a product of power and interest.

In the context of the Students’ Assembly, even those whose views did not win out confided that they understood the fact that the collective decisions of the body were supported by good reasons. As a result, members – despite disagreement – all regarded their conduct as guided, generally, by their own reason. In my estimation, establishing such political deliberation could realize an ideal of self-government under conditions of pluralism, and could be adapted to a variety of issues.

Citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries build on the “distinctive practical competence that citizens possess as users of public services, subjects of public policy and regulation, or residents who have contextual knowledge of their neighborhoods and ecosystems.”[iv] The idea, and it certainly isn’t a new one, is to draw on these competencies by bringing ordinary citizens into deliberation over certain public issues.

[i] Archon Fung, www.archonfung.net/papers/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

Comment on Thrasymachus’ Deliberative Democracy Theory and the Citizens’ Assembly

2006-11-24T14:43:00.000-05:00

One of my namesake’s most notable compositions, Federalist No. 10, argues for the importance of diverse factional interests in protecting the Union’s overall interests against any one faction. In this sense, although modern democracies are rarely at risk of dangerous government takeovers, this same theory applies to the ensuring of a representative democracy, in the same way, against Mill’s tyranny of the majority. People will talk amongst themselves, if need be, to reach an electoral common ground. To a degree, their differences will cancel themselves out and a shared opinion will emerge as the middle ground. I purport that deliberative democracy has been preceded by the American revolutionary ideas of public participation and the encouragement of political diversity, as outlined by James Madison in The Federalist.

The basis of deliberative democracy, as articulated by Gutmann and Thompson, is founded in communication and discussion. It is assumed that with consideration, opposing parties will be sympathetic to one another and will find common ground. The idea of extending deliberation to aspects of governing and policy-making is simply reiterating the concepts that are already implied in liberal democracy. Although the original argument made in The Federalist was one that addressed the problems of factions in revolutionary America, the implication of Madison’s solution relate to the grounding of deliberative theory: the nurturing of a variety of interest groups and parties, each in competition with each other, will allow the extremes to neutralize each other to allow a moderate mainstream opinion to emerge. Essentially, deliberative democracy is a cover for the same concept. Gutmann and Thompson offer a sanguine and optimistic procedural model that is gentler than the factions at war with each other that Madison writes about.

Gutmann and Thompson claim, “in the standard theories of democracy – proceduralism and constitutionalism – deliberation likewise receives little attention. (Gutmann and Thompson 12) However, I’m not so sure that it doesn’t. Their three characteristics of a deliberative democracy, viz., reciprocity, publicity and accountability, (ibid. 14-15) can certainly be ordained in a particular liberal democracy should the electorate support such a cause. The outlet is available, but the authors from their ivory tower that the people need to be guided into full participation. The problem with the proceduralism presented in Democracy and Disagreement is that it utilizes the liberty of a liberal democracy to institute how people should be using that liberty. On the surface, moral deliberation should already be a component of liberal democracy; making it a standard for the way a liberal democracy is managed is antithetical to the liberty it supposedly enshrines. In a true liberal democracy, like the one presented in The Federalist, people should already be either deliberating or disagreeing. An alternative is to not participate at all, and the true notion of liberty should allow for that, too.

The institution of moral deliberation (within “middle democracy,” or otherwise) is redundant in a liberal democracy. As well, it is antithetical to the enshrined ideas of liberty. If public input needs to be instituted, the authenticity of that input needs to be questioned. Just as mandatory voting may not yield a true gauging of public opinion, so too will instituted deliberative input be put into question. Deliberation already exists in our current models of liberal democracy, and there are many outlets for its use in the public sphere, but it just happens to be tacit for much of the time.

Gutman, Amy and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Madison, James. (1788). The Federalist Papers, No. 10. Wikisource. Retrieved November 24, 2006 from http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=The_Federalist_Papers/No._10&oldid=277414.

Coment on Thrasymachus: Rationality and Inclusivity

2006-11-22T00:29:00.000-05:00

This is a comment on Thrasymachus’ post on deliberative democratic theory.
I think Thrasymachus was very effective in making theories of deliberative democracy accessible and applicable to the CA process. In this comment, I’d just like to supplement Thrasymachus’ post by addressing an important element that was not discussed; the fact that there is some tension between adhering exclusively to rational argument (based on the principals of reciprocity, publicity and accountability) within deliberation and the goal of inclusivity within the process.
While I don’t deny that rational argumentation that's open to scrutiny is the cornerstone of a legitimate deliberative process (Thrasymachus gives an excellent explanation of why this should be the case)and that any potential final report should contain strong public minded reasons supporting any potential recommendation; I think it’s important to recognize that individual assertions within the deliberation that don't meet this rational, public minded criteria aren’t necessarily illegitimate.

In The Coming Of Age of Deliberative Democracy (1998), Bohman highlights this issues in his discussion of some criticism of deliberative democratic theory; “Epistemic and moral proceduralism is seen as too demanding by some critics, putting it in tension with its own demands for inclusion and equal standing in the process of deliberation itself” (pg 10). Bohman points to prominent, political philosopher Iris Young who presents the argument that overly rational models of deliberative democracy aren’t the most egalitarian as they favour educated participants while “excluding the many ways that people communicate reasons outside of argumentation and formal debate, such as testimony, rhetoric, symbolic disruptions, story-telling and cultural and gender-specific types of communication.” (pg 11). This shows that even within a deliberative process there are other legitimate ways of presenting ideas and arguments that don’t fall within the rational framework that Thrasymachus presents as key to the legitimacy of the CA.

I think Young’s argument highlighting that there are numerous ways that people communicate their opinions within a deliberation is especially important to recognize considering the diversity of background (cultural, educational, gender, age etc.) within the CA. It is especially relevant given that the majority of members (myself included) have no doubt never participated in a deliberative process such as the CA so (without having read Thrysymachus’ post) will be unsure of what the appropriate ‘public’ way for presenting their arguments is. Taking this into account, suggesting that non-rational, non-public minded arguments are illegitimate will make it much easier for the members who are most comfortable with formal argumentation (i.e the lawyers, professors and possibly, university students) to control the process. This of course, presents tension with the deliberative ideal of an inclusive process. Bohman succinctly states, “If equal standing contributes to the value of a procedure and the willingness to accept its outcome, then deliberators should not be quick to exclude a reason as non-public” (pg 11). This, if we truly value inclusivity, points to the importance of listening and considering arguments within the process with an open mind even if they may not appear to be as rational or public minded as other’s argumentation.

Sources

Bohman, James. "The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy". The Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol.6. No.4 (1998): 400-425

Response to Young Ontarian: The CA’s Role in Relation to Marginalized Groups

2006-11-19T15:17:00.000-05:00

Young Ontarian’s CA observation report addresses the issue of representation of marginalized groups in light of Melissa William’s theory of group representation outlined in her book, “Voice, Trust, and Memory.” I am glad that Young Ontarian has addressed the problem of representation of marginalized groups in light of William’s theory. There are a few reasons why William’s theory is especially relevant to the work of the assembly. Though Young Ontarian mentions these reasons, I would like to re-highlight them in order to demonstrate how the assembly can act with William’s insights in mind. Though Williams advocates moving past a simple procedural vision of legitimacy, her concept of legitimacy based on fair outcomes is still based in a liberal procedural model and concept of representation. Williams does not seek to tear down the liberal procedural understanding of representation. She simply wishes to restructure it in such a way as to be more advantageous to the representation of historically marginalized groups.
Before turning back to a procedural solution for the problem of group representation, Williams analyzes several cases of institutionalized group representation around the world. In every case, she finds that historically marginalized groups granted institutionalized representation are simply re-marginalized in the legislative setting. In other words they are tokenized and routinely left outside the structures of power within the legislature. Williams discovers that formal state-sanctioned group representation is counter-productive within the wider context of the liberal state. For this reason, Williams seeks a liberal mechanism to invoke a non-liberal concept of group representation and justice of out-comes. Williams suggests proportional representation, but in the case of the United States where electoral reform is seen as nearly impossible, race-conscious districting is seen as a best possible alternative. For Williams, PR can help to solve the problem of group representation without tokenizing groups or granting the state ascriptive power—power to define who is counted as marginalized. PR allows for the emergence of “self defined constituencies (215).”
However, for Williams, PR is not the end of the story. It simply the bedrock of a new way of doing politics that brings focus to the representation of marginalized groups. In the context of PR, the importance of quotas does emerge and the discussion of quotas in committees of the CA is thus very important, so long as the CA does not seek to legally institutionalize quotas. In Williams view, quotas should likely not be imposed by the state. They should rather emerge through competitive party politics as has occurred in Scandinavian countries. The shift toward group representation that Williams discusses requires state-level reform to the end of PR, yet it also requires a revolution in the way politics are done by parties. The other side of the benefit of PR is the necessity that a quota system becomes a self-imposed norm of party politics (220). With Williams view in mind that formal changes to liberal representation within the liberal state become tokenized, it is clear that the work of the CA is to create bedrock for group representation by introducing a system that incorporates PR. The CA should not be involved in formally institutionalizing quotas, as such quotas, given their track record globally, would be quickly tokenized. It is the work of parties and public pressure to institutionalize marginalized group’s representation high on party lists. It is the work of the assembly to help establish an electoral system that functions through lists rather than personality competition in order to lay the ground-work for a future in which parties pay more than lip service to the representation of marginalized groups.

Thank you Young Ontarian for bringing up this important issue.

Works Cited

Williams, Melissa S. (1999). Voice, Trust, and Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Underrepresented groups and the CA

2006-11-18T21:16:00.000-05:00

In class, we kicked off our discussion of contemporary democratic theory with Melissa Williams' (1998) book, Voice, Trust and Memory. In this post, I will highlight the key points of the group-based representation theory that Williams presents in her book and discuss how Williams provides a useful theoretical framework for the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) with respect to questions about the representation of marginalized groups in the legislature. Specifically, I will address how Williams work helps to answer the critical questions why should the assembly focus on marginalized groups and consequently, why is the consultation phase such a critical part of CA process?

The CA has established working groups on four key substantive issues including women and underrepresented groups that will present the topics of their discussion to the plenary during the upcoming final weekend of the learning phase. The question is, why does the CA need a working group to discuss increasing representation of women and underrepresented groups in the legislature? Why should the CA be concerned with insuring self-representation of these groups? Melissa Williams' contemporary theory of representation provides a theoretical framework useful for answering these questions. Williams starts her book Voice, Trust and Memory with the common intuition that when marginalized groups are underrepresented in the legislature, members of those groups aren’t adequately represented. (pg 1). Based on this intuition, Williams develops a complex group-based theory of representation to provide a theoretical explanation for why members of marginalized groups should be self-represented in the legislature.

Williams starts explaining her theory by making a distinction between her group-based representation theory and classical liberal principal-agent theories that most notably discussed by Hanna Pitkin (see Dr. Ron’s Sept. 19 post “Is the Citizens’ Assembly a representative body?”). Williams' group-based theory differs from liberal theories in that, in order to address the needs of minorities in the legislature, she focuses not only on procedural fairness but also stresses substantively fair outcomes. To elaborate; in liberal theories a fair outcome is guaranteed by a fair process such as one person one vote whereas in group-based theories a fair out come must not only have a fair process but also meet substantive criteria such as providing representation for underrepresented groups. (pg.10) This shows that William’s theory has an added layer of complexity than preceding theory.

Williams’ group based theory “representation as mediation” is also more complex than principal-agent theories as it introduces institutions (for example the electoral system) and processes as the mediating factors between citizens and government decision making. Williams explains, “The complexity of representation arises from the fact that its institutions and processes mediate between citizen concerns and governmental decisions in several ways.”(pg.8) Williams asserts that representation as mediation takes place in three distinct forms; through the dynamics of the legislative process, the nature of legislature-constituent relations and the way in which citizens are aggregated into representable constituencies (pg 8). These forms of mediation go along with the corresponding themes of voice, trust and memory. Williams argues that underrepresented groups are best represented by members of their own group in the legislature because marginalized groups have a ‘distinct voice’ due to their experiences of systemic discrimination. (pg 13). She further argues that the most effective legislature-constituent relationship for underrepresented groups is to have a representative from their own group as this fosters trust in the representative that doesn’t exist to the same degree for a member of the dominant group because of a history of discrimination (pg. 9). Her third theme of a collective memory of exclusion is discussed as a method to distinguish which marginalized groups have strong claims to ‘enhanced representation’ and suggests that this memory should help determine how to form constituencies of citizens for representation (pg.14). Using her themes voice, trust and memory, Willliams succeeds in providing a useful framework for why marginalized groups are best self-represented within the legislature. This highlights the importance of having an official working group in the CA that can examine specific questions (such as their discussion on gender quotas) and concerns dealing with increasing representation of historically marginalized groups.

Williams' theory is a useful tool for understanding why underrepresented groups should be represented in the legislature. Her theory has been praised as being an important contribution to modern democratic theory for this reason. The question that obviously follows is which groups should be represented in the legislature? Did the working group on women and underrepresented groups get it right when choosing which groups to discuss (see appendix)? In her book, Williams identifies four characteristic features of marginalized groups; a history of structural inequality, the involuntary and immutable nature of group membership and the negative meanings associated with group membership(pg.16). This is a useful framework when trying to determine which groups should be given special consideration (and it appears that the working groups has an appropriately comprehensive list) however Williams' focus on listening suggests that having a working group discuss these issues and identify potentially marginalized groups isn’t enough. She highlights the critical act of listening to the groups in order to determine which communities identify as marginalized and what their needs are(pg.12). Williams herself developed her group-representation theory by listening to specific marginalized groups (women and African Americans) to determine what they themselves felt their needs to be(pg.12). This highlights that the working group, while undoubtedly useful in identifying critical issues, is not an end of the discussion on underrepresented groups but merely the beginning.

Taking Williams' theory into consideration, we can judge the effectiveness of the working group on women and underrepresented groups not so much on its internal workings but instead on how successful it is in presenting key issues (i.e gender quotas) to the plenary and consequently how effective the assembly as a whole is in determining the opinions of the public on these issues during the consultation phase. The consultation phase is of critical importance because it provides the opportunity to listen to claims made by groups on how the status quo may be disadvantaging them and how any possible recommendation can take their concerns into account. Williams elaborates, “we increase our understanding of the meaning of fair representation for marginalized groups if we turn to group members’ own views about political equality and political representation”. In light of this, the consultation phase will be successful only if it provides adequate opportunity for all who may consider themselves marginalized to have an equal voice and an equal chance to be heard in the process.

It remains to be seen how successful the CA will be in listening to members of underrepresented groups during the consultation phase. The fact that the assembly has four official ‘special consultation’ meetings (in addition to the regional meetings) in order to seek out marginalized voices such as natives and lower income Ontarians is a promising sign that the assembly has made a commitment to seek out and listen to the voices of underrepresented Ontarians. There are of course key challenges that will face the CA in listening to the concerns of marginalized communities. One such challenge, which has already been discussed within the assembly, is how to effectively reach out to all Ontarians when there’s such linguistic diversity within the province. Recent statistics show that over 24% of Ontarians mother tongue is neither French nor English.(2) The fact that many Ontarians may not be able to voice their opinions and concerns adequately in an official language provides a particular challenge for an inclusive consultation process especially since assembly members have been told that that the CA, as much as they may like to, simply doesn’t have the resources to officially accommodate linguistic diversity. Within the assembly, it’s been discussed that some of the gaps in the official consultation phase can be filled by members who have ties to different ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups. Some member driven efforts that have been discussed include an upcoming Spanish language meeting and the contacting of ethnic media (Chinese, Italian etc). Although it’s too early to tell if these efforts will be effective in facilitating listening for those who want to be heard in a multicultural, multilingual Ontario; the recognition of the upcoming challenges and the commitment of members to reach out to their communities suggests that the consultation phase will likey be an effective tool for listening to and incorporating the views of those who may feel marginalized into any potential decision.

Conclusion

In this post I’ve discussed Melissa Williams' group-representation theory ‘representation as mediation’ and shown how her theory provides an understanding of why marginalized groups fare better if self-represented in the legislature. I’ve applied Williams' theory to the CA by showing how it highlights the importance not only of a working group on women and underrepresented groups but the consultation phase as well. In this report, I’ve focused the discussion on Williams' theory and its application to the CA process. In the last chapter of her book, Chapter 7, “The institutions of fair representation” Williams discusses particular institutional arrangements such as Proportional Representation and intra-party quotas as possible substantive applications of her theory. I would recommend that CA members (and all others) who are interested in representation of marginalized groups read Voice, Trust and Memory.

References
(1)Williams, Vanessa. Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized groups and the failings of liberal representation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.

(2) "Mother Tongue and Home Language in Ontario". Census 2001 Highlights. Government of Ontario: Ministry of Finance, Feb 2003. Accessed through

Appendix

A)women*natives*visible minorities*immigrants*economic classes* francophones*disabled* minority sexual orientation*religion

Comment on Thrasymachus: The Concept of Reciprocity as Legitimacy

2006-11-18T16:28:00.000-05:00

In Thrasymachus’ paper on deliberative democractic theory, he states of the
Citizens’ Assembly that, “Ideally, the vast majority of Ontarians would be involved in the process, making deputations and attending consultation meetings, thereby integrating their views and arguments with those of the CA members.” Drawing on Thrasymachus’ formulation of the concept of reciprocity in deliberative democratic theory, I would like to re-phrase the concept in stronger terms in order to suggest why a view to the necessity of such widespread participation in the Assembly is really a vestige of social choice theory inspired thinking and not necessary in the deliberative context.

Thrasymachus touched on the concept of “reciprocity” as a central difference between deliberative and social choice democratic theories. Thrasymachus describes the concept of reciprocity as a “method of argumentation [that] essentially entails a respect for other citizens as politically and morally equal.” In other words, argumentation must recognize fellow interlocutors as legitimate actors with legitimate points of view. Continuing his definition of reciprocity, Thrasymachus provides a quotation from Gutmann and Thomas. Gutmann and Thomas establish the conditions for reciprocity as those in which, “empirical claims… [are] consistent with reliable methods of inquiry.” As all interlocutors are viewed as legitimate, argumentation is framed in such a way as to be considered legitimate by all actors. According to Thrasymachus, “By making claims which follow the concept of reciprocity, citizens are making themselves accountable to their interlocutors and making their stances open to the public.” To be acceptable in a deliberative framework, argumentation must rely on a vision of the interest of the public as a whole while citing information and values that are considered legitimate by all actors. Given these conditions outlined by Thrasymachus, I think it would be safe to re-conceptualize reciprocity simply as the condition of refutability. An argument based on reciprocity is simply one that is open to counter-factual analysis and refutation.

The condition of reciprocity is operable due to a simple social fact overlooked by social choice theorists. According to Jon Elster social choice theorists imagine a reality in which, “people [affect] each other only by tripping over each other’s feet, or by dumping their garbage into one another’s backyards (Elster, 111).” Social choice theorists ignore the fact that in a public, arguments based on particular belief and self-interest are never acceptable. If individuals are simply made to face each other rather than register their own interest secretly, then they will never admit to wanting to dump garbage in each other’s backyard and by virtue of this fact such garbage dumping will never be condoned. The statement, “I want to dump garbage in your backyard” is non-refutable. The forum, in addition to “creating public-mindedness in citizens” according to Thrasymachus, also establishes conditions in which private-mindedness is simply impossible due to the necessity for refutability. Though Thrasymachus effectively states this fact, he does not push it to its logical conclusion.

By virtue of reciprocity, the legitimacy of the Citizen’s Assembly as a forum is not tied to the number of people who participate but rather to the degree to which the Assembly subjects all possible arguments to counter-factual analysis. Reciprocity suggests that it does not matter so much exactly who or how many people deliberate so long as all possible arguments are processed. I do not mean to suggest that popular participation is unimportant. I simply want to divorce popular participation from any concept of legitimacy. The idea that each registering her interest is necessary in order for the assembly to be more legitimate is tied more to a social choice model then to the concept of deliberation on which the Assembly is operating. Simply put, a balancing of ideas replaces a balancing of interests.

Works Cited

Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in J. Elster & A. Hylland (eds.) Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge University Press), 104-132.

Deliberative Democratic Theory and the Citizens' Assembly

2006-11-17T15:43:00.000-05:00

The focus of this week’s discussion was the concept of deliberative democracy, which is a pertinent concept when considering the Citizens’ Assembly (CA). What I aim to do in this post is describe the basic theory of deliberative democracy, discussing key issues like reciprocity and legitimacy. Applying these concepts to the case of the CA, I will attempt to illustrate ways in which the CA can be viewed as legitimate by the public at large, specifically through the use of reasoned arguments appropriate to the setting. I apologize in advance for the length of this posting, but the complexity of the subject matter and its relevance to the CA necessitates it.

Deliberative democracy is currently a major focus of study by political scientists and democratic theorists. Stemming from the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas, deliberative democracy emphasizes the role of communication and discussion in regards to politics and public issues. Its basic contention is that the best method of reaching the best decisions which everyone would feel were legitimate is through the ongoing defense and critique of public opinions through the reasoned arguments of active and engaged citizen-participants. As John Rawls puts eloquently,

when citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by their discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests.[i]

Accordingly, deliberation is seen as a means to produce results which, even if everybody has not been convinced of, everybody can at least understand the logic of and see as legitimate. It also is seen as effectively taking issues out of the realm of “private or nonpolitical interests” and made appropriately public in nature, an idea which I will develop later.

In their now canonical book Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson outline a theory of deliberative democracy based on its capability to properly address moral disagreement in politics. Noting that deliberative discussion, even at the level of political elites, only occurs in reference to democratic procedure or in matters of interpreting governing principles (ie Supreme Court rulings), Gutmann and Thompson contend that the practice of deliberation should extend to what they call “middle democracy,” which encompasses “any setting in which citizens come together on a regular basis to reach collective decisions about public issues—governmental as well as nongovernmental institutions.”[ii] By extending deliberation to policy-making, administration and public reaction, citizens are put in more situations in which they are forced to defend their moral views to those who disagree, and are made to listen to opposing arguments and rationales. In doing so, “they express and respect [each other’s] status as political equals even as they continue to disagree about important matters of public policy.”[iii]

Gutmann and Thompson articulate three traits which democratic deliberation must possess in order to properly address moral dispute: reciprocity, publicity and accountability. Publicity refers to openness of argument, that moral claims and refutations are intended for “dissemination in public forums.”[iv] The notion of accountability indicates the need for those making moral claims to explain their claims to those for whom the reasons are offered. So, in current political life elected officials are (in theory) accountable to those who elected them, and therefore must defend their actions to the citizens. In deliberation, not only elected officials, but “ordinary citizens when they act in a public capacity”[v] (inclusive to participating in public deliberation) must be able to defend and explain their stances to other citizens. These two concepts, publicity and accountability, when taken in tandem point towards the third criterion of reciprocity.

Reciprocity refers to the method of argumentation, and essentially entails a respect for other citizens as politically and morally equal. Thusly, “reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens.”[vi] So, if in defending one’s moral stance a citizen cites his or her religious doctrine as a reason, he or she is appealing to reasons which other citizens not of the same religious belief could not reasonably, as free and equal citizens, come to share. Reciprocity also asks that “empirical claims in political argument be consistent with reliable methods of inquiry, as these methods are available to us here and now, not for all times and all places,”[vii] so that a claim and its supporting facts can be examined by other citizens, being open to scrutiny by other empirical claims. By making claims which follow the concept of reciprocity, citizens are making themselves accountable to their interlocutors and making their stances open to the public.

By this light, the CA is a legitimate deliberative body if it follows these three principles. To demonstrate how these principles might and might not be followed, an example is helpful. Say Bill is a member of the CA from Kapuskasing which is located in northern Ontario. In the deliberative phase of the CA, Bill makes the following argument: “The current FPTP system will represent me and my interests better than any other system because I am from the north. FPTP gives me better representation, therefore we should not alter the electoral system.” This argument does not satisfy reciprocity. Bill’s reasons (“FPTP gives me better representation”) prioritize his interests over others and, in turn, his argument does not appeal to reasons which others could reasonably come to share. Furthermore, he has not given any rationale as to why FPTP would better represent his interests just because he is from the north; without giving an account for how he came to this conclusion Bill appeals to a belief which he has, and by doing so forecloses any rational discussion or criticism of his claim. A better argument, which falls more in line with reciprocity, would be: “It is important that our electoral system take into account the regional diversity of Ontario, and assures representation of regional interests in Parliament. FPTP, with its geographic riding systems, best considers the regional interests of Ontarians.” Here, Bill appeals to reasons which are more open to inspection. Someone might hear this argument and agree that regional interests are most important, and in turn support FPTP. If someone disagrees they can refute Doug’s claims through argumentation of their own. So, someone might argue that regional interests are not nearly as important as proportionality, and give reasons why. Or, someone might agree that regional interests are important, but demonstrate the ways in which FPTP does not actually account for regional interest (For an example of such an argument see my Response to Scholar84)). In this way, whether or not we agree with Bill, we can understand his argument and his reasons, and accordingly see it as a legitimate claim, refuting it by challenging the method in which he arrived at the conclusion.

In this example what deliberation can be seen to do is create public-mindedness in citizens. This is perhaps the most important and distinguishing aspect of deliberative democracy. Prior to the development of deliberative theories of democracy, the prevailing concepts of democracy fell into the category of social choice theory. Social choice theory, as Jon Elster explains, sees political views as determined by private interest, and therefore sees political participation as a private act. The political system then functions in a manner similar to the market in which individuals compete for their own interests, making the goal of politics “the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests.”[viii] Deliberative democracy differs in that it sees politics as a necessarily public realm. In this way, individual interests should not be aggregated and then a conclusive compromise be reached, but interests should be made into public interests in which all could discuss on the same grounds: “the core of the theory, then is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation.”[ix] As I stated in the beginning of this discussion, deliberation makes political issues appropriately public in nature, by making the grounds on which citizens seek to justify their claims public-minded. Even if private interests are stated, they must be stated in terms of reciprocity, and in turn they are opened to exposure. Our previous example of Bill from Kapuskasing, illustrates this: while his interests might still be entrenched in his stance, he is still forced to appeal to the public good. Public-mindedness is forced to be brought out in deliberative bodies on the simple basis that individual-interest-based arguments will not move a forum brought together to discuss the good of the whole.

In these ways, the deliberations of the CA would are seen as legitimate if arguments conform to reciprocity and if the issues are discussed in terms of public-welfare as opposed to private interest. But legitimacy in this situation must function in two ways, both within the CA and outside the CA: even if the deliberations of the CA are reasoned and open, how might the general public see these deliberations as legitimate? This is characteristic of a question which has already come up on this forum, namely why should Ontario see the deliberations of the CA as representative or legitimate? This is a more difficult question to answer, which a contextualizing of the CA in terms of deliberative democratic theory will illustrate.

The CA is emblematic of a departure from the more classical theories of deliberative democracy to the more contemporary. James Bohman writes of this transition,[x] noting that earlier democratic theorists dealt mainly with concepts of ideal speech situation, in which the actualization of something like Habermas’s ideal public sphere[xi] was the main goal. Currently, deliberative democrats deal more with making current institutions and procedures more compatible with, and open to, public deliberations. Bohman writes, referencing the more contemporary theories of Habermas, that “the only feasible form of deliberation occurs in the interaction between formally organized institutional decision-making mechanisms and informal and “anonymous” debates and discussion in the public sphere…it is this interaction via institutional channels…that makes deliberative politics possible, five the “unavoidable” constraints of complexity and the need for…law.”[xii] As such, the CA represents the opening up of electoral procedures and policy-making powers of the legislature to deliberative practice. However, the CA is hard to locate in the terms which Bohman lays out; certainly it is not part of the “institutional decision-making mechanisms” which the Ontario parliament represents, but it is also not simply an “informal and anonymous” debate as it has been vested with some authority, and has been called together by the Ontario government. Simply put, does the CA lie in the public sphere or in the governmental realm? This ambiguity makes it hard to define where the CA’s legitimacy lies: not in its purely spontaneous dedication to the pursuit of the public good, nor through its elected status, as neither of these are true. So how can the deliberation of the CA be viewed as legitimate by the public?

Ideally, the vast majority of Ontarians would be involved in the process, making deputations and attenting consultation meetings, thereby integrating their views and arguments with those of the CA members. In this way the CA’s deliberation would contain the views of most of Ontarians, and in turn be viewed as legitimate by most of Ontarians. However, this has not been the case as of yet, and there seems to be no reason to suspect it will.

I would suggest that, similar to how arguments would be legitimate within its deliberations, the CA’s decision should be seen as legitimate based on the reasons, which follow reciprocity, it gives the general public for its decision (its decision being the question posed in the referendum). The general public can then agree or disagree with the CA’s suggestion and vote accordingly. In this way, if the reasons the CA offer do not convince the general public they are held accountable through the vote. But the suggestion would still be legitimate based on the rationale offered. According to this view, whether the CA is “representative” is not really important; the prime function of deliberation is to produce reasoned conclusions and any body, representative or not, might be completely capable of doing that. One might argue, as I would, that the merit and quality of the reasons and arguments the CA, or any deliberative body, offers might be directly related to how representative it is. For example, if the CA was composed entirely of Torontonians, not only would this not be representative of all Ontario, it would be very unlikely that it would produce a reasoned conclusion which all of Ontario would see the logic to. Still, representation, as it is commonly understood, is only important in terms of its instrumentality to effective and good deliberation.[xiii] This differs from the notion of representation which individual-interest-oriented models, like those of social choice theory, would suggest. In those cases, representation is seen as crucial because the final decision rests on the aggregation of individual interest. If a citizen’s interest is not seen to have been represented in the process, the end-result is fundamentally flawed because it did not encompass the interests of all in some form. Because the basis for deliberation is the public, and not the private, good, the “fair representation” of individual-interest in the process is not obligatory for the decision reached at the end to be legitimate. As stated before, the role of “fair representation” in deliberation is to create a more complete understanding of the public good. If the majority of Ontarians disagree with this conception (and its ensuing proposal), they can vote against it. However, they will be voting against it in terms of the reasons, which must conform to reciprocity, offered. In this way, the CA’s decision is made public, and is held accountable through the referendum.[xiv]

[i] John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999: 138-139.

[ii] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996:12.

[iii] Ibid, 18.

[iv] Ibid., 15

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid, 14.

[vii] Ibid., 15.

[viii] Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three varieties of Political Theory” from Foundations of Social Choice Theory” ed. Elster, J & Hylland, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 103.

[ix] Ibid., 112. According to this, Scholar84’s comprehension of the deliberative process as he states it in his recent Response to Young Ontarian is correct: “deliberative interaction…is different from this process because it should actually change the preferences of the opposing interlocutor, or the preferences of all interlocutors, if the resulting decision is a synthesis of two or more opposing arguments (something that is not possible with simple interest aggregation…), such that the new policy or prescription is supported whole heartedly and fully by all who deliberated on the topic.” The addendum to this might be that even if it is not “supported whole heartedly” by all, it could be by most, and seen as at least legitimate and logical by all.

[x] James, Bohman, “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1998): 400-425

[xi] See Habermas, Jurgen. “The Public Sphere" in On Society and Politics, A Reader. Ed Seidman, S. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989: 231-237.

[xii] Bohman, 415.

[xiii] Here, J.S. Mill’s defense of freedom of expression, that the more opinions voiced the more likely the truth is to be revealed, seems particularly relevant. In this regard, representativeness can be equated to inclusiveness of opinions and viewpoints. On Liberty. London: Penguin Publishing, 1984: 115-117.

[xiv] This view fits well into an argument I made early on in this forum that the CA capacity for representation was similar to that of statistics. The premise of the CA in this view was that any 103 Ontario citizens brought together in similar circumstances would come to a similar conclusion, and in this way it is representative. See my post Monday's Public Issues Forum.

Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

2006-11-10T19:39:00.000-05:00

Although I suppose, when I think about it…at the proposed referendum, we Ontario will be using a FPTP system (albeit with an imposed super majority requirement) to get rid of the current FPTP system. How’s that for a theoretical issue? What does it mean when you’re new electoral system (which is supposedly better than the FPTP system) came into existence and to a certain extent finds legitimacy in a FPTP referendum? What about all those Ontarians, however small a minority, who vote no…or don’t vote at all?

Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

2006-11-10T19:38:00.000-05:00

Response to Young Ontarian

Hello again everyone. This posting of mine is a response to Young Ontarian’s Observation Report of October 28^th and 29^th. I’ll begin with a personal note: It is in fact, at least for myself, quite enjoyable to have Young Ontarian participate in this class with us, not simply because he/she is privy to (as the Observation Report indicates) the happenings and intricacies of participation within the CA, both formally and informally, but also because I know that whenever I attend a plenary session on any given CA meeting date, there’ll always be someone there whom I know from class, whom I can chat with during the breaks.

Back to business though: I am inclined to agree with Yong Ontarian, and this is through my own experiences of sitting in on the plenary sessions and small group talks, that there does indeed seem to be a high level of “internal inclusion” within the community of CA members. I am also in agreement with Young Ontarian that the CA is a deliberative institution. I think we would all agree on that point. We have also, in this Blog, as Young Ontarian states, recently started a thread of thought that is trying to conceptualize how private preferences are transformed through the deliberative encounter. An encounter that we have agreed, to some extent, should be conducted with a measure of equality between/among the participants.

Now what I want to ask Young Ontarian (and in part, he/she is the only one we can ask, since none of us are actually on the Assembly) is how he/she conceives of the end result of the CA’s deliberations. According to my interpretation (and please, class, feel free to attack me on this) what makes deliberation different from interest aggregation is that in a deliberative forum, unlike during simple bargaining or interest aggregation, what is sought is not simply acquiescence to another’s argument or to an alternative point of view. That’s the kind of system we have gotten used to. In fact, that is the archetypal description of the ‘First Past the Post System.’ Interests are aggregated (in the form of votes) and the majority interest wins (forms the government) while the rest of us bite our tongues, hold our breath, and hope for the best.

However, the deliberative interaction, according to my interpretation, is different from this process because it should actually change the preferences of the opposing interlocutor, or the preferences of all interlocutors, if the resulting decision is a synthesis of two or more opposing arguments (something that is not possible with simple interest aggregation and FPTP), such that the new policy or prescription is supported whole heartedly and fully by all who deliberated on the topic. This preference change is conceptualized to be a product of the reasoning process, the public reason, and discussion between the participants. What this means is that theoretically at the end of the CA’s deliberations, all the members will be wholly convinced…or I should say, wholly in support of the decision. I want to ask Young Ontarian what he/she thinks of this. I doubt that if the CA decides that a new electoral system is in order, that any of them members would (although it is possible) secretly vote ‘no’ during the referendum.

Now, this is a theoretical issue, and there those who would argue that expecting everyone in however large or small a group to agree with one another 100% is futile. We should note though, that deliberative democracy does not stress an ‘agreement with one specific agenda out of many’ (although that is possible I suppose), but a synthesizing of the ‘best’ outcome or policy after taking into consideration a multiplicity of views, positions and arguments through public reasoning. I don’t think that the CA members are at the end of their learning phase simply going to take a vote on whether Ontario should adopt a new electoral system (and a majority vote will determine the outcome). That would be contradictory to everything that the members have been taught to date about deliberation.

Democratic Theory Seminar: on Ontario Citizens' Assembly

2006-11-10T16:13:00.000-05:00

Cards on the Table...

Hello all. This posting of mine will be very short. It is a small response to Democrat84’s critique of my earlier Assembly observation report. I must apologize for the haste in which it seems I wrote that earlier report…I’ve already had to post one reformulation in response to another class member. Still I am gratified that it caused such a reaction, and in that sense, I suppose it serves the purposes of this forum.

I’m not going to offer a rebuttal to Democrat84 here. In fact, I think that his/her critique of my arguments is well formulated. The first point that he/she makes is well taken, that,

“We must properly understand the locus of responsibility…The decision-making power actually rests in the hands of Ontarians themselves when the issue is put to referendum. Hence, they are not “subject to” the Citizen’s Assembly decision – they merely have the ability to make a recommendation, but we as citizens ultimately have the final responsibility and opportunity to vote on it,”

However, when he/she says

“As members were assigned roles in some discussions, all were encouraged to play an equal part in the discussion. In my opinion, in this process preferences which are “vague, unreflective, ill-informed and private” do in fact have the capability to be “transformed into more firm, reflective, informed, and other-regarding ones through the deliberative encounter.” This conclusion was what Scholar84 originally argued was not possible (as set out in “The Main Argument”), and I do not see how his point conclusively rejects such an argument at this juncture. “

Here, I can say, that it was never my intent, nor my argument that “preference transformation” was impossible for the Citizens’ Assembly. In fact, verbatim, what I said was,

“In light of my comment concerning preserving participant equality through reciprocity in discussion, equal speaking time and equal enforcement power, I am arguing that the Assembly’s deliberations should be viewed in much the same way as the small group learning sessions in which the members already participate bi-weekly. The focus should be on making a collective binding decision, covering all the stages of the decision-making process from problem definition and agenda-setting to discussions of solutions, decision-making and implementation. Furthermore, this process should not be disconnected from questions of agendas, decisions and actions (i.e. whether the secretariat team, whom some may think “reads like a who’s who list” of supporters of Proportional Representation, has had an impact on the learning process and biased some members choices).”

I never argued that “preference transformation” and “genuine deliberation” was impossible for the CA. I’m sorry for not mentioning this in the original post, but in fact, and here are my cards, I’m a supporter of the CA, and am a BIG fan of the small group sessions. I am making the recommendation to keep such a format when the CA starts formally deliberating on its mandate. To say that I argue that preference transformation and deliberation is not possible in the CA is to misread me entirely. I never made that point (although I might have been very unclear about my arguments). What I am afraid of is if the forum becomes too big (say the whole 103 of them in one room), so that not all CA members will have the chance to equally participate; this not conducive to deliberation and would constitute a loss of legitimacy in my view. However, the small discussion groups (7 to 8) allow for effective equal participation (Democrat84, You and I are in whole agreement here actually)…and I wholly support them. These are my thoughts on the matter.

CA Observation Report (oct 28-29) Member Participation

2006-11-07T22:24:00.000-05:00

I attended the Citizens’ Assembly (CA) meetings on the weekend of October 28-29. Although this observation focuses on that weekend, it’s really a cumulative observation as, being a member of the CA, I’ve had the privilege of being part of all CA meetings to date. In this observation report, I’m interested in exploring a procedural issue of relevance to the CA as a tool of deliberative democracy; member participation.

As the CA really is a historic process, (similar CA’s on electoral reform have taken place only in B.C and the Netherlands) there has been a lot of academic interest in the assembly as a model of deliberative democracy that could, potentially, have far reaching applications as a tool to supplement our current system of representative democracy. In order for the Ontario CA to be a viable model of deliberative democracy, it must be viewed as being internally democratic.
In this post, I’m going to discuss the internal democracy of the CA with a focus on the participation of the assembly members in the process.

Theories of deliberative democracy have stressed the importance of the inclusion of all participants in the process. Jane Mansbridge highlights this point in a direct way, “to be democratic, deliberation must (italics hers) be widely inclusive.” (1) A key question we should be asking (which has already been the topic of lively discussion on this blog) is whether or not the CA promotes the inclusion of the views of all of its 103 members. An inclusive deliberative process can be contrasted with an exclusive one. As Scholar84 discussed in his/her post “CA observation report Oct 28”; there is the legitimate concern that the process will be dominated and controlled by a few members within the assembly. In Inclusion and Democracy Iris Marison Young defines exclusion as occurring when “some people’s ideas and social perspectives are likely to dominate discussion and decision making even when a forum has diversity in the room”. (2) After having observed and been an active part of the assembly proceedings to date, I contend that the CA has a high level of internal democracy in that there is a high level of inclusion of all members in the process. In my observation, it appears that all members are encouraged to, and indeed do, participate in the assembly process in different but equally meaningful ways. The key that produces the high level of equitable participation is the fact that the assembly has several different forums which the assembly members are encouraged to participate in.

Shared Values: Equality

The CA has a range of forums which the members participate both during and in between weekends that the assembly meets. Before discussing how selected forums within the assembly have facilitated equitable participation, it’s important to highlight that during Weekend 1 the members came up with “Our Shared Values of Working Together” a consensus of values that the assembly (as individuals or as a group) can refer back to at any point during the proceedings to make sure that the values are being respected in assembly proceedings. The values include (but aren’t limited to) a comfortable environment, listening and learning from each other, respect and equality. Equality was elaborated on to mean “providing opportunity for all (original bold) to participate in a way that is comfortable for them” and “Be inclusive and encourage each other” (3). I contend that, to date the members have done exactly that.

Plenary Sessions

Although the bulk of discussion occurs outside of plenary sessions, they are the focal point of the CA and the forum most visible to the general public. Even though there are definitely members who’ve spoken more frequently in the plenary than others (and many who’ve yet to speak), in my observation, those that have asked questions and made comments in the plenary have been a fairly balanced mix of age, gender, and visible minorities. A sample of regular speakers (according to my not-so-scientific observation mind you) include a white man 40ish,
a white man in his 20's and a woman of a visible minority in her 20s. It’s interesting that every weekend members who haven’t yet spoken in plenary contribute comments and questions.

Small Group Sessions

The small group sessions (with 10 participants each) are an excellent way to encourage active participation of all members as the groups are small enough to facilitate dialogue and debate between all participants. There were a lot of comments among assembly members that the small group sessions this weekend (oct 28-29) were the liveliest to date showing that the quality of participation has increased as the learning phase progresses and members get more comfortable with both the material and each other. Although there are, undeniably, the more vocal members, in all of the small groups I’ve been part of to date, everyone spoke at least once during the course of the conversation. The facilitators have done a commendable job of drawing out quieter voices with comments such as “you look like you wanted to say something?” This demonstrates that the facilitators have played an active role in insuring inclusive participation within the assembly.

To briefly address Finley Stockton’s concern about French language use within the assembly in his/her post “Observations based on three sessions of the Citizens’ Assembly”, there is a bilingual small group discussion conducted every session which I had the privilege to be a part of on the weekend of October 15-16. Instructions and comments by the facilitator were presented in both official languages and the two francophone members presented their comments in their mother tongue (to be translated into English by the facilitator). Although this doesn’t address all of Finley Stockton’s legitimate concerns, it does show that there are more procedural mechanisms, than just the simultaneous translation in the plenary, in place to facilitate equitable participation from the francophone members.

Website Member’s Forum

The member’s forum is a great tool that has added to the inclusivity of the assembly. It connects members between meetings and allows for those who feel more comfortable expressing themselves in writing to do so. The member’s forum has various strands including a discussion on what principles members value most and questions for Jonathan Rose’s question box. In browsing the forum, I observed that the regular contributors are a diverse group (of different ages and both genders) and don’t represent the same people that are regularly very vocal during plenary and small group discussion. This diversity in participation supports my claim that the different forums have allowed for inclusive participation in the assembly.

Informal avenues of participation:

In addition to formal forums for member participation, there are informal avenues that encourage inclusive discussion and debate between members. It was a wise decision to structure the CA so that secretariat and assembly members are highly encouraged
to stay at the same hotel for the duration of the weekend irrespective of how far away (or close) they live from Osgoode Hall. This promotes participation as the members get a chance to get to know each other on a personal level. A more personal relationship, outside of formal assembly proceedings, encourages inclusive participation in two ways; first it allows members to feel more comfortable around each other and therefore more likely to participate actively in the more formal channels such as the plenary. Secondly, it allows members to continue discussion started at Osgoode hall in informal, relaxed settings such as over the breakfast table or a casual drink on saturday night. I think the fact that there is so much after hours discussion on CA related issues testifies to the involvement of the members.

In this observation, I have highlighted three forums (plenary,small groups and the online members forum) that I feel have facilitated equitable participation in the assembly. There are other equally important forums (including academic director Jonathan Rose’s politics 101 and active working groups) that, due to space constraints, I will not address here but may discuss in further postings.

Conclusion

My observations have led me to conclude that (at this point anyway) the Citizens’ Assembly has a high level of internal democracy in regards to member participation and that this participation is facilitated through the range of forums within the assembly.

I would like to stress that my conclusion comes from my personal observations (the nature of the post being an ‘observation report’) of assembly proceedings and therefore I recognize that it’s open to criticism for being too subjective in nature. Clearly the issue of member participation is a critical one and should be subject to in depth examination using a more methodological approach. In light of this, it would be advisable for an independent research team to conduct a study on member participation.

If researched further, it would critical that the researchers properly define what would constitute an acceptable level of inclusion in participation that would of course not depend solely on my personal observation that all members are participating and engaged in the proceedings. It would be interesting if an impartial survey was conducted asking all members whether they feel that the CA has a sufficient level of internal democracy in respect to all members being given an equal and meaningful voice. The survey should include questions specific to whether members feel that the variables of age, gender, first language, education, and visible minority status are affecting the level and quality of member participation. The survey should take into account a member’s status in these groups and compare opinions across groups as to whether members feel that there is equitable participation in the CA. This survey should also be conducted at different points during the process.

It is critical to take into consideration that the CA is still in the learning phase of the process and even my own personal observations that the CA is highly inclusive should be revisited as the assembly moves into the deliberation phase. The deliberation phase will undoubtedly give rise to a different, likely more intense, group dynamic and it may be that CA proceedings become less inclusive at this important stage.

Considering my involvement in the assembly to date, I’m impressed by the way the CA is running and do believe that it will serve as an invaluable model for a more deliberative democracy in Ontario’s future. I share the vision of Jane Mansbridge in that I too, “can imagine a polity in which every citizen is called at least once…to serve on such a citizens’ assembly.”(4)

References:

1)Archon Fung, “Deliberation’s Darker Side: A Discussion with Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge,” National Civic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (2004): 47-54. pg 50.

2)Fung, pg. 49

3)Cohl, Karen. "Learning Phase Meeting Notes: Weekend 1-Sept". Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. pg 4.

4)Fung, pg.53.

Schumpeter and Dewey on the Citizens’ Assembly and its options

2006-11-06T22:44:00.000-05:00

Schumpeter
Joseph Schumpeter was an Austrian economist who lived from 1883 to 1950. He is considered a major figure in his field, having introduced or advanced the concepts of business cycles, entrepreneurship and “creative destruction”, among others.

Schumpeter was also interested in political science, and in his 1942 work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy he introduces his own theory of democracy. It is not a prescriptive theory so much as a description of how he saw democracy operating in practice. Schumpeter notably considers blind belief in democracy to be dangerous. Of the classical doctrine of democracy he says “this rationalization is so dangerous because it is so tempting”. He suggests it is safer to acknowledge the less idealistic reality that a party is simply “a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (Schumpeter, p. 283).

Our readings from Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (chapters XXI and XXII) question whether individuals truly have their own free will, unencumbered by influence, and points out that government cannot be both for the people and by the people, since the two are frequently mutually exclusive. Schumpeter believes that in reality, democracy lies between the two poles of autocracy and pure rule by the people. The role of the electorate is limited to producing a government and then, when necessary, evicting it (Schumpeter, p. 272).

It is worth noting that while the book is flattering to Marxist thought in many ways, Schumpeter intended the book to encourage readers to question the tenets of Marx, which were the conventional wisdom of the time. “In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, irony served as a wedge with which to pry open minds”. Why did Schumpeter write the book in an ironic tone? “Probably because he had reason to believe that a frontal intellectual attack on socialism would fall on deaf ears among the younger intellectuals he sought to influence” (Muller, p. 307).

Schumpeter actually hated much of the practical implementation of communism. As a minister, he was actively involved in combating the bolshevik regime in Hungary. (Stolper). He also witnessed the rise of the Nazi party and notes in the book that “democratic phraseology has been instrumental in fostering the association of inequality of any kind with ‘injustice’ which is so important an element in the psychic pattern of the unsuccessful and in the arsenal of the politician who uses him” (Schumpeter, p. 254).

What insight might Schumpeter be able to offer the Assembly in their task of comparing electoral systems? Capital, Socialism, and Democracy comments briefly on the subject. Schumpeter believes that proportional electoral systems allow minority voices to be heard better than the majoritarian systems, but that proportional systems are inefficient in dangerous times, when stronger (read: majority government) leadership is required (Schumpeter, pp. 272-273). Assembly Academic Director Jonathan Rose agrees with this stance, noting that proportional representation encourages small parties and coalition governments (Rose, slides 34-38). Rose uses much softer language to describe the weaker leadership found in proportional representation, but this seems appropriate given his environment. Schumpeter was writing at a time when European democracies were engaged in a world war and needed determined leadership at the helm. Ontario in 2006 is not in danger of being attacked by expansion-hungry nation-states, so the more balanced political power associated with proportional representation is not the same sort of liability.

Perhaps influenced by the events of his era, Schumpeter comes out in favour of majoritarian systems because he believes that “acceptance of leadership is the true function of the electorate’s vote”. He goes on explicitly support majoritarian systems when he says that “the principle of democracy then merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams” (Schumpeter, p. 273).

What would Schumpeter have thought of the current project of democratic renewal in Ontario? For him, competition between members of the political elite is the key measure of democracy. Schumpeter approaches democracy as his theory of creative destruction approaches the market – he believes that competition brings out the best in individuals.

In order to understand how democratic politics serve this social end, we must start from the competitive struggle for power and office and realize that the social function is fulfilled, as it were, incidentally – in the same sense as production is incidental to the making of profits. (Schumpeter, p. 282)

For Schumpeter, re-evaluating the electoral system would be comparable to reviewing the efficiency of free market regulations - the goal is to create the best environment for healthy competition. Given that one of the eight principles the Citizens’ Assembly follows is that “an electoral system should promote voter choice in terms of quantity and quality of options available to voters”, I believe Schumpeter would support the Assembly’s work (Citizens’ Assembly, 2006).

When it comes to the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly as the vehicle to carry out the project, however, Schumpeter would be at odds with the arrangement. He believes any collective of people, no matter its size and the nobility of its intentions, too easily displays a mob mentality: “a reduced sense of responsibility, a lower level of energy of thought and greater sensitiveness to non-logical influences” (Schumpeter, p. 257). As well, regular citizens are not as rigorous in their evaluation of options because they lack “the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility” (Schumpeter, p. 262). As a result, I suspect he would dismiss the Assembly even if he saw how well it runs in practice.

For similar reasons, Schumpeter would object to a referendum as the final test for a proposed change. The members of the Assembly are being educated about political science in preparation for their deliberations, but the public of Ontario will not receive similar lessons. For the same rationale Schumpeter would object to the Citizens’ Assembly, he would object to the referendum even more strongly.

Dewey
John Dewey (1859-1952) was an American philosopher active in the first half of the twentieth century. He was one of the founders of the Pragmatism school of philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of values and how problems are stated in determining how they are solved. He taught at Columbia University for many years and later in life presided over the Dewey Commission that exonerated Leon Trotsky.

The Public and Its Problems was published in 1927 as a response to two books by the journalist/philospher Walter Lippmann: Public Opinion and The Phantom Public. Lippmann believed that governments should be run by elite groups of economists and political scientists who would make decisions based on data supplied by social scientists. While the sections our class read (chapters III and IV) did not make it explicit, the purpose of Dewey’s book is to rebut Lippmann and re-enforce the role that communities play in society (Fott, p. 29).

Like Schumpeter, at first glance Dewey appears to be cynical about democracy. He defines it as “a specified practice in selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials” (Dewey, p. 82). Using America as an example, he describes how significantly the organization of society has changed since the early days of democracy. Unlike Schumpeter, he denies the supremacy of economic forces, and he disparages those who see economic laws as ‘natural laws’. Dewey believes that social factors play an important part – that many of our desires and habits are actually socially conditioned customs (Dewey, pp. 103-104).

Dewey also describes the increasing pace of technological advancement that characterized his era, and believes that many civil institutions had become out of date. With the pace of change speeding up and an increasing number of amusements diverting regular citizens from political concerns, he wonders how the public should organize and participate in democracy. Ultimately, he suggests that social scientists and other technocrats have a major role to play in governance, but that a civil society of politically active citizens grouping into communities of interest should also be an integral part of the system.

The central problem of The Public and Its Problems is really how to facilitate the self-identification of publics (Fott, p. 29). As a result, it’s not a great leap to suggest that Dewey would support an electoral system that gave smaller interest groups more opportunity to participate in governance. In her statistical analysis of electoral systems in place around the world, Norris tells us that “one central virtue of proportional systems is the claim that they are more likely to produce a parliament which reflects the composition of the electorate” (Norris, p. 309).

Dewey also derides the fact that the ratio of actual to eligible voters had fallen to about one-half, so he would be in favour of systems that tend to increase voter turnout (Dewey, 1927, p. 117). Norris’s research tells us that proportional systems increase turnout the most, followed closely by mixed and semi-proportional systems. Average turnout is lowest under majoritarian systems (Norris, p. 309).

We can also look at electoral systems through the lens of another of Dewey’s impressions, that of the world’s increasing complexity as technology advances and jobs become ever more specialized. Rose says that the logic of proportional representation is easy to understand, but the mechanics of the system can prove complex (Rose, slide 38). Dewey might argue that this complexity would make the public more susceptible to manipulation by shrewd political and advertising specialists, given that average citizens are distracted by “bread and circuses” and not willing to invest the time and effort required to become a fully functioning member of society (Dewey, p. 137). It is important to keep in mind that if an alternative system is selected, voters will not get the same quality of indoctrination in it as the Assembly.

A final note
While Schumpeter and Dewey have significantly different democratic theories, they are united in their belief that the classical doctrine of democracy is flawed. Schumpeter’s approach paints a picture of competition between elites, while Dewey emphasizes the importance of citizen participation. And while each theory points to a different electoral system, they both agree with the role of the Citizens’ Assembly for Electoral Reform.

References

Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. (2006). Our mandate. Retrieved November 3, 2006 from http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/en-CA/About/Mandate.aspx

Dewey, J. (1954 [1927]). The public and its problems. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Fott, D. (1998). John Dewey: America’s philosopher of democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Muller, J. Z. (2002). The Mind and the Market. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Norris, P. (1997). Choosing electoral systems: proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems. International Political Science Review, 18, 297-312.

Rose, J.. (2006, October 28). Proportional Representation. Retrieved November 3, 2006 from http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/GetFile.aspx?aliaspath=%2fen-CA%2fdocs%2fWeekend+Four%2fProportional+Representation+-

Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

Stolper, W. F. (1994). Joseph Alois Schumpeter. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

Response to Thrasymachus and Finley Stockton on Marxist Electoral Reform

2006-11-06T20:00:00.000-05:00

To begin with, I would like to thank my colleagues for their comments on my earlier blog “Marxist Tradition and Electoral Reform”. In light of their comments I would like to make a short response to some of the raised criticisms.

Firstly, Thrasymachus wrote: “A Marxist critique or solution to electoral systems in Canada, therefore, should be targeted at the development of the working class and their interests. Solutions that abandon this development, I would argue, fall outside of the Marxist vision, no matter how labor-friendly they are in scope.”

To this end, I want to suggest that my earlier post was primarily intended to create a critique of Ontario’s current electoral system by appealing to Marx’s comprehensive understanding of capitalism and democracy. As such, although Thrasymachus is right in pointing to the need of further developing class consciousness, my suggestion of adopting PR was meant to be understood as a step in that general direction. My logic would therefore hold that since FPTP is detrimental to the proletariat in the way that it limits voters’ choices to usually only two candidates in each riding, PR should be implemented as a progressive alterative to promote the interests of the working class by offering more choices on the ballot, which has the inherent potential to giving rise to a real worker’s movement.

Secondly, in reference to my claim that PR would fair better in helping to moderate the adverse effects of capitalist economic fluctuations, Finley Stockton wrote: “I believe most market fluctuations are outside the scope of an electoral system to fix. The global economy is complex and beyond the control of most countries period, regardless what system of government they have.”

In response to this comment, I would like to point out that although electoral reform is not primarily aimed at fixing market fluctuations, it nonetheless may be best to let go of FPTP in order to give the working class a better voice in expressing its discontent with the bourgeois-dominated status quo. Consequently, a shift towards PR in this regard could potentially lead the proletariat towards better solidifying its position within democratic institutions.

Finally, although adopting PR cannot be understood as an inherently Marxist solution to the ills of FPTP, it nonetheless constitutes a progressive step towards true democracy, which can in the future legitimately facilitate the workers seizing the mode of production from their capitalist oppressors.