Sunday, December 03, 2006
Theoretical Perspectives on the Education and Legitimacy of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly
The Ontario Citizens’ Assembly is an exercise in community, and representation of community. These citizens from all walks of life are brought together under the values defined by their elected Ontario Legislative Assembly, and consequently, on behalf of Ontarians. Their purpose is to discuss, deliberate and propose electoral reform. Are they brought together as individuals, as members of their home communities, or members of the Citizens’ Community? Education gives them a common experience that transforms the role members of the Citizens’ Assembly play as representatives. Pericles notably glorified the importance of service over self, of the honor of dedicating one’s life and liberty to the community. (Thucydides 3) Although the men that died while fighting Sparta were Athenians as one, civically they were individuals. Internally, Athens was a divided democracy but externally she was a united front. Disagreement and debate was nurtured on the inside, for the furtherance of democracy and citizenship, but common training and leadership made the Athenian army a noble opponent externally. The Citizens’ Assembly in Ontario is comparable to ancient Athens, except it is a reversal. On the outside, the Assembly gives the impression that its objectives are dialogue and exchange between individuals drawn from all over Ontario, but internally, an element of education brings them together into a community of uniformity of perspective. The entire Learning Phase of the Citizens’ Assembly, taking up almost as much time as the Deliberation Phase, in a way preconditions the members from playing the reflective role they are sought out to perform. This prerequisite education, or re-education as it might be, threatens the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly in serving as a body representative of the general populace. Without this accurate representation, the Assembly’s thoughts and proposals become out of sync, especially when their final proposal goes to the electorate for ratification. Some might argue that anything otherwise would lead the Assembly to be too uneducated to make the important decisions regarding electoral reform proposal; however, the argument of this essay is that Assembly members need to remain untainted in their responsibility as a representative body. Here, a number of theoretical approaches will be applied to the argument to test its validity.
Pitkin defines a number of forms of representation that help to illustrate the transformation that is taking place in the Citizens’ Assembly. To her, representation is simply the “re-presentation” of another group, or making present something that is absent. (Pitkin 16) But within that concept, there is much division. The definition of representation per se is a more complex issue, but she is able to narrow down several different incarnations, all of which vary based on what the representatives’ roles are. From a superficial perspective, two can be applied to the general idea of the Citizens’ Assembly. It is either an accurate representation of delegates that reflects the interests of the public at large; or, it can serve as a symbolic body of trustees that are entrusted with working amongst themselves on behalf of society. In the Assembly, the delegate/reflective model is more akin to a random sample, whereby the members, as they are selected by random from each district in Ontario, work towards hammering out proposals – almost like a focus group – that would be agreeable with the rest of their fellow citizens. The trustee model bears close resemblance to the Ontario Legislative Assembly as both are congregations of representative members that immerse themselves in policy and emerge with solutions. But how does the referendum factor in? Since, when all the deliberations are over and the proposals have been made, the proposals go to a referendum for ratification. Trusteeships rarely involve members facing their electorate on any one particular issue, and trustees are only held accountable by virtue of their office itself. In the Citizens’ Assembly, the members have nothing personal to lose whether the public ratifies their proposals or not. Further, trustees only face a vote on their individual performance, not on specific policy issues that they were entrusted to deal with. It makes little sense to view the Citizens’ Assembly as a body of trustees from the start. Instead, when taking into account the referendum, the Assembly should be viewed as a body that has been transformed from a body of delegates into a body of trustees, by virtue of their added sophistication.
Ultimately, “The more a theorist sees representatives as superior in wisdom and expertise to their constituents, the more he will stress the need for independent judgment […] there is no point in counting noses accurately among the constituents if the question is a technical one calling for expertise.” (Pitkin 20) This expertise, gained through study and contemplation on the subject, places greater importance on the need for representatives to be independent in their thought and actions. Thus, a dichotomy emerges for the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly: the Assembly remains uneducated (or rather, untainted) and their proposal goes to referendum, or, the members continue with their regimen of lectures but are granted more independence in their decision-making power, e.g. their recommendation goes to the Legislature instead of the general public. These are obviously both hypothetical scenarios. The reality at hand maintains that the transformed Assembly is dealing with material that the general public will not be able to handle on a policy-level yes/no vote. Montesquieu, on representatives, states, “The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.” (Montesquieu 176) In this case, it makes little sense to take these detailed public affairs to the public for approval when it is difficult enough for them to participate in the deliberation with Assembly members who underwent months of specialized training.
The Assembly process in itself, however, minus the Learning Phase, can be viewed as an educational experience. In Tocqueville’s assessment of American democracy in New England, he came to the conclusion that, “Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” (Tocqueville 2) His notion of localized deliberating, or “municipal institutions,” helps also to define where the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly is lacking. To contrast the two, municipal institutions of colonial and post-colonial America were a method of direct democracy, where decisions were made by the local community regarding local issues. As if it was their duty, the community as a whole came together to discuss and deliberate voluntarily. The Citizens’ Assembly, however, meets as a group selected randomly by the government.
It should be noted that the Citizens’ Assembly is not entirely without grassroots involvement. The Ontario process has, in between the Learning and Deliberation Phases, a Consultation Phase that allows members of the general public to come forward and make presentations to members of the Citizens’ Assembly before they begin their deliberations. Two points render this consultative phase inferior to that which Tocqueville praises: first, private citizens making presentations are not at the same level as Assembly members since they are separated by months of standardized learning, and second, public deliberation is not ingrained in post-modern democratic citizenship as it was in 18th century America, so the quality of these consultations is not as comprehensive. The purpose of contrasting the Citizens’ Assembly with Tocqueville’s writing is to display that even when regarding the output of educational potential, i.e. the potential these public deliberations have for enlightening and broadening the democratic capacity of the society, the Assembly process is lacking.
For Schumpeter, however, public discourse has the opposite effect. This theory takes a more pessimistic view of human nature, as “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. [The citizen] argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests.” (Schumpeter 262) Along these anti-educational lines, man is more thoughtful and rational when he is introspective rather than when he looks for answers in others. He has more to learn from himself than from others, who tend to reduce his rational ability. At the same time, public reason does not really exist, and consequently there is no accurate way at arriving at a “common good.” In speaking of society, “The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in turn explain the ordinary citizen’s ignorance and lack of judgment in matters of domestic and foreign policy which are if anything more shocking in the case of educated people and of people who are successfully active in non-political walks of life than it is with uneducated people in humble stations.” (Schumpeter 261) The position this theory arrives at is one, when examining the Citizens’ Assembly, which would characterize citizen deliberation as a waste of time. Accordingly, man has little free will and is easily manipulated; citizens are ignorant and superficial, and are easily manipulated by politicians. Thus, the entire Assembly process can be seen as moot: there is no common will to be determined. What is more, the fact that the referendum to ratify the proposal to come out of this Assembly is to take place concurrently with the Ontario General Election characterizes its openness to being politicized by parties and candidates seeking to gain election. In his advocacy for a minimalist government, with periodic votes and such, the only effective form of government is one that is made up of a small number of trustees, and thus education and study can be considered valuable to those few in his minimalist model. Schumpeter would be very critical of the Assembly, its sheer size and scope, and would most likely claim that the members, as well as the citizens voting in the referendum, are vulnerable to manipulation. Within this model, the education the Assembly receives threatens the legitimacy of the Assembly process, but within the context of an already illegitimate form of democracy.
Another theory, by Dewey, asserts that governments are representative simply if they lay claim to standing for the interests of the public. People involved in representative capacities do not lose their human nature and their personal interests and allegiances, viz., “interests of special groups, those of the family, clique or class to which they belong.” (Dewey 76) Here, there is no question whether the Citizens’ Assembly is legitimate or not. The composition of the Assembly itself is one that purports to be representative of regional (one member form each district), gender (divided equally between the sexes), and Aboriginal interests (at least one seat for a citizen of Aboriginal status). This representational cross-section aims to take into account sufficient viewpoint diversity, enlisting a wide range of Ontarians what will provide adequate perspective in drawing conclusions on the subject of electoral reform. Education enters the equation as an external factor that disrupts the Assembly by helping the members shed their personal interests and allegiances. Dewey’s notion of representation is all-encompassing, and the dual capacity he presents for representatives, one as voter and one as a stated official, expands on what has above been deemed a struggle, (ibid.) the delegate vis-à-vis the trustee. But again, education provides a standardizing force that moves members away from their personal allegiances and towards uniformity. Take for instance the fact that the legislation enacted by the Ontario Legislative Assembly requires to apply government-mandated principles and characteristics when assessing electoral systems: legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability. (Ontario Regulation 82/06) Such impositions upon members of the Assembly imply that personal preconditions of thought regarding electoral systems are not welcome. Under the Dewey model, although the system remains legitimate, it strikes an imbalance in the dual mandate of the members which causes them to ward off their viewpoint diversity in favor of commonality.
Deliberative democracy has been studied in philosophical depth relatively recently. This new concentration of study can be seen as a reflection of the evolving nature of democracy, or at the very least, democratic thought. According to Macpherson, democracy has shifted models several times, and is slowly approaching a manifestation in participatory democracy. (Macpherson 22). Although participation does not necessarily require deliberation, deliberation surely requires participation. The foundations of deliberation theory are traced in a desire to provide a rational response to the market-style, competitive, liberal democratic elements of society that usually result in “bargaining equilibrium.” (Bohman 400) Instead, consensus and agreement is sought. Williams discusses an abandonment of these same market-style ideals, what she terms “liberal representation,” as problems are found with the greater divisions and marginalization that result. (Williams 7) Consequently, “Because the processes that constitute political representation are complex, any theory of fair representation must be similarly complex.” (Williams 8) Education has a considerable position to fulfill in deliberative democratic theory as it has the greatest ability to influence many political actors, and, as a result, political outcomes. The rest of this discussion will focus on the implications of education within deliberative democratic theories of representation.
Embodying the “will of the people” is the aim of deliberative democracy, in which public reason is the highest ideal. (Bohman 401) Continuing Williams’ maxim, Bohman claims that deliberation is a complex idea, a concept that is rooted in public reason. He also recognizes the problem of liberal representation: “The problem is that the state is structured around the pressure to make a timely decision and to perform particular functions in complex societies.” (Bohman 414) Modern states have grown into organisms with such large bureaucracies that the slowly but surely attitude of public deliberation would not be sufficient for the fast-paced approach modern governments have come to adopt. As such, “the only feasible form of deliberation occurs in the interaction between formally organized institutional decision-making mechanisms and informal and ‘anonymous’ debates and discussion in the public sphere.” (Bohman 414-15) Thus, under Bohman’s theory, the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly may gain legitimacy after all. The Assembly can be seen as an embodiment of this personal interaction between the government and its public. The “will of the people” is collected (Consultation Phase) and organized (Deliberation Phase) until the members of the Assembly reach a consensus on the public’s behalf (Final Report). But the public is not actually engaged in any of the deliberation. The extent to which public consensus is sought comes in the form of a double majority that is required when the Assembly’s proposal is made available at the polls for ratification. This is not exactly the version of public deliberation that Bohman, or any other deliberative democracy theorists, have in mind. Deliberative democracy is the New England town meeting transformed to a larger scale. Perhaps public discourse can be embodied in public education campaigns. If the Assembly, by means of public education, can convince the public to be on side with their proposed reforms, then this might be considered public deliberation. Theoretically the Assembly should not have much of a problem convincing the public of anything, since it in itself is a cross-section of the public. But again the problem of an educated Assembly arises: is the government trying to create dialogue with the public, or is it appointing a random few to be groomed to be able to deliberate at the government’s level? Or, perhaps the members’ education puts them in a better position to engage their fellow citizens. Whether or not this is the case, their fellow citizens are not being persuaded one way or another within this process. The nature of the Assembly process is to foster enough discussion between Assembly members, with merely input from self-selecting members of the public, in order to produce recommendations that the general public will find palatable. Unfortunately, the degree to which public engagement occurs is quite limited.
Gutmann and Thompson seek out to diminish the deliberative deficit that exists in liberal democracy. (Gutmann and Thompson 12) Deliberation is a way citizens can go on living with their moral disagreements. To them, the absence of deliberation means that, “citizens cannot even provisionally justify many controversial procedures and constitutional rights to one another.” (Gutmann and Thompson 18) In essence, deliberation is a necessity in a healthy democracy, one that is naturally stricken with divisions and differences along moral lines. Several principles are identified here that aim to foster deliberation: reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity. These principles serve as conditions for healthy deliberation to take place, and by no means can be forced upon a public. A society, however, can take steps to foster these ideals, e.g. penalizing those who violate the notion of basic liberty, but the only way of encouraging such considerations is through public education. These principles seem to parallel the ideals set forth by the Ontario Legislature as principles to guide the Assembly in their assessment of electoral systems. But the fact that these principles can only be encouraged in the general public and not instituted (anything otherwise would be a treat to liberty) means that true public deliberation among all citizens is a mere dream. At most, a compromise between democratic proceduralism and deliberation democracy can be envisioned. In this way, education can be incorporated into procedure, but insofar as it is not used as a mechanism for social conditioning.
“Actual deliberation […] encourages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens […] if they were all living in an ideal society.” (Gutmann and Thompson 16) The theorists offer an account that makes citizen deliberation an alternative to hypothetical deliberation. When applied to the Citizens’ Assembly, citizen deliberation is all hypothetical: electoral systems are a very intangible concept that can be only be brought closer to home by means of education. It is through education that the citizen gains a greater understanding but also develops a closer connection to his representation and the representation of society. Citizens’ moral understandings belong to the realm of self-interest, but it is very difficult to attach (or extract) self-interest from a sphere that is not within the grasp of most, except when it comes time to mark an “X” every now and then. Education, therefore, makes deliberating electoral politics within reach of the public, allowing them to make it their self-interest. But the Citizens’ Assembly falls short in this regard, also. Aside, from a consultation guide that is available online, aptly titled “Citizens Talking to Citizens,” very little has been invested in communicating or making available educational materials for the general public.
Education is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can empower citizens to the level of participating in deliberative democracy. On the other, it makes citizen representatives illegitimate in their responsibility to accurately reflect their fellow citizens. Pericles made the claim, “instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.” (op. cit.) For most of these theorists, discussion adds to the democratic side of the equation. The Citizens’ Assembly, overall, is an exercise remarkable for its openness and good intentions. Unfortunately, when political scientists get involved, the world is turned on its side. From this end of observation, its legitimacy is threatened by the use of education as an antecedent, and the lack of education in the public realm makes its deliberative legitimacy powerless.
Bohman, James. “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 4, 400-425.
Dewey, John. (1954, 1927). The Public and its Problems. Athens: Ohio University Press. 75-142.
Election Act, Ontario Regulation 82/06, Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press. 1-51.
Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. 9-22.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. (1748). The Spirit of Laws. Tr. Thomas Nugent. (1752). Kitchener: Batoche Books. 171-184. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. (1969). “Introduction: The Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Pitkin. New York: Atherton Press. 1-23.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 250-283.
Thucydides. Pericles’ Funeral Oration. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. (1835) Book I, Chapter V: “Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States Before That of the Union at Large,” in Democracy in America. Tr. Henry Reeve. (1899). Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Williams, Melissa S. (1998). Voice, Trust, and Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-22, 203-243.
Pitkin defines a number of forms of representation that help to illustrate the transformation that is taking place in the Citizens’ Assembly. To her, representation is simply the “re-presentation” of another group, or making present something that is absent. (Pitkin 16) But within that concept, there is much division. The definition of representation per se is a more complex issue, but she is able to narrow down several different incarnations, all of which vary based on what the representatives’ roles are. From a superficial perspective, two can be applied to the general idea of the Citizens’ Assembly. It is either an accurate representation of delegates that reflects the interests of the public at large; or, it can serve as a symbolic body of trustees that are entrusted with working amongst themselves on behalf of society. In the Assembly, the delegate/reflective model is more akin to a random sample, whereby the members, as they are selected by random from each district in Ontario, work towards hammering out proposals – almost like a focus group – that would be agreeable with the rest of their fellow citizens. The trustee model bears close resemblance to the Ontario Legislative Assembly as both are congregations of representative members that immerse themselves in policy and emerge with solutions. But how does the referendum factor in? Since, when all the deliberations are over and the proposals have been made, the proposals go to a referendum for ratification. Trusteeships rarely involve members facing their electorate on any one particular issue, and trustees are only held accountable by virtue of their office itself. In the Citizens’ Assembly, the members have nothing personal to lose whether the public ratifies their proposals or not. Further, trustees only face a vote on their individual performance, not on specific policy issues that they were entrusted to deal with. It makes little sense to view the Citizens’ Assembly as a body of trustees from the start. Instead, when taking into account the referendum, the Assembly should be viewed as a body that has been transformed from a body of delegates into a body of trustees, by virtue of their added sophistication.
Ultimately, “The more a theorist sees representatives as superior in wisdom and expertise to their constituents, the more he will stress the need for independent judgment […] there is no point in counting noses accurately among the constituents if the question is a technical one calling for expertise.” (Pitkin 20) This expertise, gained through study and contemplation on the subject, places greater importance on the need for representatives to be independent in their thought and actions. Thus, a dichotomy emerges for the legitimacy of the Citizens’ Assembly: the Assembly remains uneducated (or rather, untainted) and their proposal goes to referendum, or, the members continue with their regimen of lectures but are granted more independence in their decision-making power, e.g. their recommendation goes to the Legislature instead of the general public. These are obviously both hypothetical scenarios. The reality at hand maintains that the transformed Assembly is dealing with material that the general public will not be able to handle on a policy-level yes/no vote. Montesquieu, on representatives, states, “The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.” (Montesquieu 176) In this case, it makes little sense to take these detailed public affairs to the public for approval when it is difficult enough for them to participate in the deliberation with Assembly members who underwent months of specialized training.
The Assembly process in itself, however, minus the Learning Phase, can be viewed as an educational experience. In Tocqueville’s assessment of American democracy in New England, he came to the conclusion that, “Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” (Tocqueville 2) His notion of localized deliberating, or “municipal institutions,” helps also to define where the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly is lacking. To contrast the two, municipal institutions of colonial and post-colonial America were a method of direct democracy, where decisions were made by the local community regarding local issues. As if it was their duty, the community as a whole came together to discuss and deliberate voluntarily. The Citizens’ Assembly, however, meets as a group selected randomly by the government.
It should be noted that the Citizens’ Assembly is not entirely without grassroots involvement. The Ontario process has, in between the Learning and Deliberation Phases, a Consultation Phase that allows members of the general public to come forward and make presentations to members of the Citizens’ Assembly before they begin their deliberations. Two points render this consultative phase inferior to that which Tocqueville praises: first, private citizens making presentations are not at the same level as Assembly members since they are separated by months of standardized learning, and second, public deliberation is not ingrained in post-modern democratic citizenship as it was in 18th century America, so the quality of these consultations is not as comprehensive. The purpose of contrasting the Citizens’ Assembly with Tocqueville’s writing is to display that even when regarding the output of educational potential, i.e. the potential these public deliberations have for enlightening and broadening the democratic capacity of the society, the Assembly process is lacking.
For Schumpeter, however, public discourse has the opposite effect. This theory takes a more pessimistic view of human nature, as “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. [The citizen] argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests.” (Schumpeter 262) Along these anti-educational lines, man is more thoughtful and rational when he is introspective rather than when he looks for answers in others. He has more to learn from himself than from others, who tend to reduce his rational ability. At the same time, public reason does not really exist, and consequently there is no accurate way at arriving at a “common good.” In speaking of society, “The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in turn explain the ordinary citizen’s ignorance and lack of judgment in matters of domestic and foreign policy which are if anything more shocking in the case of educated people and of people who are successfully active in non-political walks of life than it is with uneducated people in humble stations.” (Schumpeter 261) The position this theory arrives at is one, when examining the Citizens’ Assembly, which would characterize citizen deliberation as a waste of time. Accordingly, man has little free will and is easily manipulated; citizens are ignorant and superficial, and are easily manipulated by politicians. Thus, the entire Assembly process can be seen as moot: there is no common will to be determined. What is more, the fact that the referendum to ratify the proposal to come out of this Assembly is to take place concurrently with the Ontario General Election characterizes its openness to being politicized by parties and candidates seeking to gain election. In his advocacy for a minimalist government, with periodic votes and such, the only effective form of government is one that is made up of a small number of trustees, and thus education and study can be considered valuable to those few in his minimalist model. Schumpeter would be very critical of the Assembly, its sheer size and scope, and would most likely claim that the members, as well as the citizens voting in the referendum, are vulnerable to manipulation. Within this model, the education the Assembly receives threatens the legitimacy of the Assembly process, but within the context of an already illegitimate form of democracy.
Another theory, by Dewey, asserts that governments are representative simply if they lay claim to standing for the interests of the public. People involved in representative capacities do not lose their human nature and their personal interests and allegiances, viz., “interests of special groups, those of the family, clique or class to which they belong.” (Dewey 76) Here, there is no question whether the Citizens’ Assembly is legitimate or not. The composition of the Assembly itself is one that purports to be representative of regional (one member form each district), gender (divided equally between the sexes), and Aboriginal interests (at least one seat for a citizen of Aboriginal status). This representational cross-section aims to take into account sufficient viewpoint diversity, enlisting a wide range of Ontarians what will provide adequate perspective in drawing conclusions on the subject of electoral reform. Education enters the equation as an external factor that disrupts the Assembly by helping the members shed their personal interests and allegiances. Dewey’s notion of representation is all-encompassing, and the dual capacity he presents for representatives, one as voter and one as a stated official, expands on what has above been deemed a struggle, (ibid.) the delegate vis-à-vis the trustee. But again, education provides a standardizing force that moves members away from their personal allegiances and towards uniformity. Take for instance the fact that the legislation enacted by the Ontario Legislative Assembly requires to apply government-mandated principles and characteristics when assessing electoral systems: legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability. (Ontario Regulation 82/06) Such impositions upon members of the Assembly imply that personal preconditions of thought regarding electoral systems are not welcome. Under the Dewey model, although the system remains legitimate, it strikes an imbalance in the dual mandate of the members which causes them to ward off their viewpoint diversity in favor of commonality.
Deliberative democracy has been studied in philosophical depth relatively recently. This new concentration of study can be seen as a reflection of the evolving nature of democracy, or at the very least, democratic thought. According to Macpherson, democracy has shifted models several times, and is slowly approaching a manifestation in participatory democracy. (Macpherson 22). Although participation does not necessarily require deliberation, deliberation surely requires participation. The foundations of deliberation theory are traced in a desire to provide a rational response to the market-style, competitive, liberal democratic elements of society that usually result in “bargaining equilibrium.” (Bohman 400) Instead, consensus and agreement is sought. Williams discusses an abandonment of these same market-style ideals, what she terms “liberal representation,” as problems are found with the greater divisions and marginalization that result. (Williams 7) Consequently, “Because the processes that constitute political representation are complex, any theory of fair representation must be similarly complex.” (Williams 8) Education has a considerable position to fulfill in deliberative democratic theory as it has the greatest ability to influence many political actors, and, as a result, political outcomes. The rest of this discussion will focus on the implications of education within deliberative democratic theories of representation.
Embodying the “will of the people” is the aim of deliberative democracy, in which public reason is the highest ideal. (Bohman 401) Continuing Williams’ maxim, Bohman claims that deliberation is a complex idea, a concept that is rooted in public reason. He also recognizes the problem of liberal representation: “The problem is that the state is structured around the pressure to make a timely decision and to perform particular functions in complex societies.” (Bohman 414) Modern states have grown into organisms with such large bureaucracies that the slowly but surely attitude of public deliberation would not be sufficient for the fast-paced approach modern governments have come to adopt. As such, “the only feasible form of deliberation occurs in the interaction between formally organized institutional decision-making mechanisms and informal and ‘anonymous’ debates and discussion in the public sphere.” (Bohman 414-15) Thus, under Bohman’s theory, the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly may gain legitimacy after all. The Assembly can be seen as an embodiment of this personal interaction between the government and its public. The “will of the people” is collected (Consultation Phase) and organized (Deliberation Phase) until the members of the Assembly reach a consensus on the public’s behalf (Final Report). But the public is not actually engaged in any of the deliberation. The extent to which public consensus is sought comes in the form of a double majority that is required when the Assembly’s proposal is made available at the polls for ratification. This is not exactly the version of public deliberation that Bohman, or any other deliberative democracy theorists, have in mind. Deliberative democracy is the New England town meeting transformed to a larger scale. Perhaps public discourse can be embodied in public education campaigns. If the Assembly, by means of public education, can convince the public to be on side with their proposed reforms, then this might be considered public deliberation. Theoretically the Assembly should not have much of a problem convincing the public of anything, since it in itself is a cross-section of the public. But again the problem of an educated Assembly arises: is the government trying to create dialogue with the public, or is it appointing a random few to be groomed to be able to deliberate at the government’s level? Or, perhaps the members’ education puts them in a better position to engage their fellow citizens. Whether or not this is the case, their fellow citizens are not being persuaded one way or another within this process. The nature of the Assembly process is to foster enough discussion between Assembly members, with merely input from self-selecting members of the public, in order to produce recommendations that the general public will find palatable. Unfortunately, the degree to which public engagement occurs is quite limited.
Gutmann and Thompson seek out to diminish the deliberative deficit that exists in liberal democracy. (Gutmann and Thompson 12) Deliberation is a way citizens can go on living with their moral disagreements. To them, the absence of deliberation means that, “citizens cannot even provisionally justify many controversial procedures and constitutional rights to one another.” (Gutmann and Thompson 18) In essence, deliberation is a necessity in a healthy democracy, one that is naturally stricken with divisions and differences along moral lines. Several principles are identified here that aim to foster deliberation: reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity. These principles serve as conditions for healthy deliberation to take place, and by no means can be forced upon a public. A society, however, can take steps to foster these ideals, e.g. penalizing those who violate the notion of basic liberty, but the only way of encouraging such considerations is through public education. These principles seem to parallel the ideals set forth by the Ontario Legislature as principles to guide the Assembly in their assessment of electoral systems. But the fact that these principles can only be encouraged in the general public and not instituted (anything otherwise would be a treat to liberty) means that true public deliberation among all citizens is a mere dream. At most, a compromise between democratic proceduralism and deliberation democracy can be envisioned. In this way, education can be incorporated into procedure, but insofar as it is not used as a mechanism for social conditioning.
“Actual deliberation […] encourages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens […] if they were all living in an ideal society.” (Gutmann and Thompson 16) The theorists offer an account that makes citizen deliberation an alternative to hypothetical deliberation. When applied to the Citizens’ Assembly, citizen deliberation is all hypothetical: electoral systems are a very intangible concept that can be only be brought closer to home by means of education. It is through education that the citizen gains a greater understanding but also develops a closer connection to his representation and the representation of society. Citizens’ moral understandings belong to the realm of self-interest, but it is very difficult to attach (or extract) self-interest from a sphere that is not within the grasp of most, except when it comes time to mark an “X” every now and then. Education, therefore, makes deliberating electoral politics within reach of the public, allowing them to make it their self-interest. But the Citizens’ Assembly falls short in this regard, also. Aside, from a consultation guide that is available online, aptly titled “Citizens Talking to Citizens,” very little has been invested in communicating or making available educational materials for the general public.
Education is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can empower citizens to the level of participating in deliberative democracy. On the other, it makes citizen representatives illegitimate in their responsibility to accurately reflect their fellow citizens. Pericles made the claim, “instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.” (op. cit.) For most of these theorists, discussion adds to the democratic side of the equation. The Citizens’ Assembly, overall, is an exercise remarkable for its openness and good intentions. Unfortunately, when political scientists get involved, the world is turned on its side. From this end of observation, its legitimacy is threatened by the use of education as an antecedent, and the lack of education in the public realm makes its deliberative legitimacy powerless.
Bohman, James. “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, 4, 400-425.
Dewey, John. (1954, 1927). The Public and its Problems. Athens: Ohio University Press. 75-142.
Election Act, Ontario Regulation 82/06, Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press. 1-51.
Macpherson, C.B. (1977). The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. 9-22.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. (1748). The Spirit of Laws. Tr. Thomas Nugent. (1752). Kitchener: Batoche Books. 171-184. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. (1969). “Introduction: The Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Pitkin. New York: Atherton Press. 1-23.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 250-283.
Thucydides. Pericles’ Funeral Oration. Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. (1835) Book I, Chapter V: “Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States Before That of the Union at Large,” in Democracy in America. Tr. Henry Reeve. (1899). Accessed on December 3, 2006 from here.
Williams, Melissa S. (1998). Voice, Trust, and Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-22, 203-243.
