Sunday, December 03, 2006
How Deliberative is the Citizens' Assembly?
The subject of this paper is deliberative democracy and the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (CA), or rather how well is the former reflected in the latter. In particular, the scope of this analysis is limited to evaluating the way that the CA incorporates the principles that are essential to deliberative citizen bodies established for the purpose of finding a particular solution to a given problem. In this way I begin by adopting a premise that citizen assemblies are beneficial to democracy as they are able to fill in the gap where ordinary representative institutions are not up to the task or, to say more accurately, leave much to desire. Having said that, however, my approach consists in a critical reflection on the Assembly’s function as a deliberative body. In undertaking this evaluation of the CA as a deliberative democratic institution, I will examine firstly, to what extent its set-up reflects a deliberative citizen body, secondly, whether it is representative enough for the purpose of achieving its end, and thirdly, to what extent its structure of the decision-making process conforms to the principles of deliberative democracy. As a result of this investigation, I will develop an argument which admits that, although the CA is involved in an admirable undertaking as it does constitute a citizen body, its inadequate representation of Ontarians and the overall structural scheme denies the possibility of effective deliberation on the subject of electoral reform.
Deliberative Citizen Bodies
It needs clarification what is meant by a deliberative body compromised of citizens. Most recently these bodies have been referred to as “mini-publics”, however, just over a decade earlier, a prominent political theorist of the 20th century, Robert Dahl, in Democracy and Its Critics envisioned a concept of “a ‘minipopulus’ consisting of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos… [whose] task would be to deliberate, for a year perhaps, on the issue and then to announce its choice” (Dahl 1989, p.342). Such citizen bodies were envisioned by Dahl and later by more contemporary writers as supplementary to the instilled legislature arrangement within a democracy, although its function as an institution could vary, in general “ordinary institutions of representative democracy generally remain sovereign, such that micro-deliberative mechanisms merely provide inputs into them” (Goodin 2006, p.200). Following Dahl, Archon Fung takes a more encompassing view of mini-publics that include the likes of town meetings that are self-selective and are generally characterized by “reformist thinking”. On this view, deliberative citizen bodies are able to improve the public sphere by allowing for “actual constructive efforts for civic participation and public deliberation” on the micro level, as well as effectively institutionalize public deliberation on the macro level (Fung 2003, p.339). This latter effect of the mini-publics, however, is outside of the scope of my analysis since it remains to be established, as the various ways of achieving this end is discussed by Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek in “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics”.
Another aspect of citizen bodies incorporated in the idea of the mini-publics is the concept of deliberative democracy, which is at the locus of their function that makes up the theoretical principles of such assemblies’ decision-making process. In particular, deliberative democracy necessarily involves finding a solution to moral disagreements by engaging in a process of reasoning that in the end produces “mutually acceptable decisions” (Gutmann 1996, p.1). Originating from the proponents of ‘critical theory’ coming from the Frankfurt school of thought, Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ greatly shaped deliberative democracy at its early stages of analytical development, which contended that instead of the process of aggregating interests, politics should consist in rational discussion that through reason and argumentation would result in unanimous preferences (Elster 1986, p.112). More recently, in their examination of the “substance of deliberation” in Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson identify the three fundamental principles of deliberative democracy as being reciprocity, publicity, and accountability (Gutmann 1996, p.12). Accordingly, with regards to the first of these principles, “when citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). The second principle of publicity is essential to dealing with moral disagreement in politics, as it allows for conflict resolution by making the debate accessible to the public at large that is in turn able to engage in the process of deliberation. Thirdly, accountability involves the agents of deliberation (i.e. citizens) to be held responsible to one another for their political actions (Gutmann 1996, p.15). As a result, deliberative democracy involves different premises than ordinary representative democracy, as the former reflects a more reasons-based approach to politics that is underpinned by the requirements of reason, reciprocity, and a more encompassing conception of public involvement in political issues.
Consequently, as part of my evaluation of the CA’s function as a citizen body that makes use of deliberative democracy, I will use the criteria of mini-publics that attempt to incorporate the essential principles of deliberation. In regards to whether the CA’s actually properly constitute a citizen body I will consider how well it fits into the conception of a mini-public. Secondly, I will examine how representative is the CA with respect to its task of electoral reform in the existing context of its supplementary role in ordinary (representative) democracy. Finally, with respect to how well the structure of its decision-making process reflects deliberative democracy, I will consider whether the CA’s overall scheme facilitates the use of reasons instead of the aggregation of interests.
Citizens’ Assembly as a Mini-Public
I answer the question of whether the CA properly reflects a mini-public with an overwhelming affirmative. In accordance with Fung’s analysis of the types of institutional designs for citizen bodies, a mini-public can be set up in four different ways: as an educative forum, participatory advisory panel, participatory problem-solving collaboration, and as participatory democratic governance (Fung 2003, p.340-342). Using these categories as an analytical framework for determining the function of a given mini-public, I will proceed to show that the CA embraces Fung’s second (advisory) institutional design, which in turn situates it as a deliberative citizen body.
To begin with, some explanation is needed in order to show how the other three views of deliberative citizen bodies do not apply to the institutional design of the CA. With regards to mini-public being an educative forum, a vision is “to create nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues through conversations with one another” (Fung 2003, p.340). To this end, the CA only partially reflects such conditions as its underlining purpose is not to facilitate a better understanding of various electoral systems by the citizens, but rather the education phase is only instrumental to the overall end of recommending a new system for Ontario. Alternatively, a mini-public that is set up as a participatory problem-solving collaboration would constitute “a continuous and symbolic relationship between the state and the public sphere aimed at solving particular collective problems…[as] citizens and officials through participatory deliberation, may invent novel solutions” (Fung 2003, p.341). As such, the CA does not embrace this end as its task does not involve any collaboration with government or politicians in general, as its work does not reflect a joint effort with members of the political community, while the simple act of parliamentary legislation that set up this Assembly cannot be understood to mean a shared undertaking since the sole responsibility of devising a new electoral system is placed entirely on the citizen body. Lastly, on the forth vision of mini-publics, participatory democratic governance refers to “…[a] more ambitious [view] than the other three [which]…seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices into the determination of policy agendas [and thereby]…injecting direct, mobilized, deliberative citizen participation into democratic governance” (Fung 2003, p.342). The CA, however, is only limited to a single policy of devising electoral reform rather than engaging in a whole range of public policies, and even within that narrow field its decision solely involves a recommendation that in the end has to be voted on in the referendum thereby making this citizen body non-authoritative in nature.
Having illustrated how the CA does not fit into any of the three above-mentioned categories of institutional design, I will now establish how it does reflect a mini-public by constituting a participatory advisory panel. Under this conception of a mini-public, the aim is “...not only to improve the quality of opinion [through the processes of education and deliberation], but also to align public policies with considered preferences [in order]...to transmit preferences after they have been appropriately articulated and combined into a social choice” (Fung 2003, p.341). Under this institutional design, a mini-public therefore takes on a supplementary role to the established dominant democratic arrangement, as it is used for the purpose of inputting citizens’ preferences on a given issue. With respect to electoral reform, the CA was set up in this fashion by the provincial government which in turn enacted Assembly’s authority on providing a concrete recommendation, if one is thought to be needed, on the question of changing the province’s current electoral system. The reason that the CA can only be considered an advisory deliberative body is that its decision would not carry any force without passing a referendum, the criteria of which is yet to be determined by another piece of government legislation. The key point here is that the CA’s role is only limited to giving a recommendation, which is itself conditional provided that is approved by the general public in a referendum that is to be formulated by parliament. The overall purpose of setting up such mini-publics, aside from the desired effect of soliciting citizen input, is also for government to solidify its own legitimacy (Fung 2003, p.341). Having said that, the CA therefore properly reflects a deliberative citizen body as it in fact conforms to a conception of a mini-public as a participatory advisory panel.
Citizens’ Assembly as a Representative Body
Next in the investigation, I turn to the question of whether the CA is a representative body in a sense that is required in order to give an expressed recommendation on the issue of electoral reform that is representative of Ontarians. In order to do this, however, a working definition of representation is needed. As a result, I turn to Hannah Pitkin who articulated a general definition of the term that she has to taken to mean ‘re-presentation’, which stands for the act of:
...making present something absent – but not making it literally present. It must be made present indirectly, through an intermediary; it must be made present in some
sense, while nevertheless remaining literally absent. But this basic idea can take very different forms, depending on what kind of thing is being made present, by what sort
of intermediary, in what sense, under what circumstances (Pitkin 1969, p.16).
Thus, in using Pitkin’s conception of representation for the purpose of this analysis, it remains to be established how the context of the CA shapes the form of representation that is needed. In developing the understanding of what exactly is made present within the scope of the Assembly’s undertaking, it is necessary to consider the task at hand that such mini-public is set up to accomplish. Thus, since its underlining task is to devise a recommendation after considering various electoral options that presupposes some degree of deliberation, the object of representation therefore has to depend on the actual process undertaken by members of the Assembly, which consists in citizens’ engagement with information. As a result, what needs to be made present is the way that Ontario’s public would react to certain electoral systems based both on their individual and collective conceptions of the good of the province. Members of the Assembly therefore have to be representative in order to account for the way that Ontarians in general would consider the issue of electoral reform.
Next, having established that the object of representation within the context of the CA is the point of view of Ontario’s citizens in regards to changes to their electoral system, I will go on to consider how representation of this kind is necessary in order to allow deliberation, and whether in this respect the Assembly is in fact representative enough. Beginning with figuring out a connection between representation on the one hand and deliberation on the other within the mini-publics, I contend that the outcome of the latter is legitimized by the fairness of the former. This therefore raises the question how fairly does the CA represent the citizens of Ontario, which regrettably enough cannot be completely settled without appealing to some doctrine of fairness, which is in itself prone to generate much disagreement. Perhaps the only possible way to assure fairness of representation is to pursue the policy implemented by the facilitators of the CA, who chose to correct the problems of total randomness by especially including members of minorities in order to reflect province’s diversity. In accordance with this approach, a “solution is to choose specific participants who demographically mirror the general population [or engage in]...affirmative action through recruitment” (Fung 2003, p.342).
Even though the question of establishing a particular factor to determine Assembly’s fairness of representation is in itself highly controversial, perhaps then the only criterion that could signify some degree of representation is the fact that all 103 electoral districts are represented within the CA. This, however, raises two major problems. Firstly, is the issue of voluntariness, as all of the members of the Assembly agreed to participate in their undertaking out of their own free will after having been randomly chosen from the voting list. Secondly, there is further an issue regarding the use of previously instituted geographical districts associated with the current electoral system that is subject to reform, which would in turn render a non-proportional representation of riding populations. As a result, members of the Assembly can be conceived not only to be largely made-up of ‘interested’ and ‘free’ individuals, but also be over-represented by members of the less populated electoral districts at the expense of more crowded urban ridings. Consequently, together these two problems have the effect of undermining the fairness of representation with the CA.
Having said that, it remains to be seen whether this lack of fairness within the make-up of the Assembly would adversely impact its ability to be representative of the views of Ontarians on the question of electoral reform. To answer this question, I return to my assertion that, in the context of a mini-public, fair citizen representation legitimizes the result of its deliberation. Building on this view, a point can be made that since the Assembly involves the representation of citizen views, which underpin the process of deliberation, an unfair representation of these views would undermine the legitimacy of the deliberation process. As a result, a conclusion can be drawn that, since the Assembly is in some respects unrepresentative of the views of Ontarians, the outcome of deliberation undertaken by the CA will therefore be illegitimate in these respects.
I expect this part of my argument to come as a shock to the proponents of mini-publics like Mark B. Brown who considers citizen assemblies to embody representation, as in his view:
Seen as representative institutions in themselves, the potential contribution of citizen panels to representative democracy resides primarily in the expertise and
resemblance elements of democratic representation and to a lesser extent in the participation and accountability elements (Brown 2006, p.221).
As my analysis of the CA has indicated, however, specifically in the context of electoral reform, the mini-public in question lacks sufficient representation to legitimize its deliberation outcome due to the existing issues of members’ voluntariness and the use of non-proportional geographic districts, which together neglects ‘to make present’ the overall views of Ontarians within the Assembly. As a result, the CA does not construe a representative body, which thereby undercuts the possibility of effective and legitimate deliberation.
The Structure of Deliberation within the Citizens’ Assembly
Turning to the question of how the structure of the CA reflects deliberative democracy, I will examine whether the Assembly’s scheme is able to facilitate the use of reason or is it rather used to aggregate interests. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this part of the investigation is quite hypothetical since the actual deliberation by the Assembly is yet to begin. Having said that, I base my analysis on the general set-up of the CA’s future deliberation process, which is aimed specifically at producing a new electoral system for Ontario.
I begin with a few words on the deliberative process that will be undertaken by the CA. As the education phase came to a close, 2007 will witness the Assembly’s deliberation phase. Thus, having obtained all of the necessary background information on various electoral systems, the CA will begin deliberations for the purpose of devising a new electoral system. Its approach, as it is now intended on, will consist of small group discussions on the subject of which of the nine decided-upon principles should be considered in the development of a new system. As a result, legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability, along with simplicity and practicality all have to be considered as viable options. Following this initial period of deliberation, the members of the Assembly will go on to vote for their top three principles that would consequently shape electoral reform. Finally, at the end of this so-called deliberation phase, the Assembly will once again engage in discussion this time to specifically work out the details of a new system, which in the end will once again be approved by a vote.
Getting into the analysis of this future deliberation process, it remains to be established whether its structure in fact properly reflects deliberation. In accordance with the general deliberative democracy model, “the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens’ reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonable agree with them” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). In this regard, I contend that the CA’s procedural reliance on some voting formula in order to reach its decision would undercut its overall character of deliberation, as making use of some degree of majority vote inherently undermines what Habermas conceived as “the force of the better argument” (Fung 2003, p.344) and replaces it with the force of numbers. By misplacing the use of reason with voting in order to reach its final outcome, the CA therefore abandons deliberative democracy and in its place adopts what I would call an ‘educated democratic approach’ to decision-making which is characterized by preceding education and discussion. In the process of voting, members of the Assembly thereby give up the deliberative technique of persuasion through reason and instead adopt a model of preference aggregation. In light of the fact that ultimately it is the vote that will decide the outcome of their decision, the Assembly is necessarily led to engage in a process of reconciling the differences of values that emerge out of this principles-based approach to the issue of electoral reform that ultimately requires building a compromise in order to accommodate diverging points of view, and which results in the aggregation of citizens’ preferences. As a result, to take the view that the CA constitutes a truly deliberative body would be construed as wishful thinking provided that voting is taken as the ultimate mode of reaching a decision.
The procedure adopted by the CA therefore incorporates deliberation only at the pre-voting stage of its deliberation phase, which would facilitate dialogue between the citizens based on reason. This narrow appropriation of deliberative democracy, however, comes short of truly allowing the CA to have a deliberative structure. Although, as pointed out by Fung “discussion may help individual participants to clarify their own views”, as “they may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and information to be pooled together” (Fung 2003, p.344), I nonetheless maintain that the structure of the CA’s process of decision-making does not qualify as a fully deliberative scheme. James Bohman expresses the strictly deliberative structure as involving ‘ideal procedure’, which he finds
…useful in making the normative feature of consensus explicit: reasoning in a procedure that embodies norms of freedom, equality, and publicity would produce (under
further ideal conditions of full information, absence of time constraints and so on) an outcome that everyone in principle could accept. By virtue of these ideal procedural
conditions, the decision reached is fair and one that all could accept (Bohman 1998, p.402).
Using this comprehensive conception of deliberative procedure as a reference point, my contention that the CA lacks proper deliberation is further strengthened. Accordingly, it is evidently clear that the Assembly does not even come close to embodying this enlightened understanding of deliberative procedure. The use of a vote as the mode of decision-making single-handedly constitutes a breach of the deliberative structure by putting an end to giving reasons as the ultimate determinant of outcomes. As a result, a conclusion here is that the CA does not reflect a deliberative structure of reaching a decision.
Final Remarks
Having first established that the CA was in fact set-up as a deliberative body as it reflects a foundation of a mini-public by being an advisory participatory panel, I then analyzed Assembly’s level of representation and deliberativeness of its overall structure. As a result of this investigation, it was uncovered that despite appearances the Assembly is not a representative institution, while its structure does not construe deliberation in the proper sense of the term, which together suggest that in actuality this citizen body does not constitute a deliberative institution. What is important to realize in light of this conclusion, however, is that in stating that the CA is not deliberative enough, a further deduction begs to be made on the possibility of implementing deliberative democracy in the context of a pluralist geographically-dispersed society like Ontario and not to mention Canada. The result of this lengthy analysis therefore reflects a kind of a lesson that is to be learned from the CA, which signals in the direction that the application of deliberative democracy (through the forum of mini-publics or in general) is highly unlikely given its idealistic conditions. By taking this approach to politics seriously, however, a body politik has to be prepared to abandon its ordinary conceptions of fairness of representation and the methodology of voting as a settlement of disputes, since adopting deliberation as the mode of decision-making would require considerably more from the citizens than it is conceivable possible within the scope of contemporary society. On that note, perhaps it could be admitted that deliberative citizen bodies like the CA nonetheless reflect a better approach to democracy. I, however, would caution anyone from considering this progressive formulation of engaging decision-making scheme as a true formulation of deliberative democracy, as the proper use of deliberation would require us to fully abandon aggregation preferences in the context of reconciling divergent interests.
Bibliography
James Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1998): 400-425.
Mark B. Brown, “Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2006): 203-225.
Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).
Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in J. Elster & A. Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 104-132.
Archon Fung, “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2003): 338-367.
Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics,” Politics & Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006): 219-244.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press, 1996).
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “Introduction: the Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Hannah Pitkin (Atherton Press, 1969), 1-23.
Deliberative Citizen Bodies
It needs clarification what is meant by a deliberative body compromised of citizens. Most recently these bodies have been referred to as “mini-publics”, however, just over a decade earlier, a prominent political theorist of the 20th century, Robert Dahl, in Democracy and Its Critics envisioned a concept of “a ‘minipopulus’ consisting of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos… [whose] task would be to deliberate, for a year perhaps, on the issue and then to announce its choice” (Dahl 1989, p.342). Such citizen bodies were envisioned by Dahl and later by more contemporary writers as supplementary to the instilled legislature arrangement within a democracy, although its function as an institution could vary, in general “ordinary institutions of representative democracy generally remain sovereign, such that micro-deliberative mechanisms merely provide inputs into them” (Goodin 2006, p.200). Following Dahl, Archon Fung takes a more encompassing view of mini-publics that include the likes of town meetings that are self-selective and are generally characterized by “reformist thinking”. On this view, deliberative citizen bodies are able to improve the public sphere by allowing for “actual constructive efforts for civic participation and public deliberation” on the micro level, as well as effectively institutionalize public deliberation on the macro level (Fung 2003, p.339). This latter effect of the mini-publics, however, is outside of the scope of my analysis since it remains to be established, as the various ways of achieving this end is discussed by Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek in “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics”.
Another aspect of citizen bodies incorporated in the idea of the mini-publics is the concept of deliberative democracy, which is at the locus of their function that makes up the theoretical principles of such assemblies’ decision-making process. In particular, deliberative democracy necessarily involves finding a solution to moral disagreements by engaging in a process of reasoning that in the end produces “mutually acceptable decisions” (Gutmann 1996, p.1). Originating from the proponents of ‘critical theory’ coming from the Frankfurt school of thought, Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ greatly shaped deliberative democracy at its early stages of analytical development, which contended that instead of the process of aggregating interests, politics should consist in rational discussion that through reason and argumentation would result in unanimous preferences (Elster 1986, p.112). More recently, in their examination of the “substance of deliberation” in Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson identify the three fundamental principles of deliberative democracy as being reciprocity, publicity, and accountability (Gutmann 1996, p.12). Accordingly, with regards to the first of these principles, “when citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). The second principle of publicity is essential to dealing with moral disagreement in politics, as it allows for conflict resolution by making the debate accessible to the public at large that is in turn able to engage in the process of deliberation. Thirdly, accountability involves the agents of deliberation (i.e. citizens) to be held responsible to one another for their political actions (Gutmann 1996, p.15). As a result, deliberative democracy involves different premises than ordinary representative democracy, as the former reflects a more reasons-based approach to politics that is underpinned by the requirements of reason, reciprocity, and a more encompassing conception of public involvement in political issues.
Consequently, as part of my evaluation of the CA’s function as a citizen body that makes use of deliberative democracy, I will use the criteria of mini-publics that attempt to incorporate the essential principles of deliberation. In regards to whether the CA’s actually properly constitute a citizen body I will consider how well it fits into the conception of a mini-public. Secondly, I will examine how representative is the CA with respect to its task of electoral reform in the existing context of its supplementary role in ordinary (representative) democracy. Finally, with respect to how well the structure of its decision-making process reflects deliberative democracy, I will consider whether the CA’s overall scheme facilitates the use of reasons instead of the aggregation of interests.
Citizens’ Assembly as a Mini-Public
I answer the question of whether the CA properly reflects a mini-public with an overwhelming affirmative. In accordance with Fung’s analysis of the types of institutional designs for citizen bodies, a mini-public can be set up in four different ways: as an educative forum, participatory advisory panel, participatory problem-solving collaboration, and as participatory democratic governance (Fung 2003, p.340-342). Using these categories as an analytical framework for determining the function of a given mini-public, I will proceed to show that the CA embraces Fung’s second (advisory) institutional design, which in turn situates it as a deliberative citizen body.
To begin with, some explanation is needed in order to show how the other three views of deliberative citizen bodies do not apply to the institutional design of the CA. With regards to mini-public being an educative forum, a vision is “to create nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues through conversations with one another” (Fung 2003, p.340). To this end, the CA only partially reflects such conditions as its underlining purpose is not to facilitate a better understanding of various electoral systems by the citizens, but rather the education phase is only instrumental to the overall end of recommending a new system for Ontario. Alternatively, a mini-public that is set up as a participatory problem-solving collaboration would constitute “a continuous and symbolic relationship between the state and the public sphere aimed at solving particular collective problems…[as] citizens and officials through participatory deliberation, may invent novel solutions” (Fung 2003, p.341). As such, the CA does not embrace this end as its task does not involve any collaboration with government or politicians in general, as its work does not reflect a joint effort with members of the political community, while the simple act of parliamentary legislation that set up this Assembly cannot be understood to mean a shared undertaking since the sole responsibility of devising a new electoral system is placed entirely on the citizen body. Lastly, on the forth vision of mini-publics, participatory democratic governance refers to “…[a] more ambitious [view] than the other three [which]…seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices into the determination of policy agendas [and thereby]…injecting direct, mobilized, deliberative citizen participation into democratic governance” (Fung 2003, p.342). The CA, however, is only limited to a single policy of devising electoral reform rather than engaging in a whole range of public policies, and even within that narrow field its decision solely involves a recommendation that in the end has to be voted on in the referendum thereby making this citizen body non-authoritative in nature.
Having illustrated how the CA does not fit into any of the three above-mentioned categories of institutional design, I will now establish how it does reflect a mini-public by constituting a participatory advisory panel. Under this conception of a mini-public, the aim is “...not only to improve the quality of opinion [through the processes of education and deliberation], but also to align public policies with considered preferences [in order]...to transmit preferences after they have been appropriately articulated and combined into a social choice” (Fung 2003, p.341). Under this institutional design, a mini-public therefore takes on a supplementary role to the established dominant democratic arrangement, as it is used for the purpose of inputting citizens’ preferences on a given issue. With respect to electoral reform, the CA was set up in this fashion by the provincial government which in turn enacted Assembly’s authority on providing a concrete recommendation, if one is thought to be needed, on the question of changing the province’s current electoral system. The reason that the CA can only be considered an advisory deliberative body is that its decision would not carry any force without passing a referendum, the criteria of which is yet to be determined by another piece of government legislation. The key point here is that the CA’s role is only limited to giving a recommendation, which is itself conditional provided that is approved by the general public in a referendum that is to be formulated by parliament. The overall purpose of setting up such mini-publics, aside from the desired effect of soliciting citizen input, is also for government to solidify its own legitimacy (Fung 2003, p.341). Having said that, the CA therefore properly reflects a deliberative citizen body as it in fact conforms to a conception of a mini-public as a participatory advisory panel.
Citizens’ Assembly as a Representative Body
Next in the investigation, I turn to the question of whether the CA is a representative body in a sense that is required in order to give an expressed recommendation on the issue of electoral reform that is representative of Ontarians. In order to do this, however, a working definition of representation is needed. As a result, I turn to Hannah Pitkin who articulated a general definition of the term that she has to taken to mean ‘re-presentation’, which stands for the act of:
...making present something absent – but not making it literally present. It must be made present indirectly, through an intermediary; it must be made present in some
sense, while nevertheless remaining literally absent. But this basic idea can take very different forms, depending on what kind of thing is being made present, by what sort
of intermediary, in what sense, under what circumstances (Pitkin 1969, p.16).
Thus, in using Pitkin’s conception of representation for the purpose of this analysis, it remains to be established how the context of the CA shapes the form of representation that is needed. In developing the understanding of what exactly is made present within the scope of the Assembly’s undertaking, it is necessary to consider the task at hand that such mini-public is set up to accomplish. Thus, since its underlining task is to devise a recommendation after considering various electoral options that presupposes some degree of deliberation, the object of representation therefore has to depend on the actual process undertaken by members of the Assembly, which consists in citizens’ engagement with information. As a result, what needs to be made present is the way that Ontario’s public would react to certain electoral systems based both on their individual and collective conceptions of the good of the province. Members of the Assembly therefore have to be representative in order to account for the way that Ontarians in general would consider the issue of electoral reform.
Next, having established that the object of representation within the context of the CA is the point of view of Ontario’s citizens in regards to changes to their electoral system, I will go on to consider how representation of this kind is necessary in order to allow deliberation, and whether in this respect the Assembly is in fact representative enough. Beginning with figuring out a connection between representation on the one hand and deliberation on the other within the mini-publics, I contend that the outcome of the latter is legitimized by the fairness of the former. This therefore raises the question how fairly does the CA represent the citizens of Ontario, which regrettably enough cannot be completely settled without appealing to some doctrine of fairness, which is in itself prone to generate much disagreement. Perhaps the only possible way to assure fairness of representation is to pursue the policy implemented by the facilitators of the CA, who chose to correct the problems of total randomness by especially including members of minorities in order to reflect province’s diversity. In accordance with this approach, a “solution is to choose specific participants who demographically mirror the general population [or engage in]...affirmative action through recruitment” (Fung 2003, p.342).
Even though the question of establishing a particular factor to determine Assembly’s fairness of representation is in itself highly controversial, perhaps then the only criterion that could signify some degree of representation is the fact that all 103 electoral districts are represented within the CA. This, however, raises two major problems. Firstly, is the issue of voluntariness, as all of the members of the Assembly agreed to participate in their undertaking out of their own free will after having been randomly chosen from the voting list. Secondly, there is further an issue regarding the use of previously instituted geographical districts associated with the current electoral system that is subject to reform, which would in turn render a non-proportional representation of riding populations. As a result, members of the Assembly can be conceived not only to be largely made-up of ‘interested’ and ‘free’ individuals, but also be over-represented by members of the less populated electoral districts at the expense of more crowded urban ridings. Consequently, together these two problems have the effect of undermining the fairness of representation with the CA.
Having said that, it remains to be seen whether this lack of fairness within the make-up of the Assembly would adversely impact its ability to be representative of the views of Ontarians on the question of electoral reform. To answer this question, I return to my assertion that, in the context of a mini-public, fair citizen representation legitimizes the result of its deliberation. Building on this view, a point can be made that since the Assembly involves the representation of citizen views, which underpin the process of deliberation, an unfair representation of these views would undermine the legitimacy of the deliberation process. As a result, a conclusion can be drawn that, since the Assembly is in some respects unrepresentative of the views of Ontarians, the outcome of deliberation undertaken by the CA will therefore be illegitimate in these respects.
I expect this part of my argument to come as a shock to the proponents of mini-publics like Mark B. Brown who considers citizen assemblies to embody representation, as in his view:
Seen as representative institutions in themselves, the potential contribution of citizen panels to representative democracy resides primarily in the expertise and
resemblance elements of democratic representation and to a lesser extent in the participation and accountability elements (Brown 2006, p.221).
As my analysis of the CA has indicated, however, specifically in the context of electoral reform, the mini-public in question lacks sufficient representation to legitimize its deliberation outcome due to the existing issues of members’ voluntariness and the use of non-proportional geographic districts, which together neglects ‘to make present’ the overall views of Ontarians within the Assembly. As a result, the CA does not construe a representative body, which thereby undercuts the possibility of effective and legitimate deliberation.
The Structure of Deliberation within the Citizens’ Assembly
Turning to the question of how the structure of the CA reflects deliberative democracy, I will examine whether the Assembly’s scheme is able to facilitate the use of reason or is it rather used to aggregate interests. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this part of the investigation is quite hypothetical since the actual deliberation by the Assembly is yet to begin. Having said that, I base my analysis on the general set-up of the CA’s future deliberation process, which is aimed specifically at producing a new electoral system for Ontario.
I begin with a few words on the deliberative process that will be undertaken by the CA. As the education phase came to a close, 2007 will witness the Assembly’s deliberation phase. Thus, having obtained all of the necessary background information on various electoral systems, the CA will begin deliberations for the purpose of devising a new electoral system. Its approach, as it is now intended on, will consist of small group discussions on the subject of which of the nine decided-upon principles should be considered in the development of a new system. As a result, legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, and accountability, along with simplicity and practicality all have to be considered as viable options. Following this initial period of deliberation, the members of the Assembly will go on to vote for their top three principles that would consequently shape electoral reform. Finally, at the end of this so-called deliberation phase, the Assembly will once again engage in discussion this time to specifically work out the details of a new system, which in the end will once again be approved by a vote.
Getting into the analysis of this future deliberation process, it remains to be established whether its structure in fact properly reflects deliberation. In accordance with the general deliberative democracy model, “the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens’ reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonable agree with them” (Gutmann 1996, p.2). In this regard, I contend that the CA’s procedural reliance on some voting formula in order to reach its decision would undercut its overall character of deliberation, as making use of some degree of majority vote inherently undermines what Habermas conceived as “the force of the better argument” (Fung 2003, p.344) and replaces it with the force of numbers. By misplacing the use of reason with voting in order to reach its final outcome, the CA therefore abandons deliberative democracy and in its place adopts what I would call an ‘educated democratic approach’ to decision-making which is characterized by preceding education and discussion. In the process of voting, members of the Assembly thereby give up the deliberative technique of persuasion through reason and instead adopt a model of preference aggregation. In light of the fact that ultimately it is the vote that will decide the outcome of their decision, the Assembly is necessarily led to engage in a process of reconciling the differences of values that emerge out of this principles-based approach to the issue of electoral reform that ultimately requires building a compromise in order to accommodate diverging points of view, and which results in the aggregation of citizens’ preferences. As a result, to take the view that the CA constitutes a truly deliberative body would be construed as wishful thinking provided that voting is taken as the ultimate mode of reaching a decision.
The procedure adopted by the CA therefore incorporates deliberation only at the pre-voting stage of its deliberation phase, which would facilitate dialogue between the citizens based on reason. This narrow appropriation of deliberative democracy, however, comes short of truly allowing the CA to have a deliberative structure. Although, as pointed out by Fung “discussion may help individual participants to clarify their own views”, as “they may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and information to be pooled together” (Fung 2003, p.344), I nonetheless maintain that the structure of the CA’s process of decision-making does not qualify as a fully deliberative scheme. James Bohman expresses the strictly deliberative structure as involving ‘ideal procedure’, which he finds
…useful in making the normative feature of consensus explicit: reasoning in a procedure that embodies norms of freedom, equality, and publicity would produce (under
further ideal conditions of full information, absence of time constraints and so on) an outcome that everyone in principle could accept. By virtue of these ideal procedural
conditions, the decision reached is fair and one that all could accept (Bohman 1998, p.402).
Using this comprehensive conception of deliberative procedure as a reference point, my contention that the CA lacks proper deliberation is further strengthened. Accordingly, it is evidently clear that the Assembly does not even come close to embodying this enlightened understanding of deliberative procedure. The use of a vote as the mode of decision-making single-handedly constitutes a breach of the deliberative structure by putting an end to giving reasons as the ultimate determinant of outcomes. As a result, a conclusion here is that the CA does not reflect a deliberative structure of reaching a decision.
Final Remarks
Having first established that the CA was in fact set-up as a deliberative body as it reflects a foundation of a mini-public by being an advisory participatory panel, I then analyzed Assembly’s level of representation and deliberativeness of its overall structure. As a result of this investigation, it was uncovered that despite appearances the Assembly is not a representative institution, while its structure does not construe deliberation in the proper sense of the term, which together suggest that in actuality this citizen body does not constitute a deliberative institution. What is important to realize in light of this conclusion, however, is that in stating that the CA is not deliberative enough, a further deduction begs to be made on the possibility of implementing deliberative democracy in the context of a pluralist geographically-dispersed society like Ontario and not to mention Canada. The result of this lengthy analysis therefore reflects a kind of a lesson that is to be learned from the CA, which signals in the direction that the application of deliberative democracy (through the forum of mini-publics or in general) is highly unlikely given its idealistic conditions. By taking this approach to politics seriously, however, a body politik has to be prepared to abandon its ordinary conceptions of fairness of representation and the methodology of voting as a settlement of disputes, since adopting deliberation as the mode of decision-making would require considerably more from the citizens than it is conceivable possible within the scope of contemporary society. On that note, perhaps it could be admitted that deliberative citizen bodies like the CA nonetheless reflect a better approach to democracy. I, however, would caution anyone from considering this progressive formulation of engaging decision-making scheme as a true formulation of deliberative democracy, as the proper use of deliberation would require us to fully abandon aggregation preferences in the context of reconciling divergent interests.
Bibliography
James Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1998): 400-425.
Mark B. Brown, “Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2006): 203-225.
Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).
Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in J. Elster & A. Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 104-132.
Archon Fung, “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2003): 338-367.
Robert E. Goodin and John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics,” Politics & Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006): 219-244.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press, 1996).
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “Introduction: the Concept of Representation,” in Representation, ed. Hannah Pitkin (Atherton Press, 1969), 1-23.
